1897 was not repugnant to the Federal Constitution on the ground
that it impaired the obligation of the contract, as there was no prom-
ise expressed in the legislation existing when the land was purchased
to the effect that the State would not enlarge the remedy or grant
another on account of the violation by the purchaser of his contract,
and no such promise is to be implied. There is a plain distinction be-
tween the obligation of a contract and a remedy given by the Legisla-
ture to enforce that obligation. Waggoner v. Flack, 595.
4. Section 453, cl. 13, of the Code of 1886, and section 3911, cl. 14, of the
Code of 1896 of Alabama taxing stocks of railroads incorporated in
other States held by citizens of Alabama are not unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment because no similar tax is imposed
on the stock of domestic railroads or of foreign railroads doing busi-
ness in Alabama; the property of the former class of railroads being
untaxed, and that of the latter two classes being taxed, by the State.
Kidd v. Alabama, 730.

5. Although a particular provision of the Constitution may seemingly be
applicable, its controlling effect is limited by the essential nature of
the powers of government reserved to the States when the Constitu-
tion was adopted. Andrews v. Andrews, 14.

6. As the State of Massachusetts has exclusive jurisdiction over its citi-
zens concerning the marriage tie and its dissolution, and consequently
the authority to prohibit them from perpetrating a fraud upon the law
of their domicil by temporarily sojourning in another State and there
procuring a decree of divorce without acquiring a bona fide domicil, a
decree of divorce obtained in South Dakota upon grounds which do
not permit a divorce in Massachusetts under the conditions stated in
the opinion is not rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and
hence the due faith and credit clause of the Constitution does not re-
quire the enforcement of such decree in the State of Massachusetts
against the public policy of that State as expressed in its statutes. Ib.
7. So far as the Federal Constitution is concerned a State may authorize
the taking of possession of property for a public use prior to any pay-
ment therefor, or even the determination of the amount of compensa-
tion, providing adequate provision is made for such compensation.
Williams v. Parker, 491.

8. The statute of Massachusetts of May 23, 1898, providing that no build-
ing should be erected within certain limits in the city of Boston of
over a certain height, and also providing that any person owning or
interested in any building then in course of construction who was
damaged thereby, might recover damages in an action commenced
within two years from the passage of the act, against the city of Bos-
ton for the actual damages sustained by them in the cost of materials
and re-arrangement of the design or construction of the buildings,
provides a direct and appropriate means of ascertaining and enforc-
ing the amount of such damages, and for their payment by the city
of Boston in regard to the solvency whereof no question is raised, and
such statute is not in conflict with the Federal Constitution. Ib.
9. Act No. 237 of Michigan of 1889 creating a board of registration in medi-

cine is not in conflict with the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Reetz v. Michigan, 505.

10. There is no provision in the Federal Constitution forbidding the State
from granting to a tribunal, whether called a court or a board of reg-
istration, the final determination of a legal question. Due process of
law is not necessarily judicial process, nor is the right of appeal essen-
tial to due process of law. Ib.

11. When a statute fixes the time and place of meeting of any board or
tribunal no special notice to parties interested is required to constitute
due process of law as the statute itself is sufficient notice. Ib.

12. A state statute requiring the registration of physicians and prohibit-
ing those who are not so registered from practicing thereafter is not
an ex post facto law as to a physician who had once engaged in prac-
tice, but who was held not to be qualified and whose registration was
refused by the board of registration appointed under the statute, such
statute not providing any punishment for his having practiced prior to
the enactment thereof. Ib.

13. Where the government of the United States by the construction of a
dam, or other public works, so floods lands belonging to an individ-
ual as to totally destroy its value, there is a taking of private property
within the scope of the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Lynah,
445.

14. The proceeding must be regarded as an actual appropriation of the
land, including the possession and the fee and, when the amount
awarded as compensation is paid, the title, the fee and whatever rights
may attach thereto pass to the government which becomes henceforth
the full owner.

Ib.

15. Notwithstanding that the work causing the injury was done in improv-
ing the navigability of a navigable river and by the Constitution Con-
gress is given full control over such improvements, the injuries cannot
be regarded as purely consequential, and the government cannot appro-
priate property without being liable to the obligation created by the
Fifth Amendment of paying just compensation. Ib.

16. The taxation by Kentucky of a franchise, granted by the proper authori-
ties of Indiana to a Kentucky corporation, for maintaining a ferry
across the Ohio River from the Indiana shore to the Kentucky shore,
(the jurisdiction of Kentucky extending only to low water mark ou
the northern and western side of the Ohio River), would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law, in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Kentucky,
385.

17. The Fourteenth Amendment does not control the power of a State to
determine the form of procedure by which legal rights may be ascer-
tained, if the method adopted gives reasonable notice and affords a
fair opportunity to be heard. Hooker v. Los Angeles, 314.

18. The claim that section 2 of the act providing for the taxation of life
estates, as construed by the highest courts of the State of Illinois, is in
contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the classification
of life tenants is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies to life tenants

the equal protection of laws because it taxes one class of life estates
where the remainder is to lineals and expressly exempts life estates
where the remainder is to collaterals or to strangers in blood, cannot
be sustained. Billings v. Illinois, 97.

19. The Constitution of the United States confers no power whatever upon
the government of the United States to regulate marriage or its disso-
lution in the States. Andrews v. Andrews, 14.

