think they are fo entirely diftinct, that they can ever be properly faid to run counter. A Man never, in any Inftance, wills any Thing contrary to his Defires, or defires any Thing contrary to his Will. The foremention'd Inftance, which Mr. Locke produces, doth not prove that he ever does. He may, on fome Confideration or other, will to utter Speeches which have a Tendency to perfuade another, and still may defire that they may not perfuade him: But yet his Will and Defire don't run counter at all: The Thing which he wills, the very fame he defires; and he don't will a Thing, and defire the contrary in any Particular. In this Instance, it is not carefully obferved, what is the Thing will'd, and what is the Thing defired: If it were, it would be found that Will and Defire don't clash in the leaft. The Thing will'd on fome Confideration, is to utter fuch Words; and certainly, the fame Confideration fo influences him, that he don't defire the contrary; all Things confidered, he chufes to utter fuch Words, and don't defire not to utter 'em. And fo as to the Thing which Mr. Locke speaks of as defired, viz. that the Words, tho' They tend to perfuade, should not be effectual to that End, his Will is not contrary to this; he don't will that they fhould be effectual, but rather wills that they should not, as he defires. In order to prove that the Will and Defire may run counter, it should be shown that they may be contrary one to the other in the fame Thing, or with respect to the very fame Object of Will or Defire: But here the Objects are two; and in each, taken by themselves, the Will and Defire agree. And 'tis no Wonder that they should not agree in different Things, however little distinguished they are in their Nature, The Will may not agree with the Will, nor Defire agree with Defire, in different Things. As in this very Inftance which Mr.

Locke mentions, a Perfon may, on fome Confideration, defire to use Perfuafions, and at the fame Time may defire they may not prevail; But yet no Body will fay, that Defire runs counter to Defire; or that this proves that Defire is perfectly a diftinct Thing from Defire.--The like might be obferved of the other Inftance Mr. Locke produces, of a Man's defiring to be eafed of Pain, &c.

But not to dwell any longer on this, whether Defire and Will, and whether Preference and Volition be precifely the fame Things or no; yet, I trust it will be allowed by all, that in every Act of Will there is an Act of Choice; that in every Volition there is a Preference, or a prevailing Inclination of the Soul, whereby the Soul, at that Inftant, is out of a State of perfect Indifference, with refpect to the direct Object of the Volition, (fo that in every Act, or going forth of the Will, there is fome Preponderation of the Mind or Inclination, one Way rather than another; and the Soul had rather have or do one Thing than another, or than not have or not do that Thing;) and that there, where there is abfolutely no preferring or chufing, but a perfect continuing Equilibrium, there is no Volition.

SECTION II.

Concerning the Determination of the Will.

B

Y determining the Will, if the Phrase be used

with any Meaning, must be intended, caufing that the Act of the Will or Choice fhould be thus, and not otherwife: And the Will is faid to be determined, when, in Confequence of fome Action, or Influence, its Choice is directed to, and fix'd upon a particular Object. As when we speak of the

Deter

Determination of Motion, we mean caufing the Motion of the Body to be fuch a Way, or in fuch a Direction, rather than another.

To talk of the Determination of the Will, fuppofes an Effect, which must have a Caufe. If the Will be determined, there is a Determiner. This must be supposed to be intended even by them that fay, the Will determines itself. But if it be as they fay, the Will is both Determiner and determined; it is a Cause that acts and produces Effects upon it felf, and is the Object of its own Influence and Action.

With refpect to that grand Enquiry, What determines the Will, it would be very tedious and unneceffary at prefent to enumerate and examine all the various Opinions, which have been advanced concerning this Matter; nor is it needful that I fhould enter into a particular Difquifition of all Points debated in Difputes on that Queftion, Whether doth the Will always follow the last Dictate of the Understanding? It is fufficient to my present Purpose to fay, It is that Motive, which, as it stands in the View of the Mind, is the ftrongest, that determines the Will. But it may be neceffary that I should a little explain my Meaning in this.

By Motive, I mean the whole of that which moves, excites or invites the mind to Volition, whether that be one Thing fingly, or many Things conjunctly. Many particular Things may concur and unite their Strength to induce the Mind, and when it is fo, all together are as it were one complex Motive. And when I fpeak of the strongest Motive, I have Refpect to the Strength of the whole that operates to induce to a particular Ac of Volition, whether that be the Strength of one Thing alone, or of many together.

B 4

Whatever

Whatever is a Motive, in this Sense, must be fomething that is extant in the View or Apprehenfion of the Understanding, or perceiving Faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the Mind to will or act any Thing, any further than it is perceived, or is fome Way or other in the Mind's View; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the Mind's View, can't affect the Mind at all. 'Tis most evident, that nothing is in the Mind, or reaches it, or takes any Hold of it, any otherwife than as it is perceived or thought of.

And I think it must also be allowed by all, that every Thing that is properly called a Motive, Excitement or Inducement to a perceiving willing Agent, has fome Sort and Degree of Tendency, or Advantage to move or excite the Will, previous to the Effect, or to the Act of the Will excited. This previous Tendency of the Motive is what I call the Strength of the Motive. That Motive which has a lefs Degree of previous Advantage or Tendency to move the Will, or that appears lefs inviting, as it ftands in the View of the Mind, is what I call a weaker Motive. On the contrary, that which appears most inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it to the Understanding or Apprehenfion, the greatest Degree of previous Tendency to excite and induce the Choice, is what I call the Strongest Motive. And in this Senfe, I fuppofe the Will is always determined by the strongest Motive.

Things that exift in the View of the Mind have their Strength, Tendency or Advantage to move or excite its Will, from many Things appertaining to the Nature and Circumstances of the Thing view'd, the Nature and Circumstances of the Mind that views, and the Degree and Manner of its View;

of

of which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect Enumeration. But fo much I think may be determin'd in general, without Room for Controverfy, that whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary Agent, which has the Nature and Influence of a Motive to Volition or Choice, is confider'd or view'd as good; nor has it any Tendency to invite or engage the Election of the Soul in any further Degree than it appears fuch. For to fay otherwife, would be to fay, that Things that appear have a Tendency by the Appearance they make, to engage the Mind to elect them, fome other Way than by their appearing eligible to it; which is abfurd. And therefore it must be true, in fome Sense, that the Will always is as the greatest apparent Good is: However, for the right understanding of this, two Things must be well and diftinctly observed.

1. It must be observed in what Senfe I ufe the Term Good; namely, as of the fame Import with Agreeable. To appear good to the Mind, as I use the Phrafe, is the fame as to appear agreeable, or feem pleafing to the Mind. Certainly, nothing appears inviting and eligible to the Mind, or tending to engage its Inclination and Choice, confider'd as evil or difagreeable; nor indeed, as indifferent, and neither agreeable nor difagreeable. But if it tends to draw the Inclination, and move the Will, it must be under the Notion of that which fuits the Mind. And therefore that must have the greatest Tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it ftands in the Mind's View, fuits it beft, and pleases it most; and in that Senfe, is the greatest apparent Good: to fay otherwise, is little, if any Thing, fhort of a direct and plain Contradiction.

The Word Good, in this Senfe, includes in its Signification, the Removal or Avoiding of Evil,

or

D