§. 42. Mental process in voting on legislative and other subjects. One object of reasoning, as stated at the commencement of this chapter, is to produce in the minds of others the conviction, which exists in our own. An important field, therefore, of reasoning is some public assembly; and it is in public assemblies in particular, which have a political or legislative object, that the most memorable displays of this powerful art have been made. With no small degree of justice might the encomium be passed on many other national senates, which Milton has so rightly bestowed on the famed debaters of Athens, "Whose resistless eloquence "Wielded at will that fierce democratie, "Shook the arsenal, and fulmined over Greece But what shall we say of the nature of that conviction, which exists in the minds of the whole assembly? This is a question, which it requires some care to settle. It is a matter of some difficulty to tell precisely, how far the belief of the legislative mass is controlled by evidence, exaggerated and rendered misshapen by feeling. Without, however, entering on this topic, or on various others arising out of the singular exhibition of large assemblies bending before the will of one man, we shall only take time to remark on an opinion relative to the formal decisions of legislatures, which has been offered by Condorcet. We shall come at the views of that writer by taking some familiar instance, where they may be supposed to apply. A proposition in some national legislature, (perhaps whether the independence of some new formed republic shall be acknowledged,) is to be discussed. After a hearing of the debaters and a thorough examination of the subject, the votes are taken, and a majority of them are in favour of the acknowledgement of independence, in the case proposed. Under this general question, the acknowledgment of independence, it is easy to see, that there must be many subordinate propositions, having a connection more or less remote with the general question. The question we suppose to have been decided in the affirmative. Condorcet has expressed an opinion of this kind, that, if the vote were taken on every subordinate proposition, the decision might be directly the reverse, in the negative, instead of the affirmative. But there is reason to believe, that this view of the subject is incorrect. In voting on the general question, every member thus voting virtually gives his opinion also on every subordinate inquiry. There are perhaps five, eight, or ten minor subjects, which it is important for him to examine; and it is only reasonable to suppose, that this has been done, and that he has in his own mind made up an opinion on them. And the last opinion, the opinion on the general question, may properly be considered as involving the comparison, combination, and the just result of all the subordinate or minor decisions. This is sometimes a very rapid mental process, so much so in some cases, as not to be remembered by the voter himself. But, if he be an honest man and desirous to give a judgment, which his own conscience would approve, something of this kind must have taken place. NOTE. There are, in the English language, a number of books of merit on the subject of reasoning in general, and of public debates. (1) Locke's CONDUCT of the UNDERSTANDING; in this work, although it is of less extent and value than his Essay, there are some original and important remarks on demonstrative and other forms of reasoning, on fallacies or sophisms, on the influence of practice,on difference of natural talents, &c. (2) Watt's IMPROVEMENT of the MIND; in respect to this book, it is remarked by Dr. Johnson, that he had perused it with great pleasure, and he further observes, that instructers may be charg ed with deficiency in their duty, if they do not recommend it. The justice of this commendation has generally been acceded to, although more recent inquiries have shown, that some of the views of the mind in the book in question are defective. (3) Gambier's INTRODUCTION to the STUDY OF MORAL EVIDENCE; this valuable treatise, which has been but lately presented to the public, contains many useful directions, relating to moral reasoning, and examines particularly the subject of grounds of belief or evidence.-See also Brucker's History of Philosophy,BK.VII,CH. III; Locke's Essay, BK. IV; Butter's First Truths, Pt. I. CHS. XXI-XXIV; Condillac's, the Port Royal, and Watt's Logic; De Stutt Tracy, (Ideologie,) Pt. II. CHS. 1, 11; Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, BK. I. CH. V. § §. 1, 2; kc. CHAPTER ELEVENTH. EVIDENCE OF TESTIMONY. §. 