father, and fellow subjects with their children. But let him mean as he pleases it is plain he allows "Adam's children to have paternal power" (p. 15), as all other fathers to have "paternal power over their children" (O., 156). From whence one of these two things will necessarily follow, that either Adam's children even in his lifetime had, and so all other fathers have, as he phrases it (p. 15), "by right of fatherhood royal authority over their children," or else that" Adam by right of fatherhood had not royal authority;" for it must be that paternal power does, or does not, give "royal authority" to them that have it; if it does not, then Adam could not be sovereign by this title, nor anybody else, and then there is an end of all our author's politics at once; if it does give "royal authority," then every one that has “paternal power" has "royal authority," and then by our author's patriarchal government there will be as many kings as there are fathers. 71. And thus, what a monarchy he hath set up let him and his disciples consider. Princes certainly will have great reason to thank him for these new politics, which set up as many absolute kings in every country as there are fathers of children. And yet who can blame our author for it, it lying unavoidably in the way of one discoursing upon our author's principles? For, having placed an "absolute power" in "fathers by right of begetting," he could not easily resolve how much of this power belonged to a son over the children he had begotten; and so it fell out to be a very hard matter to give all the power, as he does, to Adam, and yet allow a part in his lifetime to his children, when they were parents, and which he knew not well how to deny them. This makes him so doubtful in his expressions, and so uncertain where to place this absolute natural power, which he calls fatherhood. Sometimes Adam alone has it all, as p. 16, O., 244, 245, and preface. Sometimes "parents" have it, which word scarce signifies the father alone (pp. 15, 23). Sometimes "children" during their father's lifetime, as p.15. Sometimes "fathers of families," as pp. 44 and 45. Sometimes "the heir to Adam" (O., 253). Sometimes "the posterity of Adam" (244, 246). Sometimes "prime fathers, all sons or grandchilden of Noah" (O., 244). Sometimes the eldest parents" (p. 15). Sometimes all kings (p. 23). Sometimes all that have supreme power (O., 245). Sometimes "heirs to those first progenitors, who were at first the natural parents of the whole people" (p. 23). Sometimes an elective king (p. 21). Sometimes those, whether a few or a multitude, that govern the "commonwealth" (p. 21). Sometimes he that can catch it-an "usurper" (p. 21, O., 155). 72. Thus this " new nothing" that is to carry with it all power, authority, and government-this "fatherhood," which is to design the person and establish the throne of monarchs, whom the people are to obey-may, according to Sir Robert, come into any hands, anyhow, and so by his politics give to democracy royal authority and make an usurper a lawful prince. And if it will do all these fine feats, much good do our author and all his followers with their omnipotent "fatherhood," which can serve for nothing but to unsettle and destroy all the lawful governments in the world, and to establish in their room disorder, tyranny, and usurpation. CHAPTER VII. Of Fatherhood and Propriety considered together as Fountains of Sovereignty. 73. IN the foregoing chapters we have seen what Adam's monarchy was in our author's opinion, and upon what titles he founded it. And the foundations which he lays the chief stress on, as those from which he thinks he may best derive monarchical power to future princes, are two-viz., "Fatherhood" and "Property ;" and therefore the way he proposes to 66 remove the absurdities and inconveniences of the doctrine of natural freedom," is "to maintain the natural and private dominion of Adam" (O., 222). Conformable hereunto he tells us "the grounds and principles of government necessarily depend upon the original of property" (O., 108). "The subjection of children to their parents is the fountain of all regal authority" (p. 15); and "all power on earth is either derived or usurped from the fatherly power, there being no other original to be found of any power whatsoever" (O., 158). I will not stand here to examine how it can be said without a contradiction that the "First ground and principles of government necessarily depend upon the original of property," and yet "That there is no other original of any power whatsoever but that of the father." It being hard to understand how there can be "no other original" but "fatherhood,” and yet that the "grounds and principles of government depend upon the original of property," "property" and "fatherhood" being as far different as lord of a manor and father of children; nor do I see how they will either of them agree with what our author says (O., 244) of God's sentence against Eve (Gen. iii. 16), "That it is the original grant of government." So that, if that were the original, government had not its "original," by our author's own confession, either from property" or fatherhood;" and this text, which he brings as a proof of Adam's power over Eve, necessarily contradicts what he says of the "fatherhood," that it is the "sole fountain of all power;" for if Adam had any such regal power over Eve, as our author contends for, it must be by some other title than that of begetting. 