is indeed, as he fays, a Thing agreeable to the Senfe and common Reason of Mankind; and therefore 'tis not fo much to be wondered at, that he unawares acknowledges it against himself: For if Liberty don't confift in this, what else can be devised that it fhould confist in? If it be faid, as Dr. Whitby elsewhere infifts, that it don't only confift in Liberty of doing what we will, but also a Liberty of willing without Neceffity; ftill the Question returns, What does that Liberty of willing without Neceffity confift in, but in a Power of willing as we pleafe, without being impeded by a contrary Neceffity? or in other Words, a Liberty for the Soul in its willing to act according to its own Choice? Yea, this very Thing the fame Author feems to allow, and fuppofe again and again, in the Ufe he makes of Sayings of the Fathers, whom he quotes as his Vouchers. Thus he cites the Words of Origen, which he produces as a Testimony on his Side; ‡ The Soul acts By HER OWN CHOICE, and it is free for her to incline to whatever Part SHE WILL. And those Words of Justin Martyr; § The Doctrine of the Chriftians is this, that Nothing is done or fuffered according to Fate, but that every Man doth Good or Evil ACCORDING TO HIS OWN FREE CHOICE. And from Eufebius, these Words; || If Fate be eftablish'd, Philofophy and Piety are overthrown. All thefe Things depending upon the Neceffity introduced by the Stars, and not upon Meditation and Exercife PROCEEDING FROM OUR OWN FREE CHOICE. And again, the Words of Maccarius; * God, to preferve the Liberty of Man's Will, fuffered their Bodies to die, that it might be IN THEIR CHOICE to turn to Good or Evil.- -They who are acted by the Holy Spirit, are not held under any Ne In his Book on the five Points, 2d Edit. p. 342. p. 360. ceffity, § Ibid. ceffity, but have Liberty to turn themfelves, and DO, WHAT THEY WILL in this Life. Thus, the Doctor in Effect comes into that very Notion of Liberty, which the Calvinists have which he at the fame Time condemns, as agreeing with the Opinion of Mr. Hobbes, namely, the Soul's acting by its own Choice, Men's doing Good or Evil according to their own free Choice, Their being in that Exercife which proceeds from their own free Choice, Having it in their Choice to turn to Good or Evil, and doing what they will. So that if Men exercise this Liberty in the Acts of the Will themfelves, it must be in exerting Acts of Will as they will, or according to their own free Choice; or exerting Acts of Will that proceed from their Choice. And if it be fo, then let every one judge whether this don't suppose a free Choice going before the free Act of Will, or whether an Act of Choice don't go before that Act of the Will which proceeds from it. And if it be thus with all free Acts of the Will, then let every one judge, whether it won't follow that there is a free Choice or Will going before the firft free Act of the Will exerted in the Cafe. And then let every one judge, whether this be not a Contradiction. And finally, let every one judge whether in the Scheme of thefe Writers there be any Poffibility of avoiding these Abfurdities. If Liberty confifts, as Dr. Whitby himself fays, in a Man's doing what He will; and a Man exercifes this Liberty, not only in external Actions, but in the Acts of the Will themselves; then fo far as Liberty is exercised in the latter, it confifts in willing what he wills: And if any fay fo, one of these two Things must be meant, either, 1. That a Man has Power to will, as he does will; becaufe what what he wills, he wills; and therefore has Power to will what he has Power to will. If this be their Meaning, then all this mighty Controversy about Freedom of the Will and Self-determining Power, comes wholly to Nothing; all that is contended for being no more than this, That the Mind of Man does what it does, and is the Subject of what it is the Subject of, or that what is, is; wherein None has any Controverfy with them. Or, 2. The Meaning must be, that a Man has Power to will as he pleases or chufes to will: That is, he has Power by one Act of Choice, to chufe another; by an antecedent Act of Will to chufe a confequent Act, and therein to execute his own Choice. And if this be their Meaning, it is nothing but fhuffling with those they difpute with, and baffling their own Reason. For ftill the Queftion returns, wherein lies Man's Liberty in that antecedent Act of Will which chofe the confequent Act. The Anfwer according to the fame Principles must be, that his Liberty in this alfo lies in his willing as he would, or as he chofe, or agreeable to another Act of Choice preceding that. And fo the Queftion returns in infinitum, and the like Answer must be made in infinitum: In order to fupport their Opinion, there must be no Beginning, but free Acts of Will must have been chofen by foregoing free Acts of Will, in the Soul of every Man, without Beginning; and fo before he had a Being, from all Eternity. SECTION Concerning the Will's determining in Things which are perfectly indifferent, in the View of the Mind. A Great Argument for Self-determining Power, is the fuppofed Experience we univerfally have of an Ability to determine our Wills, in Cafes wherein no prevailing Motive is prefented: The Will (as is fuppofed) has its Choice to make between two or more Things, that are perfectly equal in the View of the Mind; and the Will is apparently altogether indifferent; and yet we find no Difficulty in coming to a Choice; the Will can inftantly determine itfelf to one, by a fovereign Power which it has over itfelf, without being moved by any preponderating Inducement. Thus the forementioned Author of an Effay on the Freedom of the Will, &c. P. 25, 26, 27, fuppofes," That there are many Inftances, wherein the Will is determined neither by prefent Un"eafinefs, nor by the greatest apparent Good, nor by the last Dictate of the Understanding, nor by any Thing elfe, but merely by itself, as a "fovereign Self-determining Power of the Soul; "and that the Soul does not will this or that Ac"tion, in fome Cafes, by any other Influence, "but because it will. Thus (fays he) I can turn my Face to the South, or the North; I can 66 point with my Finger upward, or downward.— "And thus, in fome Cafes, the Will determines "itself in a very fovereign Manner, because it " will, without a Reafon borrowed from the Un derstanding and hereby it discovers its own "perfect Power of Choice, rifing from within it felf, and free from all Influence or Reftraint of any Kind." And in Pages 66, 70, 73, and 74. This Author very exprefly fuppofes the Will in many Cases to be determined by no Mctive at all, but to act altogether without Motive, or Ground of Preference-Here I would obferve, 1. The very Suppofition which is here made, directly contradicts and overthrows itself. For the Thing fuppofed, wherein this grand Argument confifts, is, That among feveral Things the Will actually chufes one before another, at the fame Time that it is perfectly indifferent; which is the very fame Thing as to fay, the Mind has a Preference, at the fame Time that it has no Preference. What is meant can't be, that the Mind is indifferent before it comes to have a Choice, or 'till it has a Preference; or, which is the fame Thing, that the Mind is indifferent until it comes to be not indifferent. For certainly this Author did not fuppofe he had a Controverfy with any Perfon in fuppofing this: And then it is Nothing to his Purpose, that the Mind which chufes, was indifferent once; unless it chufes, remaining indifferent; for otherwife, it don't chufe at all in that Cafe of Indifference, concerning which is all the Question. Befides, it appears in Fact, that the Thing which this Author fuppofes, is not, that the Will chufes one Thing before another, concerning which it is indifferent before it chufes; but alfo is indifferent when it chufes; and that its being otherwise than indifferent is not 'till afterwards, in Confequence of its Choice; and that the chofen Thing's appearing preferable to and more agreeable than another, arifes from its Choice already made. His Words are (P. 30.) "Where the Objects "which are proposed, appear equally fit or good, the Will is left without a Guide or Director; "and |