quiries. Guided by this internal light, the inquirer will find his path consistent amid all its windings, and though it may pass through dark shades and rough declivities, terminating at last in green fields and pleasant streams, where he shall be crowned with quietness and with hon

our.

The opposite of a desire of the truth is a wish to decide the subject of dispute in one way rather than another. The foundation of such a preference of one result to another are in general the prejudices of interest and passion; and these are the great enemies of truth. Whenever we are under their influence, we form a different estimation of testimony and of other sources of evidence from what we should do under other circumstances; and at such times they can hardly fail to lead us to false results.

We have an illustration of the effects of a disputatious spirit, unconnected with any desire of the truth, among the Schoolmen. No persons seem to have been more skilled in the technical forms of argument. To dispute with readiness and skill was considered among them a part of education so valuable, that all possible pains were taken in securing this mental accomplishment. But the acquisition of truth did not form any prominent part of their plan. The subjects, about which they debated, were frivolous; and the spirit, which animated them, exceedingly captious and disingenuous. The testimony of John of Salisbury, a learned man of the Scholastic ages, confirms this. He visited Paris, in the year 1137, and attended upon the lectures of the famous Abelard and other masters, and made great advancements in learning. A number of years afterwards he returned to the place of his early studies, in order to confer with his former associates, who yet remained there, on the topics, on which they had been used to converse.

"I found them (says he) the same men, in the same place; nor had they advanced a single step towards resolving our ancient questions, nor added a single proposition, however small, to their stock of knowledge. Whence I

inferred, what indeed it was easy to collect, that dialectic studies, however useful they may be when connected with other branches of learning, are in themselves barren and useless."It may be briefly added, that the above mentioned rule is important to be observed on all occasions of reasoning whatever, but particularly in public debate; because, in addition to the influence of general interest and passion already alluded to, the presence of others and the love of victory over an opponent too often induce men to forget or to disregard the claims, which truth is always entitled to enforce.

§. 32. (II.) Care to be used in correctly stating the subject of inquiry and discussion.

Another rule in the prosecution of an argument is, that the question under debate is to be fairly and correctly stated. Relying solely on the justice of our cause, and animated by a desire of the truth, we should be unwilling to allow any artifice here.-The matter in controversy may be stated in such a way as to include, in the very enunciation of it, something taken for granted, which must necessarily lead to a decision in favour of one of the opponents. But this amounts to begging the question, a species of fallacy or sophism, upon which we shall again have occasion to remark. Sometimes the subject of discussion is stated so carelessly, that the true point at issue is wholly left out. It may be proper, therefore, in many cases to adopt the practice of special pleaders, and first to ascertain all the points, in which the opponents agree, and those in which they differ. And then they can hardly fail of directing their arguments, to what is truly the subject of contention.

In order that there may not be a possibility of misunderstanding here, dialecticians should aim to have clear ideas of every thing stated in the question, which has an intimate connection with the point at issue. That is, subordinate parts of the question, and even particular words are to be examined. If the statement affirm or deny any thing, in regard to the qualities or properties of material bodies, it is incumbent upon us to possess as clear ideas

as possible, both of the object in general, and of those properties or qualities in particular. Similar remarks will apply to other subjects of inquiry of whatever kind.

As an illustration of these directions, we will suppose, that the point in dispute is, Whether civil government originates in all cases from the people? Here it is necessary to understand what is meant by the word government; that is, whether it is meant to include in the term all the different kinds of public authority, such as absolute, monarchical, and aristocratical, as well as republican, and to give it the most general meaning. The reason of this is, that some might be inclined to say, that purely absolute governments, such as that of the Ottoman Porte, are no governments at all, but merely usurpations or tyranny, and, therefore, ought to be excluded from the inquiry. The meaning of the word, originate, is also to be looked into. We are to know what constitutes a beginning or origin in this case; and particularly whether the term, as here used, implies and admits the validity of a tacit agreement, or not. In the inquiry, it will necessarily be admitted, that many governments exist without any written or express agreement on the part of the people; and still it may be urgently contended, that they have originated by virtue of a tacit agreement, provided it be granted, that there is any such thing as a tacit agreement, which is binding, and which, therefore, can be a ground of existence. or origin. The taking of such precautions would often have prevented great waste of words, as well as undue indulgence of irritable feelings; and would have often led more directly and surely to the discovery of truth.

