SERM ferent from mere power, abftractedly confidered; CXXXII. for one may have all the materials of happiness, and yet want the wisdom and skill to put them fo together, as to frame an happy condition out of them; and he is not happy, who doth not thoroughly understand the proper method and means of compaffing and fecuring his own happiness. 4. Another moft confiderable and effential ingredient of happiness is goodnefs; without which, as there can be no true majefty and greatness, so neither can there be any felicity or happiness. Now goodness is a generous difpofition of mind to communicate and diffuse itself, by making others partakers of its happinefs in fuch degrees as they are capable of it, and as wisdom fhall direct: For he is not fo happy as he may be, who hath not the pleature of making others fo, and of feeing them put into an happy condition by his means, which is the highest pleasure (I had almoft faid pride, but I may truly fay glory) of a good and great mind: For by fuch communications of himself, an immenfe and all-fufficient being doth not leffen himself, or put any thing out of his power, but doth rather enlarge and magnify himfelf, and does, as I may fay, give great ease and delight to a full and fruitful being, without the leaft diminution of his power and happiness. For the cause and original of all other beings can make nothing fo independent upon itself, as not ftill to maintain his intereft in it, to have it always under his power and government; and no being can rebel against his maker, without extreme hazard to himself. a 5. Perfect happinefs doth imply the exercife of all other virtues, which are fuitable to so perfect bing, upon all proper and fitting occafions; that is, that fo perfect a being do nothing that is con tary CXXXII. trary to, or unbecoming his holinefs and righteouf- SERM. nefs, his truth and faithfulness, which are effential to a perfect being; and for fuch a being to act contrary to them in any cafe, would be to create difquiet and disturbance to itself: For this is a certain rule, and never fails, that nothing can act contrary to its own nature without reluctancy and displeasure, which in moral agents is that which we call guilt: for guilt is nothing else but the trouble and difquiet which arifeth in one's mind, from the conscioufnels of having done something which is contrary to the perfective principles of his being, that is, fomething that doth not become him, and which, being what he is, he ought not to have done; which we cannot imagine ever to befal fo perfect and immutable a being as God is. 6. Perfect happiness implies in it the settled and fecure poffeffion of all thofe excellencies and perfections; for if any of thefe were liable to fail, or be diminished, so much would be taken off from perfect and complete happiness. If the Deity were fubject to any change or impairment of his condition, fo that either his knowledge, or power, or wisdom, or goodnefs, or any other perfection, could any ways decline or fall off, there would be a proportionable abatement of happiness. And from all those do result, in the 7th and last place, Infinite contentment and fatiffaction, pleasure and delight, which is the very effence of happiness. 1. Infinite contentment and fatisfaction in this condition. And well may happiness be contented with itself; that is, with fuch a condition, that he that is poffeft of it, can neither defire it should be better, nor have any caufe to fear it should be worse. VOL. VIII. C 2. Plea SFRM. 2. Pleafure and delight, which is fomething more CXXXI. than contentment: for one may be contented with an affliction, and painful condition, in which he is far from taking any pleasure and delight. "No 6: affliction is joyous for the prefent, but grievous," as the apoftle speaks, Heb. xii. But there cannot be perfect happiness without pleasure in our condition. Full pleasure is a certain mixture of love and joy, hard to be exprest in words, but certainly known by inward fenfe and experience. And thus I have endeavoured to defcribe to you, as well as I could, according to our imperfect conceptions and expreffions of GoD, the happiness of the divine nature, and wherein it confifts. I proceed to the II. Thing I propofed, which was to fhew, that this attribute of perfection doth belong to GOD; and that the divine nature is perfectly bleffed and happy; and this is fo univerfal an acknowledgment of natural light, that it would be a very fuperfluous and impertinent work, to trouble you with particular citations of heathen authors to this purpose; nothing being more frequent in them than to call the Deity, beatiffimam & perfectiffimam naturam, "the moft "happy and most perfect being," and therefore happy, because felicity doth naturally refult from perfection. It fhall fuffice to take notice of these two things out of heathen writers, to my present purpose. 1. That they accounted happiness so effential to the notion of a GoD, that this was one of the ways which they took to find out what properties were fit to attribute to GOD, and what not; to confider, what things are confiftent with happiness, or inconfiftent with it; and whatever did fignify happiness, and was a perfection confiftent with it, they afcribed to GOD, as a fuitable property of the divine nature; S ERM. and whatever was otherwife, they removed it from CXXXII. GoD, as unfit to be faid of him. 2. Whatever differences there were among the philofophers concerning the perfection of the divine nature, they all agreed in the perfect felicity of it; even Epicurus himfelf, who fo boldly attempted to ftrip the divine nature of moft of its perfections, by denying that God either made or governed the world; whereby he took away at once his being the first cause and original of all things, and his goodness likewise, and wisdom, and power, and juftice; or at least made all these ufelefs, by taking away all occafion and opportunity for the exercife of them; yet this man does frequently own, and profefs to believe the happiness of the divine nature; and then out of an ignorant and officious kindness to the Deity, and (as he pretended) for the fecurity of his felicity, did, in effect, take away his other perfections; he would by no means put GOD to the trouble and burden of making the world, or taking care of the affairs of it, left this should discompofe the Deity, or be an interrup. tion or disturbance of his ease and felicity. For thus Lucretius, the great difciple of Epicurus, defcribes his opinion of the divine nature: Omnis enim divím, per fe, natura neceffe eft, That is, "It is neceffary that the divine nature SER M." danger, fufficient for itself, and standing in need CXXXII. "of no body, neither pleased with our good actions,' "nor provoked by our faults." This was a very falfe notion both of GOD and happiness, to imagine that the care of the world fhould be a pain and difturbance to infinite knowledge, and power, and goodness. But this is not now my business to confider; that which is to my prefent purpose, is, that the happiness of the divine nature was univerfally owned; and that bleffedness is so infeparable from the notion of a Deity, that whoever profeffes to believe a GOD, must acknowledge him to be perfectly happy. As for the teftimony of fcripture, I have already told you, that there are but two texts wherein this title of μandp, the happy or bleffed, is given to God; but by confequence the fcriptureevery where declares the happiness of the divine nature, viz. wherever it fpeaks of the excellency and perfection of his being, of his knowledge, and power, and wisdom, and goodness, and righteousness, and of the eternity and unchangeableness of these, and of the infinite delight and complacency which he takes in the enjoyment of these perfections. I fhall now proceed to the III. And last thing which I propofed to confider, viz. How far creatures are capable of happiness, and by what ways and means they may be made partakers of it. They are not capable of absolute and perfect happiness, because that refults from infinite perfection, which is no where to be found but in GoD: it remains then, that creatures are only capable of being happy in a finite and limited degree, by the resemblance of GOD, and by the enjoyment of him; by being like to him, and by our likeness to |