43. Of the importance of the evidence of testimony and of its perversions. In connection with the general subject of reasoning, we shall not fail to be recompensed by delaying a little, in the further consideration of the subject of HUMAN TESTIMONY, upon which the reasoning process in such a multitude of cases so much depends. Although every person posesses a great fund of evidence in himself, independently of that of testimony, he is confessedly restricted, as to other grounds of belief, by the limits of his mere personal experience. Whereas by means of the evidence of testimony, he is able to call upon, and command the experience of the whole mass of mankind. But the importance of this form of evidence does not depend merely upon its extent; that is to say, on the great multitude of cases merely, where it is susceptible of application. It not only has the merit of influencing our conduct in all our ordinary concerns; but is constantly appealed to in courts of justice, and in the most serious and weighty transactions. Individuals are frequently required to give testimony, which involves, in its results, the reputation, property, and life of their fellows. But it cannot be denied, although we are led by the natural and original impulse of our nature to rely on testimony, that it is from various causes liable to be perplexed and perverted. A perversion of it may even exist without necessarily implying any evil intention on the part of the person who testifies.And hence we are led briefly to prosecute this subject, and to point out some of the causes of mistake from this source, and also their correctives. And it will here be recollected, that the subject of testimony has already been in part examined. (Vol. 1, §.§.92 -97.) It was shown that mankind, as a general statement, rely without hesitation on each other's testimony; the va rious explanations of confidence in testimony were considered; as also the objections, which may be made to such reliance. In the observations made on this last topic,our liability to be led astray by means of testimony was admitted, accompanied with the remark, that it is our duty to take suitable precautions against this liability. It was stated in particular to be consistent with any suitable degree of reliance on testimony to satisfy ourselves, whether the person, who testified, possessed ample means of information; whether he made use of those means, and whether he may not be under the influence of prejudice or passion. And these are some of the topics, which are to be more distinctly attended to in this chapter. §. 44. Of the competency of the person who testifies. Before speaking of those circumstances, which perplex and give a wrong bias to the judgment, a prior inquiry seems to be as to the competency of the witness to form an opinion on that subject, to which his testimony relates. Witnesses sometimes labour under a natural incapacity of judging, which necessarily annuls their testimony. A person, who is deprived of the sense of hearing, is not capable of testifying to the oral assertions of others; and a blind man cannot give testimony on subjects, the knowledge of which necessarily implies the existence of the sense of seeing. The competency of the narrator, therefore, to judge in respect to that subject, on which his testimony is given, is very justly to be examined into. And in the question of competency, we may not only inquire into the capacity, or want of it in the witness; we may further inquire into his opportunities of exercising that capacity, which he is acknowledged to possess. If he testifies, that he saw an object or action, when circumstances positively show, that he had no opportunity of thus seeing, his testimony is as much invalidated, as if he laboured under a natural incapacity of sight. If, for instance, it be necessarily implied in what he says, that he was in a particular place, but on inquiry circumstances satisfactorily show, that he was not there, then evidently he had no opportunity of knowing what he testifies, and his declarations are to be set aside. It is believed, that views of this kind are to be found. in all treatises, the object of which is to settle the principles of Legal Evidence. We accordingly introduce here a passage, which not only goes to show the correctness of this remark, but indicates, moreover, the close connection, which the study of the Mind has with the common and practical concerns of life. "All persons, who are examined as witnesses, must be fully possessed of their understanding, that is, such an understanding as enables them to retain in memory the events of which they have been witnesses, and gives them a knowledge of right and wrong. Idiots and lunatics, while under the influence of their malady, not possessing this share of understanding, are excluded; as are also children of so early an age, as to be incapable of any sense of truth. As a general rule, fourteen is said to be the age at which a child may be a witness, for then all are supposed to have attained a competent knowledge of right and wrong; but short of that age, the receipt or rejection of his testimony must, in every case, depend upon the sense of religion, and apparent understanding of the child, when examined previous to the oath being administered to him. A person, deaf and dumb, if of sense to have intelligence conveyed to him, may be a witness, and give his evidence by signs, through the medium of an interpreter."* Peake's Law of Evidence, Chap. III, §. 1. |