§. 33. (III.) Consider the kind of evidence applicable to the subject.

As one subject clearly admits of the application of one species of evidence, while another as clearly requires evidence of a different kind, we are thence enabled to lay down this rule, viz., We are to consider what kind of evidence is appropriate to the question under discussion.

When the inquiry is one of a purely abstract nature,

and all the propositions, involved in the reasoning, are of the same kind, then we have the evidence of intuition or intuitive perception; and the conclusion, for reasons already mentioned, is certain.

In the examination of the properties of material bodies, we depend originally on the evidence of the senses; which gives a character and strength to our belief according to the circumstances, under which the objects are presented to them. In judging of those facts in the conduct of men, which have not come under our own observation, we rely on testimony. This source of belief causes probability in a greater or less degree, according as the testimony is from one or more, given by a person, who understands the subject, to which it relates, or not, &c. And again, some subjects admit of the evidence of induction, and in respect to others we have no other aids, than the less authoritative reasonings from analogy. In other cases, the evidence is wholly made up of various incidental circumstances, which are found to have relation to the subject in hand, and which affect the belief in different degrees and for various causes.

And hence as the sources of belief, as well as the belief itself, have an intimate connection with the subject before us, they ought to be taken into consideration. The evidence should be appropriate to the question. But if the question admit of more than one kind of evidence, then all are entitled to their due weight.

§. 34. (IV.) On excluding all unmeaning propositions.

Deeply interested in the subject of discussion, and bent not so much upon putting down your opponent, as the discovery of the truth, avoid the introduction of proppositions, which are destitute of meaning. A proposition is in general said to be without meaning, when it is so stated, that all the information, it gives as a whole, is already contained in one of the parts, viz., the subject.

The first class, answering to this view, may be termed IDENTICAL PROPOSITIONS.-The proposition, WHATEVER IS, 1s, may be given as an instance. When examined, it will

be found to teach us nothing; and although it was in the times of the Scholastic philosophy, employed as an axiom, and thought to be of much consequence in aiding as a medium in argument, the proof, which it brings in any case whatever, amounts to no more than this, that the same word may with certainty be predicated of itself. When we say that man is man, or that blue is blue, we receive as much information and as valuable, as when we say, that whatever is, is; that is, we know no more afterwards than we did before the enunciation of the proposition. The same of all, which belong to this class.

There is a second class of unmeaning propositions, slightly differing in form, from the above, but are the same in substance, viz., THOSE, WHERE A PART ONLY OF

THE COMPLEX IDEA IS PREDICATED OF THE WHOLE.

Hence to this class belong all those, where the genus is predicated of the species; when, for instance, it is said, that lead is a metal. If we know, the meaning of the term, lead, which is the subject of the proposition, we of course know, that it is a metal. The propositions, that gold is yellow, and that man is rational, are of this kind. We are supposed to know the meaning of the separate terms of these propositions; one of these terms is the subject; and this evidently involves and implies the meaning of the proposition, taken as a whole. When, on the contrary, we are told, that man has a notion of God, or that man is cast into sleep by opium, we then learn something, since the ideas here expressed are not contained in the word, man.-When a single word is employed with vagueness and inconsistency, it is rightly considered to be a proper subject of criticism, and may fairly be objected to; and the same liberty, and for the same reasons, may properly be taken with unmeaning propositions, which have the appearance of carrying us onward in the investigation of a subject, but which, when truly estimated, leave us no wiser, than before we heard them.