20. The constitutional inhibition against the impairment of contracts ap-
plies only to legislative enactments of the States and not to the judi-
cial decisions or acts of the state tribunals or officers, under statutes in
force at the time of the making of the contract, the obligation of
which is alleged to have been impaired. Weber v. Rogan, 10.
21. Where a state law imposing a tax upon transfer is in force before the
funds come within the State the tax does not impair the obligation of
any contract, deny full faith or credit to a judgment taxing the inher-
itance in another State, or deprive the executrix and legatees of the
decedent of any privilege or immunity as citizens of the taxing State,
nor is it contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. Blackstone v.
Miller, 189.

See DIVORCE, 2;
TAXATION, 6.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

See APPEAL AND WRIT OF ERROR; PUBLICATION;

1. Where land is owned by three trustees under a trust requiring an
exercise of the judgment and discretion of all the trustees and there is
no evidence of authority for one of them to act alone, the execution of
what purports to be a lease for five years by one of the trustees does
not make a valid lease of the property, nor does it affect the share of
the trustee executing it as in the case of ordinary joint tenants; and
where all the trustees do not join in the execution of an instrument,
the burden is on the grantee to prove the deaths of those not joining
therein. Recognition or ratification by the other trustees cannot be
assumed unless it is shown to have been founded upon full knowledge
of all the facts. Winslow v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 646.
2. The receipt of rent by the beneficiary under the trust directly from the
tenant will not amount to a part performance of the contract in such
manner as to make it binding upon the trustees not signing when it
appears that the check received for such rent was not endorsed by the
trustee and there is no proof that the beneficiary knew there was no
binding lease in existence, but it does appear that subsequently rent
was refused and only accepted under an agreement that the acceptance
was without prejudice. Ib.

3. Where a lease contains an option to the lessee to purchase at a price
named in the lease during the continuance thereof and the trustees
VOL, CLXXXVIII-48

making the lease have no general or absolute power of sale, specific
performance of that portion of the contract should be denied. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 20, 21; FEDERAL QUESTION, 3, 4;

EMINENT DOMAIN;

JURISDICTION, B, 1;

LEASE.

COPYRIGHT.

Chromolithographs representing actual groups of persons and things,
which have been designed from hints or descriptions of the scenes rep-
resented, and which are to be used as advertisements for a circus
pictorial illustrations" within the meaning of Rev. Stat. § 4952,
allowing a copyright to the "author, designer, or proprietor
of any engraving, cut, print,

are

66

or chromo" as affected by the
act of 1874, chap. 301, § 3, 18 Stat. 78, 79. And on complying with all
the statutory requirements the proprietors are entitled to the protec-
tion of the copyright laws. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,
239.

CORPORATIONS.

See LOCAL LAW, 4;

RECEIVER, 1, 2, 3;
STOCKHOLDER.

COURTS.

See JURISDICTION, A, 1; C, 2;

PRACTICE, 5, 6;

RECEIVER, 1, 2, 3.

COVENANT.

See LEASE;

MORTGAGE.

CUSTOMS DUTIES.

See JURISDICTIONS, C, 3;

STATUTES, 1.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

See LEASE;

PUBLICATION;

WILL.

DIVORCE.

1. A State may forbid the enforcement within its borders of a decree of di-
vorce procured by its own citizens who, whilst retaining their domicil
in the prohibiting State, have gone into another State to procure a di-
vorce in fraud of the law of the domicil. Andrews v. Andrews, 14.
2. The statute of Massachusetts which provides that a divorce decreed in
another State or county by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and
both the parties shall be valid and effectual in the Commonwealth;

but if an inhabitant of Massachusetts goes into another State or country
to obtain a divorce for a cause which occurred in Massachusetts, while
the parties resided there, or for a cause which would not authorize a
divorce by the laws of Massachusetts, a divorce so obtained shall have
no force or effect in that Commonwealth, is an expression of the public
policy of that State in regard to a matter wholly under its control and
does not conflict with the Constitution of the United States or violate
the full faith and credit clause thereof. And the courts of Massachu-
setts are not obliged to enforce a decree of divorce obtained in another
State as to persons domiciled in Massachusetts and who go into such
other State with the purpose of practicing a fraud upon the laws of the
State of their domicil; that is, to procure a divorce without obtaining
a bona fide domicil in such other State. Ib.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6;

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.

DOMICIL.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6.

EJECTMENT.

See PLEADING.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

All private property is held subject to the necessities of government and
the right of eminent domain underlies all such rights of property. When
the United States government appropriates property, which it does
not claim as its own, it does so under an implied contract that it will
pay the value of the property it so appropriates. United States v.
Lynah, 445.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7, 8, 13, 14;

INJUNCTION;

JURISDICTION, B, 4.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS.

An actual discrimination by the officers charged with the administration
of statutes unobjectionable in themselves against the race of a negro
on trial for a crime by purposely excluding negroes from the grand and
petit juries of the county, will not be presumed but must be proved.
An affidavit of the persons under indictment, annexed to a motion to
quash the indictment on the grouud of such discrimination, stating
that the facts set up in the motion are true "to their best knowledge,
information and belief" is not evidence of the facts stated. Smith v.
Mississippi, 162 U. S. 592, followed; Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442, dis-
tinguished. Tarrance v. Florida, 519.

EQUITY.

1. Where the United States holds lands in trust for Indians under an Act
of Congress known as the Indian General Allotment Act, (February 8,