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servation of our tempers and paffions, of our inter- S ERM. efts and defigns, and from the general tenor of our CXXXIV, actions in public and private, and from our prayers and confeffions to GOD (if he permit him at any time to be fo near good men) I think there is no doubt: but this is far from a knowledge of our hearts; all this is but conjecture, and fuch as men may make of one another in a low degree.

But as to the bufinefs of cafting blafphemous and despairing thoughts into the minds of men, to this I would say these three things.

1. That there are few of these cafes which may not more probably be refolved into the wickedness and infidelity of mens hearts, or into the darkness and melancholy of our tempers, which are apt to raise and suggest strange thoughts to men, and fuch as we may be apt to think have no rife from our felves, not confidering what an odd and strange influence the disorder of our bodily humours may have upon our minds, as we fee in violent fevers, and feveral other difeafes; and melancholy, though the workings of it are more ftill and quiet, is as truly a disease as any other; fo that I chuse rather to afcribe as much of thefe to a bodily diftemper as may be, because it is a very uncomfortable consideration, to think that the devil hath such an immediate power upon the minds of men.

2. I do not fee how by any means it can be granted, without prejudice to this prerogative of GOD, which the scripture plainly gives him, of being " the "only knower of the heart," that the devil can have fo immediate an accefs to our minds, as to put wicked thoughts into them; nor can I think, that when it is faid, I Chron. xxi. 1. that "Satan pro"voked David to number the people," and Luke

xxii. 3.

SER M. xxii. 3. That "the devil entered into Judas," and CXXXIV. Acts v. 3. That " fatan had filled the heart of Ana"nias to lie unto the Holy Ghost," and Eph. ii. 2. That "the devil is the spirit that worketh in the "children of disobedience :" I fay, I cannot think that any, or all of thefe expreffions do amount to fuch an immediate power of putting wicked thoughts into mens minds; but they only fignify, that the devil hath a greater hand in fome fins than others, and that a heart wickedly bent and inclined, give him a great advantage to tempt men more powerfully, by prefenting the occafion of fuch wicked thoughts and actions to them; for it is ufual, in fcripture-phrase, as to afcribe all good motions to GOD's fpirit, fo all evil thoughts and actions to the devil, not that he is the immediate caufe of them, but because he is always ready to tempt men to them, and one way or other to promote them.

3. I fee no reason to grant (as many have done) an immediate power to the devil over the fancies and imaginations of men, and that he may know the workings of them, though not the fecret thoughts of mens minds; for this feems to me to be in effect to grant him the knowledge of mens hearts, and to give him a key to that closet which GOD hath referved to himself for it is a very nice diftinction which is here made between the thoughts of mens minds, and the image of their fancies; and if these fhould happen to be but words that fignify the fame thing, we fhall unawares intrench upon the prerogative of GOD. Therefore because the fcripture is a stranger to these nice and fubtile diftinctions between the imaginations of the fancy, and the thoughts of the heart, I think it is much fafer to affert the prerogative of GOD in that latitude that the

CX XXIV.

fcripture useth the word heart; for all the inward SER M. motions of the mind, for the thoughts and intentions of the heart, and roundly to affirm that all the inward motions of our fouls are totally exempt from the immediate cognizance of any other fpirit but GOD's alone; and that neither angel nor devil hath any further knowledge of them, than may be collected and inferred in a way of probable conjecture from the particular knowledge of mens tempers and habits and defigns, and the course of their actions. I proceed to the

III. Particular; GOD's knowledge of future events. This GoD purposes as the way to difcern the true GOD from idols, Ifaiah xli. 21, &c. " Produce "your cause, faith the LORD, bring forth your

ftrong reasons, faith the king of Jacob;" that is, let them bring fome argument that may convince us that they are gods; and he inftanceth in foretelling future events, ver. 22. "Let them fhew the "former things, what they be, that we may confider દ them, and know the latter end of them; or declare "us things for to come. Shew the things that are to "come hereafter, that we may know that ye are ' gods." GoD puts it upon this iffue, if they can "foretel future things," then they are gods; if not, they are "vanity, and a work of naught, and "he is an abomination that chufeth them," ver. 24. By "things to come," I understand such ef fects as do not depend upon any neceffary cause, but upon the will of free agents, and fo may be, or may not be; from whence it is plain, that it is the prerogative of GOD, proper and peculiar to him, to know future events. And here I fhall confider these two things.

1. That God knows future events.

2. That

SERM. 2. That he only knows them.

CXXXIV.

1. God knows future events; which will appear from the dictates of natural light, and from scripture.

(1.) From the dictates of natural light, as it is a perfection, and that which among men is accounted the best part of wisdom; and unless this did belong to God, how could he govern the world? The heathens, except only the Epicureans, generally granted this, as appears in those wife counfels, which we frequently meet with in them to this purpose, that we should not be anxious for the future; but having done our endeavour, leave the event of things to GOD, who only knows them and disposeth them.

Permittes ipfis expendere numinibus, quid

Conveniat nobis, rebufque fit utile noftris. Juv.

And afterward, faith he, "We are importunate "with GOD for wife and children :" At illis notum, qui pueri, qualifque futura fit uxor. And that this was their opinion, appears yet more clearly from those apprehenfions which they had of divination. Tully lays down this for a principle, deos poffe nobis figna futurarum rerum oftendere; de legibus. And in his book de Divin. he tells us, "that there was fuch "a thing as divination, for it was an old opinion," jam ufque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque Pop. Rom. & omnium gentium firmata confenfu, and afterward, that this divination was not, fine inftin&tu afflatúque divino.

I know they did variously explain this, according to their several opinions about fate and contingency, and their apprehenfions about the providence of GoD. One fect of them, the Stoicks, held that there was a fatal chain of caufes from first to laft, and things did neceffarily follow one another; and by this means

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they made fore-knowledge easy and explicable; and S ER M.
though in their disputes they seem to grant no fuch CXXXIV.
things as events and contingencies, yet they are

agreed in the thing, that those things which we call
events, though they would not call them fo, were
fore-known to GOD. And for this I fhall only cite
one teftimony of Seneca, fpeaking of God's fore-
knowledge of the moft contingent things, the dif-
pofitions of men long before they are born; he adds,
nota eft enim illis operis fui feries, omniúmque illis re-
rum per manus fuas iturarum fcientia in aperto fem-
per eft; nobis ex abdito fubit; & quæ repentina pu
tamus, illis provifa veniunt & familiaria; and how
peremptory foever this fect is in their difputes about
fate, yet when they fpeak of the ra ip' nu, and
generally in their moral discourses, they seem plain-
ly to me to exempt the will of man from this fatal
neceffity.

And those other fects of the philofophers that de-
nied fate, did generally grant "God's fore-know-

ledge of contingent things." I grant indeed, that they did rather make God's fore-knowledge an arbitrary and voluntary, than a neceffary perfection, that is, that God, when he pleased to apply himfelf to it, could fore-know all future events: but their general opinion was, that as his providence did not extend to finall and inconfiderable things, fo neither his fore-knowledge. But Tully feems to attribute a very perfect providence to him, and a foreknowledge of the least things, Quis non timeat omnia providentem, cogitantem, animadvertentem, & omnia ad fe pertinere putantem, curiofum & negotii plenum Deum? But I cannot fay he is conftant to himself: but they all agree in granting to him this perfection of knowing all future things, if he pleased to trouble VOL. VIII,

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him

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