Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

by the act, or to the place where instruction was to be giventhe school buildings and grounds?

The words, "said seminary," in the exemption provision, referred to the corporation created by the act, and designated in the title as the Chicago Theological Seminary, and not to the school buildings and grounds, as held by the state Supreme Court, and this being so, the exemption provision indisputably exempted from taxation the property against which the judg ments were rendered.

The first mention of "the seminary" in the act is in the title, "an act to incorporate the Chicago Theological Seminary." It is well settled that the title of an act may properly be referred to to ascertain the legislative intention. There can be no room for question that this first mention of the "Chicago Theological Seminary” referred to the institution incorporated by the act, and not "to the property," the school buildings, etc. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457; Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall. 374; Heirs of Emerson v. Hall, 13 Pet. 409, at 413; Bell v. Mayor, 105 N. Y. 144; President, etc., of St. Vincent's College v. Schaefer, 104 Missouri, 261.

Similar corporate names are found in all the earlier charters; those creating railroad corporations, incorporated banks, etc., as well as charitable institutions, such as "the President and Board of Directors of," etc. But it was not therefore necessary or customary to always use the cumbersome full name when the corporation was referred to. Angel and Ames on Corporations, sec. 99.

On the contrary, instead of using the full corporate name, it was natural and appropriate to use the words " said seminary to designate the incorporated institution referred to in the title of the act as "The Chicago Theological Seminary," and again in section 4 as "the seminary." Marine Bank of Baltimore v. Bias, 4 Har. & J. (Md.) 338; Nobles v. Hamline University, 46 Minnesota, 316.

This use of the shorter designation instead of the full, formal name, is illustrated in the title of the act; in the proceedings in the County Court, in the return of delinquent property and in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois, in No. 140. In

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

fact, that the general words "the Chicago Theological Seminary" were appropriate to designate the incorporated institution is recognized in the very name itself, "the Board of Directors of the Chicago Theological Seminary."

The seminary buildings had no board of directors. The Board of Directors referred to in this corporate name as "the Board of Directors of the Chicago Theological Seminary," were the directors of the incorporated institution created by the act and referred to in its title.

The precise word "located" is frequently used in charters and other statutes as applied to corporations. At common law it was an attribute of every corporation that it had a locality. Its locality was the place where it carried on its operations— where it did business. Angel and Ames on Corporations, sec. 103; Sangamon & Morgan R. R. Co. v. County of Morgan, 14 Illinois, 163; Bristol v. Chicago & Aurora R. R. Co., 15 Illinois, 436; Charlotte National Bank v. Morgan, 132 U. S.

141.

Our construction of the exemption provision is forcibly confirmed by the adjudicated cases, in which like provisions were construed, and it was held, on grounds peculiarly pertinent to the case before the court, that similar general words, "belonging to" and "the college," "the institution," "the asylum," etc., referred to the corporation created by the act, and that all the property of the corporation was, therefore, exempt. County of Nobles v. Hamline University, 46 Minnesota, 316; Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 U. S. 362; President and Faculty of St. Vincent's College v. Schaefer, 104 Missouri, 261.

If the meaning is given to the words "said seminary," and "belonging to," in the exemption provision, which the state Supreme Court found it necessary to give to them to reach the conclusion it did, the result is that the provision, as a whole, is given an unreasonable, and, in fact, absurd meaning. It is familiar law that in giving construction to a statute an absurd or unreasonable meaning will not be attributed to the legislature if the language admits of any other construction. Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U. S. 47, 59; People ex rel. v. Gaulter, 149 Illinois, 39.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

The decision of the state Supreme Court, in both cases, is based on a construction of its previous decision in 174 Illinois, which gives to the exemption provision a meaning wholly dif ferent from the meaning given it by the same court in its opinion in 174 Illinois, and one which it is impossible to derive from the words of the provision.

The construction of the state Supreme Court is based wholly on the erroneous view that, instead of construing the provision of exemption in a fair and liberal sense, so as to promote the charitable object for which the corporation was formed, it should be construed narrowly by applying the rules of strict construction, and that the express provision of the charter that "this act shall be construed liberally in all courts," should be given a construction contrary to its plain intention, which would in fact render it wholly meaningless.

The rule of strict construction does not apply to exemptions in favor of charitable corporations, but such exemptions should be construed liberally, to promote the charitable object for which the corporation was created. Yale University v. New Haven, 71 Connecticut, 316; Phillips Academy v. Andover, 175 Massachusetts, 118; Association for Colored Orphans v. Mayor, 104 N. Y. 581; People v. Sayles, 50 N. Y. Supp. 8; Long Branch Firemen's Relief Ass'n v. Johnson, 62 N. J. L. 625; Sisters of Charity v. Township of Chatham, 52 N. J. L. 373; State v. Fisk University, 87 Tennessee, 233; M. E. Church v. Hinton, 92 Tennessee, 88.

