afterwards to intellectual, many persons are led into serious and permanent mistakes.

These mistakes may in a good measure be avoided by an adherence to the rule which has been given, and probably in no other way, viz., by modifying the meaning of terms by the nature of the subject, to which they relate. -And this, it may be added, requires care, examination, and particular analysis of the terms used.

One further illustration, of a little different kind from those already given, will help to evince the necessity of such care and examination. In the use of the word IMAGINATION, which is employed as expressive of something in our mental nature, we are liable to be led astray, both in consequence of the original meaning of the word, and also for another reason. We are apt to suppose, because the name happens to be an unit or single term, that the mental power, for which it stands, is an unit also, and that the internal process is an unit. Whereas in truth the mental susceptibilities, involved in an act of the imagination, are many, and not one; and the process is complicated, and not simple and undivided. And similar views will apply to other instances.

The effect on the mind, in these cases, may be illustrated by the phrase laws of nature. People are much in the habit of saying of natural events, that they are the result of these laws. The phrase is undoubtedly a convenient one, but the consequence of its frequent use is, that we convert these three words into a sort of Deity. We impose upon our own understandings, and under the influence of this self imposition, we give them a local habitation, and impale them on high, as an object of all power, and in some cases of all worship. We thus exclude and throw back from the vast visible creation the immediate agency of the infinite God, and like the Israelites in the desert, set our eyes upon this tabernacle of Moloch, this star of the god Remphan.

§. 146. We have not words for all our ideas.

Words are employed as signs standing for ideas; but

it must not be imagined, and certainly is not true, that all ideas have words, corresponding to them. This assertion holds in regard to both simple and complex ideas. Among our simple ideas are our conceptions of colours; we call one colour RED; another, WHITE; but it is certainly not too much to say, there are many diversities or grades in those colours, which we have a notion of or perceive, but have not given them specific names. The same may be said of the diversities in our sensations of hearing, touch, and

taste.

There are various complex ideas, which a person has or may have, and yet without names, answering to them. In translating from one language into another the truth here stated is clearly perceived; in reading the German language, for example, which has a large number of very expressive compounds, we often meet with words, which suggest to the mind very clear ideas, but find no single words in English precisely corresponding. And it is sometimes with difficulty, that we can express them even by a number or combination of words.

And there is this further remark to be made. Although words, when separately considered, are supposed to have a definite meaning, which is settled by the custom or use of the language, yet whenever a word, in the formation of a sentence, is arranged with other words, its meaning is undoubtedly modified in a multitude of ways. The shades of meaning, which thus arise, are sometimes so pcculiar, and at others so slightly distinguished from each other, that it is difficult to make them clearly understood by any verbal statement. This knowledge is acquired rather by practice than precept. That is to say; if a person wishes to understand the full power of a language, he must not confine himself to the study of a book of formal definitions, but must study it in authors, especially the great masters of reason; and while he follows the track of such guiding minds, he should be careful in noticing the intellectual perceptions and various nice shades of thought, which arise within himself.

§.147. Of the definition of words.

The schoolmen defined terms PER GENUS ET DIFFERENTIAM, that is, by a term more general, than the word to be defined, with an additional word or words, expressive of some specific or distinguishing quality. Thus, man was defined by them ANIMAL RATIONALE, an animal endued with reason; ANIMAL being the term, wider in signification or more generic than man, and RATIONALE the epithet, indicative of the difference between man and other animals. A serious objection might be readily raised to this definition. If the schoolmen meant by the epithet RATIONALE What has been termed the discursive faculty or that operation, by which we compare together propositions and deduce conclusions from premises, it might be questioned, whether dogs, horses, and elephants are not men, since it is the opinion of very many, that they possess this ability in some small degree.

A better mode of definition is by enumerating and explaining some essential elements, entering into the nature and composition of the thing to be defined; and this analysis of the elementary parts may be more or less particular, as circumstances require. It should be remarked here, that we now speak of the definition of words, standing for complex ideas; since, as already observed in §. 134 of the First volume, words standing for simple ideas do not admit of definition. No one can make the simple ideas of red, white, blue, sweet, bitter, &c. more clear than they are at present by any definitions whatever, which can be given.

Although it be difficult, or rather impossible to define simple ideas, to make them any clearer than they already are, what are called complex ideas admit of a definition. Complex ideas consist of various simple ideas combined together; the words, standing for them, cannot, indeed, of themselves, suggest the simple ideas, and show us what they are independently of the aid of the senses and of our own internal experience; but they may clearly and readily indicate to us, how those ideas are to be arranged and combined together in order to form complex ones. The

word, rainbow, expresses a complex idea. Accurately define it by an enumeration of the colours, entering into its composition, and by a statement of its appearance to a person, who has the faculty of sight, and he will understand or have a conception of it, although he may never have seen one; and this happens, because he has the simple ideas; and the words or description shows him, how they are combined together. But it is impossible to impart such a conception to a person, who has always been blind; because he has never had the simple ideas of colours; and words merely can never convey to him that knowledge.

§. 148. Of an universal language.

The inquiry has sometimes been started, Whether there might not be a conventional, (that is an arbitrary oral and written,) language, which should be permanent, and be employed by all nations ;-in other words, Whether there might not be an universal language? The impracticability of such an universal tongue appears both from the nature and the history of this mode of expressing thought.

(1) The nature of language shows its impracticability.

It is an idea, which observation seems to have well established, that whatever is imperfect, has a tendency to work out its own ruin; and conventional language, however excellent an invention, can never be otherwise than imperfect, since the human mind, which forms it, is itself limited, and is often running into errour. It will illustrate this remark, when we are reminded, that the external, material world is one of the great sources of our ideas, but our mental powers being imperfect, different persons form different ideas of the same objects. They then agree in giving the same names to these ideas or combinations of ideas, and there often arises in this way a mutual misapprehension of that very agreement, which is not only the origin, but the support of language. The seeds of the mutability and destruction of language are, therefore, sown in its very birth, since a very little reflection cannot fail to show how many perplexitics, how many discussions, how many

changes may arise from this single circumstance, that in consequence of the imperfection of our faculties, men often agree to consider words, as standing for what they imagine to be the same ideas, but which are not.

We cannot, then, reasonably expect an universal and permanent language, until our minds can fully penetrate into the true nature of things, until our ideas are perfect, and different individuals can certainly and exactly inform themselves of the thoughts, existing in the minds of others.

Further; the political institutions of one country, the peculiarities in the aspects of its natural scenery, early associations, occupations, and habits, lay the foundation for a variety of thoughts and shades of thought, which, in other countries, will not exist, because the causes of their existence are not to be found. If thoughts, feelings, imaginations exist under these circumstances, words will be needed to express them, for which there will be no occasion in another country and among another people;-so that we find here also a permanent and extensive cause of the diversities of languages.

(2) The impracticability of an universal language is scen also from the history of languages in times past.

We cannot conceive of an universal language without supposing it to be permanent, for if there are any causes, which would operate to affect its permanency, the operation of the same causes would be felt in checking and preventing its universality. But if we search the whole history of man, in order to find a language, that has remained permanent and unaltered, it will be an entirely fruitless pursuit. Not one such can be found.

There appears to have been originally in Asia Minor a language, spoken to a great extent, which after a time disappeared, so that the very name was lost. So far from being able to maintain itself and increase the territories, where it was spoken, it was at last broken up into a varicty of subordinate idioms, certainly no less than seven, the Hebrew, the Syriac, the Chaldaic, the Arabic, the Ethiopic, Phenician, and Samaritan. A common language