was required a great variety of parts, and a regular and orderly disposition of those parts, done by chance? Will chance fit means to ends, and that in ten thousand instances, and not fail in any one? How often might a man, after he had jumbled a set of letters in a bag, fling them out upon the ground before they would fall into an exact Poem, yea or so much as make a good discourse in Prose? And may not a little Book be as easily made by chance, as this great volume of the world? How long might a man be in sprinkling colours upon canvass with a careless hand, before they would happen to make the exact picture of a man? And is a man easier made by chance than his picture? How long might twenty thousand blind men, which should be sent out from the several remote parts of England, wander up and down before they would all meet upon Salisbury plains, and fall into rank and file in the exact order of an army? And yet this is much more easy to be imagined, than how the innumerable blind parts of matter should rendezvous themselves into a world. A man, that sees Henry the seventh's chapel at Westminster, might with as good a reason maintain, (yea with much better, considering the vast difference betwixt that little structure and the huge fabric of the world,) that it was never contrived or built by any man, but that the stones did by chance grow into those curious figures into which they seem to have been cut and graven; and that upon a time (as tales usually begin) the materials of that building, the stone, mortar, timber, iron, lead, and glass, happily met together, and very fortunately ranged themselves into that delicate order, in which we see them now so close compacted that it must be a very great chance that parts them again. What would the world think of a man that should advance such an opinion as this, and write a book for it? If they would do him right, they ought to look upon him as mad: but yet with a little more reason than any man can have to say that the world was made by chance : or that the first men grew up out of the earth as plants do now. For can any thing be more ridiculous and against all reason than to ascribe the production of men to

the first fruitfulness of the earth, without so much as one instance and experiment in any age or history to countenance so monstrous a supposition? The thing is at first sight so gross and palpable, that no discourse about it can make it more apparent. And yet these shameful beggars of principles, who give this precarious account of the original of things, assume to themselves to be the men of reason, the great wits of the world, the only cautious and wary persons that hate to be imposed upon; that must have convincing evidence for every thing, and can admit of nothing without a clear demonstration for it."

§. 8. Of differences in the power of reasoning.

The faculty of reasoning exists in different individuals, in very different degrees. There is the same diversity here, which is found to exist in respect to every other mental susceptibility and mental process. In some persons it is not even powerful enough to meet the ordinary exigencies of life, and hardly rescues its possessor from the imputation of idiocy; in others it elevates human nature, and bestows extraordinary grasp and penetration. And between the extremes of extraordinary expansion and marked imbecility, there are multitudes of distinct grades, almost every possible variety.

This difference depends on various causes. -(1) It will depend, in the first place, on the amount of knowledge, which the reasoner possesses. No man can permanently sustain the reputation of great ability in argument, without having previously secured a large fund of knowledge as its basis. And we may add, that no man can reason well on any given subject, unless he has especially prepared himself in reference to that subject. All reasoning implies a comparison of ideas; or more properly a comparison of propositions, or of facts stated in propositions. Of course, where there is no knowledge on any given subject, where there is no accumulation of facts, there can be no possibility of reasoning; and where the knowledge is much limited, the plausibility and power of the argument will be proportionally diminished.

That many speak on subjects, which are proposed to them, without having made any preparation, cannot be denied; but there is a vast difference between noisy, incoherent declamation, and a well-wrought argument, made up of suitable propositions, following each other with a direct and satisfactory reference to the conclusion. In every case of reasoning, the mind passes successively along the various topics, involved in the argument; and in so doing is governed by the principles of association, as we have already had occasion to notice. But what opportunity can there possibly be for the operation of these principles, when the mind is called to fasten itself upon a subject, and to decide upon that subject, without any knowledge of those circumstances, which may be directly embraced in it, or of its relations, and tendencies ?

(2) The power of reasoning will depend, in the second place, on the power of attention and memory.

There are some persons, who seem to have no command of the ATTENTION. Every thing interests them slightly, and nothing in a high degree. They are animated by no strong feeling; and enter into no subject, requiring long-continued and abstract investigation, with a suitable intensity of ardour. A defective remembrance of the numerous facts and propositions, which come under review, is the natural consequence of this. And this necessarily implies a perplexed and diminished power of ratiocination.

(3) A third ground of difference is diversity in the susceptibility of feeling relations. The remark has already been made,(§. 937, Vol. I,) that facts may be accumulated, having close and decisive relations to the points to be proved, but that they can never be so bound together as to result in any conclusion, without a perception or feeling of those relations. But it is well known, whatever it may be owing to, that the relations of objects are much more readily and clearly perceived by some than by others. As, therefore, every train of reasoning implies a succession or series of relative perceptions, a defect in the power of relative suggestion necessarily implies a defect in the rea

soning power. And on the other hand, a great quickness and clearness in the perceptions of relations is necessarily attended,(other things being equal,) with an augmented efficiency of reasoning.

§. 9. Of habits of reasoning.

But whatever may be the mental traits, that render, in particular cases, the reasoning power more or less efficient, its efficacy will undoubtedly depend, in a great degree, on Habit. The effect of frequent practice, resulting in what is termed a HABIT, is often witnessed in those, who follow any mechanic calling, where we find that what was once done with difficulty comes in time to be done with great ease and readiness. The muscles of such persons seem to move with a kind of instinctive facility and accuracy in the performance of those works, to which they have been for a long time addicted.

There is a similar effect of frequent practice in the increase of quickness and facility in our mental operations; and certainly as much so in those, which are implied in reasoning as in any others. If, for instance, a person has never been in the habit of going through geometrical demonstrations, he finds his mind very slowly and with difficulty advancing from one step to another; while on the other hand, a person, who has so often practised this species of argumentation, as to have formed a habit, advances forward from one part of the train of reasoning to another with great rapidity and delight. And the result is the same in any process of moral reasoning. In the prosecution of any argument of a moral nature, there is necessarily a mental perception of the congruity of its several parts, or of the agreement of the succeeding proposition with that, which went before. The degree of readiness in bringing together propositions, and in putting forth such perceptions, will greatly depend on the degree of practice.

§. 10. Of limitations of the power of reasoning.

We shall prosecute these general views of the subject of

reasoning with the further remark, which has perhaps already suggested itself, that this faculty is essentially and permanently circumscribed and limited in certain respects. From the statements, which have been made, it appears, that the great law of association is directly and very effectively concerned in every process of this kind. It is to this law we are indebted for the introduction of propositions, having a bearing upon the subject of inquiry and debate, and suitable to the occasion. We are no more able by a mere act of volition to secure the existence of applicable and conclusive points in any given argument, than by mere volition to give creation to our thoughts in the first instance.

Persons, therefore, of the most gifted intellect are held in check, and are restrained by the ultimate principles of their mental constitution. These are boundaries, which they cannot pass; and men, who are capable of the greatest efforts in framing arguments, will be no less sensible of this truth, when they carefully examine the course of their thoughts, than others.

§. 11. Of reasoning in connection with language or expression.

There is often a want of correspondence between the purely mental process in reasoning and the outward verbal expression of it. When persons are called upon to state their arguments suddenly and in public debate, they often commit errours, which are at variance with the prevalent opinion of their good sense and mental ability. This is particularly true of men, who are chiefly engaged in the ordinary business of life, or are in any situation where there is a constant call for action. The conclusions, at which such persons arrive, may be supposed to be generally correct, but they frequently find themselves unable to state clearly and correctly to others the process of reasoning, by which they arrived at them.-Oliver Cromwell, the famous English Protector, is said to have been a person, to whom this statement would well apply. The complicated incidents of his life, and the perplexities of his situation, and his great success sufficiently evince, that he pos