Scr. VI. the Objects of it an additional Claim to Relief and Mercy, over and above what our Fellow-creatures in common have to our Good-will. Liberality and Bounty are exceedingly commendable, and a particular Diftinction in fuch a World as this, where Men fet themfelves to contract their Heart, and close it to all Interefts but their own: It is by no means to be oppofed to Mercy, but always accompanies it: The Distinction between them is only, that the former leads our Thoughts to a more promifcuous and undistinguished Distribution of Favours, to those who are not, as well as those who are neceffitous; whereas the Object of Compaffion is Mifery. But in the Comparison, and where there is not a Poffibility of both, Mercy is to have the Preference: The Affection of Compaffion manifeftly leads us to this Preference. Thus to relieve the Indigent and Distressed, to fingle out the Unhappy, from whom can be expected no Returns either of prefent Entertainment or future Service, for the Objects of our Favours; to efteem a Man's being friendless as a Recommendation; Dejection, and Incapacity of ftrugling through the World, as a Motive for affifting him; in a word, to confider

thefe

thefe Circumstances of Disadvantage, which Ser. VI are ufually thought a fufficient Reafon for Neglect, and overlooking a Perfon, as a Motive for helping him forward: This is the Course of Benevolence which Compaffion marks out and directs us to; This is that Humanity, which is fo peculiarly becoming Nature and Circumftances in this

World,

To these Confiderations, drawn from the Nature of Man, must be added the Reason of the Thing itself we are recommending, which accords to and fhews the fame. For fince it is fo much more in our Power to leffen the Mifery of our Fellow-creatures, than to promote their positive Happiness ; in Cases where there is an Inconsistency, we fhall be likely to do much more Good by setting ourselves to mitigate the former, than by endeavouring to promote the lat ter. Let the Competition be between the Poor and the Rich. It is eafy, you will fay, to fee which will have the Preference, True: But the Question is, which ought to have the Preference? What Proportion is there between the Happiness produced, by doing a Favour to the In

digent,

Ser. VI. digent, and that produced by doing the

fame Favour to one in eafie Circumftances?

It is manifeft, that the Addition of a very large Estate to one who before had an Affluence, will in many Inftances yield him lefs new Enjoyment or Satisfaction, than an ordinary Charity would yield to a neceffitous Perfon. So that it is not only true, that our Nature, i. e. the Voice of God within us, requires the Exercife of Charity and Benevolence in the Way of Compaffion or Mercy, preferably to any other Way; but there is alfo manifeftly much more Good done by the former; or, if you will allow me the Expreffions, more Mifery annihilated, and Happiness created. Charity and Benevolence, and endeavouring to do Good to our Fellow-creatures, be any thing, this Obfervation deserves to be most seriously confidered by all who have to beftow. And it holds with great Exactnefs, when applied to the feveral Degrees of greater and lefs Indigency, throughout the various Ranks in Humane Life; the Happiness or Good produced not being in Proportion to what is bestowed, but in Proportion to this joined with the Need there was of it.

If

It may perhaps be expected, that upon Ser. VI. this Subject Notice fhould be taken of Occafions, Circumstances, and Characters, which feem at once to call forth Affections of different Sorts: Thus Vice may be thought the Object both of Pity and Indignation; Folly, of Pity and of Laughter. How far this is ftrictly true, I fhall not inquire; but only obferve upon the Appearance, how much more Humane it is to yield and give Scope to Affections, which are most directly in Favour of, and friendly towards our Fellow-creatures; and that there is plainly much less Danger of being led wrong by thefe, than by the other.

But notwithstanding all that has been faid in Recommendation of Compaffion, that it is most aimable, moft becoming Humane Nature, and most useful to the World; yet it must be owned, that every Affection, as diftinct from a Principle of Reason, may rife too high, and be beyond its just Proportion: And by means of this one carried too far, a Man throughout his Life is fubject to much more Uneafiness than belongs to his Share; and in particular Instances, it may be in such a Degree, as to incapacitate

Ser. VI. him from affifting the very Person who is the Object of it. But as there are fome who upon Principle fet up for fuppreffing this Affection itself as Weakness, there is also I know not what of Fashion on this Side; and by fome Means or other, the whole World almoft is run into the Extreams of Infenfibility towards the Diftreffes of their Fellow-creatures: So that general Rules and Exhortations must always be on the other Side.

And now to go on to the Ufes we should make of the foregoing Reflections, the further ones they lead to, and the general Temper they have a Tendency to beget in in us. There being that diftinct Affection implanted in the Nature of Man, tending to leffen the Miseries of Life, that particular Provision made for "abating its Sorrows, more than for incrcafing its pofitive Happinefs, as before explained; this may fuggeft to us what fhould be our general Aim refpecting ourselves, in our Paffage through this World Namely, to endeavour chiefly to escape Mifery, keep free from Uncafinefs, Pain, and Sorrow, or to get Relief and Mitigation of them; to propose to our

felves