66 66 74. But I leave him to reconcile these contradictions, as well as many others which may plentifully be found in him by any one who will but read him with a little attention, and shall come now to consider how these two originals of government, "Adam's natural and private dominion," will consist and serve to make out and establish the titles of succeeding monarchs, who, as our author obliges them, must all derive their power from these fountains. Let us then suppose Adam made by God's donation lord and sole proprietor of the whole earth, in as large and ample a manner as Sir Robert could wish, let us suppose him also by right of fatherhood absolute ruler over his children with an un limited supremacy : I ask them,upon Adam's death what becomes of his "natural" and "private dominion"? and I doubt not it will be answered, that they descended to his next heir, as our author tells us in several places ; but that cannot possibly convey both his "natural" and "private dominion" to the same person; for should we allow that all the propriety, all the estate of the father ought to descend to the eldest son, which will need some proof to establish it, and so he have by that title all the "private dominion" of the father, yet the father's" natural dominion," the paternal power, cannot descend to him by inheritance; for being a right that accrues to a man only by "begetting," no man can have this natural dominion over any one he does not "beget," unless it can be supposed that a man can have a right to anything without doing that upon which that right is solely founded. For if a father by "begetting," and no other title, has "natural" dominion" over his children, he that does not beget them cannot have this "natural dominion" over them, and therefore be it true or false that our author says (O., 156) that every man that is born, by his very birth, becomes a subject to him that begets him," this necessarily follows-viz. : that a man by his birth cannot become a subject to his brother who did not beget him, unless it can be supposed that a man by the very same title can come to be under the "natural and absolute dominion" of two different men at once, or it be sense to say that a man by birth is under the "natural dominion" of his father only because he begat him, and a man by birth also is under the "natural dominion" of his eldest brother, though he did not beget him. 66 75. If, then, the "private dominion" of Adam, his property in the creatures, descended at his death all entirely to his eldest son, his heir (for if it did not there is presently an end of all Sir Robert's monarchy and his "natural dominion") the dominion a father has over his children by begetting them, belonged equally to all his sons who had children by the same title their father had it immediately upon Adam's decease; the sovereignty founded upon "property," and the sovereignty founded upon "fatherhood," come to be divided, since Cain, as heir, had that of " property" alone, Seth and the other sons that of "fatherhood" equally with him. This is the best can be made of our author's doctrine and of the two E titles of sovereignty he sets up in Adam, one of them will either signify nothing, or if they both must stand they can serve only to confound the rights of princes, and disorder government in his posterity; for by building upon two titles to dominion, which cannot descend together, and which he allows may be separated, for he yields that "Adam's children had their distinct territories by right of private dominion" (O., 210, p. 40). He makes it perpetually a doubt upon his principles where the sovereignty is, or to whom we owe our obedience, since "fatherhood" and "property" are distinct titles, and began presently upon Adam's death to be in distinct persons. And which then was to give way to the other? 76. Let us take the account of it as he himself gives it us. He tells us, out of Grotius, that "Adam's children by donation, assignation, or some kind of cession before he was dead, had their distinct territories by right of private dominion; Abel had his flocks and pastures for them, Cain had his fields for corn and the land of Nod, where he built him a city" (O., 210). Here it is obvious to demand which of these two, after Adam's death, was sovereign. "Cain," says our author (p. 23). By what title? "As heir for heirs to progenitors, who were natural parents of their people, are not only lords of their own children, but also of their brethren," says our author (p. 19). What was Cain heir to? Not the entire possessions, not all that which Adam had "private dominion" in; for our author allows that Abel, by a title derived from his father, "had his distinct territory for pasture by right of private dominion." What, then, Abel had by "private dominion" was exempt from Cain's dominion, for he could not have "private dominion" over that which was under the private dominion of another, and therefore his sovereignty over his brother is gone with this "private dominion;" and so there are presently two sovereigns, and his imaginary title of "fatherhood" is out of doors, and Cain is no prince over his brother, or else if Cain retain his sovereignty over Abel, notwithstanding his "private dominion," it will follow that the "first grounds and principles of government" have nothing to do with property, whatever our author says to the contrary. It is true Abel did not outlive his father Adam, but that makes nothing to the argument, which will hold good against Sir Robert in Abel's issue, or |