Whatever the rule in the absence of an express provision in the charter-whether the rule of strict construction applies to an exemption provision in the charter of a charitable corporation or not the legislature of Illinois, in granting this charter, expressed its intention (in section 6) not to leave the question open, by making the express provision on the subject, that the act should be "construed liberally in all courts." For cases in which under similar statutory provisions, either abolishing the rule of strict construction as to all statutes, or providing that it shall not apply to particular statutes, the rule of liberal construction was held to apply in giving a construction to criminal and penal statutes, see Commonwealth v. Davis, 12 Bush,

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

(Kentucky), 240; People v. Soto, 49 California, 67; Hankins v. People, 106 Illinois, 628; Maxwell v. People, 158 Illinois, 248; Peterson v. Currier, 62 Illinois App. 163.

For a case in which a similar charter provision was referred to as requiring a liberal construction of a provision in the charter of Brown University, exempting its property from taxation, see Brown University v. Granger, 19 R. I. 704.

The decision of the state Supreme Court is not only based on the erroneous view that the rules of strict construction apply, but on the wholly erroneous assumption, that under these rules "if the language (of a provision) is capable of a broader, or more restricted meaning, the latter must be adopted." Such is not the effect of the rules of strict construction, even on the assumption that they apply, but on the contrary, the words used, if "capable of" two meanings, should be given their primary and ordinary meaning in the absence of other language showing that a different meaning was intended, and such meaning as will best express the legislative intention.

The rule of strict construction does not require that if the language used "admits of two meanings," either one or the other of these two meanings "must be " adopted, or in any way change or override the other rules of construction, including the well settled rule that, where a word admits of two meanings, the natural and ordinary meaning should be adopted, in the absence of other provisions showing a contrary intention. Endlich on the Interpretation of Statutes, secs. 337, 466; United States v. Winn, 3 Summ. 209 (quoted with approval in Black on Interpretation of Statutes, p. 290); United States v. Hart well, 6 Wall. 385, at p. 395; Meadowcraft v. People, 163 Illinois, 56, at p. 70.

The construction of plaintiff in error does not "extend the meaning of the words used, by implication," as erroneously held by the state Supreme Court.

It is proper to refer to other charters, passed by the same legislature, as an aid in ascertaining the meaning it was intended the words used in the particular provision should have. Vane v. Newcombe, 132 U. S. 220; 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, under the title "Statutes," p. 311; Chase v. Lord 77 N. Y. 1,

Argument for Defendant in Error.

18; Middleton v. Greeson, 106 Indiana, 18; Levering v. Phila delphia, Germantown & Norristown R. R. Co., 8 Watts & S. 459 at 463; Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall. 162.

On reference to the different charters passed by the same legislature, containing provisions for exemption from taxation, it will be seen that there are many passed at different sessions which provide by specific language for a partial exemption from taxation identical (or substantially so) with the exemption the state court holds was intended by the provision in question.

Mr. Edwin W. Sims, Mr. Frank L. Shepard and Mr. William F. Struckmann, for defendant in error, contended in their brief:

I. This court has no jurisdiction to review the judgment of the state court.

One of the grounds for the judgment of the state court is res judicata, and this is not a Federal question.

It is well settled law that where there are two grounds for the judgment of a state court, only one of which involves a Federal question and the other is broad enough to maintain a judgment sought to be reviewed, this court will not look into the Federal question but will dismiss the writ of error. Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207; Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361; Beaupre v. Noyes, 138 U. S. 397; Rutland v. Central Vermont R. R., 159 U. S. 630; Gillis v. Stinchfield, 159 U. S. 658; Seneca Nation v. Christy, 162 U. S. 283.

The state court did not give effect to and enforce a new rule of exemption established by the revenue act of 1872. It was not necessary to determine whether the act of 1872 changed the rule of exemption; the state court did not pass on any such question. Knox v. Exchange Bank, 12 Wallace, 383; Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wallace, 177-181; St. Paul, etc., Ry. Co. v. Todd Co., 142 U. S. 282; Railroad Co. v. McClure, 10 Wallace, 511-515.

II. The charter of plaintiff in error exempts only such property owned by it as is a part of or connected with its seminary located in the city of Chicago.

The exemption clause of the charter has been construed by