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of the Word, any Thing of the Caufe or Original of that Choice; or at all confidering how the Perfon came to have fuch a Volition whether it was caused by fome external Motive, or internal habitual Bias; whether it was determin'd by fome internal antecedent Volition, or whether it happen'd without a Caufe; whether it was neceffarily connected with fomething foregoing, or not connected. Let the Perfon come by his Volition or Choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is Nothing in the Way to hinder his pursuing and executing his Will, the Man is fully and perfectly free, according to the primary and common Notion of Freedom.

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What has been faid may be fufficient to fhew what is meant by Liberty, according to the common Notions of Mankind, and in the ufual and primary Acceptation of the Word: But the Word, as used by Arminians, Pelagians and others, who oppofe the Calvinists, has an entirely different Signification. These several Things belong to their Notion of Liberty. 1. That it confifts in a Selfdetermining Power in the Will, or a certain Sovereignty the Will has over itself, and its own Acts, whereby it determines its own Volitions; fo as not to be dependent in its Determinations, on any Cause without itself, nor determined by any Thing prior to its own Acts. 2. Indifference belongs to Liberty in their Notion of it, or that the Mind, previous to the Act of Volition be, in equilibrio. 3. Contingence is another Thing that belongs and is effential to it; not in the common Acceptation of the Word, as that has been already explain'd, but as oppofed to all Neceffity, or fixed and certain Connection with fome preany vious Ground or Reafon of its Existence. They fuppofe the Effence of Liberty fo much to confift in thefe Things, that unless the Will of Man be

free

free in this Senfe, he has no real Freedom, how much foever he may be at Liberty to act according to his Will.

A moral Agent is a Being that is capable of thofe Actions that have a moral Quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral Senfe, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a moral Faculty, or Senfe of moral Good and Evil, or of fuch a Thing as Defert or Worthiness of Praise or Blame, Reward or Punishment; and a Capacity which an Agent has of being influenced in his Actions by moral Inducements or Motives, exhibited to the View of Understanding and Reafon, to engage to a Conduct agreeable to the moral Faculty.

The Sun is very excellent and beneficial in its Action and Influence on the Earth, in warming it, and causing it to bring forth its Fruits; but it is not a moral Agent: Its Action, though good, is not virtuous or meritorious. Fire that breaks out in a City, and confumes great Part of it, is very mischievous in its Operation; but is not a moral Agent: what it does is not faulty or finful, or deferving of any Punishment. The brute Creatures are not moral Agents: the Actions of fome of them are very profitable and pleasant; others are very hurtful: yet, feeing they have no moral Faculty, or Senfe of Defert, and don't act from Choice guided by Understanding, or with a Capacity of reasoning and reflecting, but only from Instinct, and are not capable of being influenced by moral Inducements, their Actions are not properly finful or virtuous; nor are they properly the Subjects of any fuch moral Treat

ment

ment for what they do, as moral Agents are for their Faults or good Deeds.

Here it may be noted, that there is a circumftantial Difference between the moral Agency of a Ruler and a Subject. I call it circumftantial, because it lies only in the Difference of moral Inducements they are capable of being influenced by, arifing from the Difference of Circumftances. A Ruler acting in that Capacity only, is not capable of being influenced by a moral Law, and its Sanctions of Threatenings and Promises, Rewards and Punishments, as the Subject is; though both may be influenced by a Knowledge of moral Good and Evil. And therefore the moral Agency of the Supreme Being, who acts only in the Capacity of a Ruler towards his Creatures, and never as a Subject, differs in that Refpect from the moral Agency of created intelligent Beings. God's Actions, and particularly thote which he exerts as a moral Governour, have moral Qualifications, are morally good in the highest Degree. They are most perfectly holy and righteous; and we muft conceive of Him as influenced in the highest Degree, by that which, above all others, is properly a moral Inducement; viz. the moral Good which He fees in fuch and fuch Things: And therefore He is, in the moft proper Sense, a moral Agent, the Source of all moral Ability and Agency, the Fountain and Rule of all Virtue and moral Good; though by Reason of his being Supreme over all, 'tis not poffible He fhould be under the Influence of Law or Command, Promifes or Threatenings, Rewards or Punishments, Counfels or Warnings. The effential Qualities of a moral Agent are in God, in the greateft poffible Perfection; fuch as Understanding, to perceive the Difference between moral Good and Evil; a Capacity of difcerning that moral Worthiness and

Demerit,

Demerit, by which fome Things are Praise-worthy, others deferving of Blame and Punishment; and also a Capacity of Choice, and Choice guided by Understanding, and a Power of acting according to his Choice or Pleasure, and being capable of doing thofe Things which are in the highest Senfe Praise-worthy. And herein does very much confift that Image of God wherein he made Man, (which we read of Gen. I. 26, 27. and Chap. IX. 6.) by which God diftinguished Man from the Beafts, viz. in thofe Faculties and Principles of Nature, whereby He is capable of moral Agency. Herein very much confifts the natural Image of God; as his fpiritual and moral Image, wherein Man was made at firft, confifted in that moral Excellency, that he was endowed with.

PART

PART II.

Wherein it is confidered whether there is or can be any fuch Sort of FREEDOM OF WILL, as that wherein Arminians place the Effence of the Liberty of all moral Agents; and whether any fuch Thing ever was or can be conceived of.

SECTION I.

Shewing the manifeft Inconfiftence of the Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will, confifting in the Will's felf-determining Power.

H

Aving taken Notice of those Things which may be neceffary to be obferved, concerning the Meaning of the principal Terms and Phrafes made ufe of in Controverfies concerning human Liberty, and particularly observed what Liberty is, according to the common Language, and general Apprehenfion of Mankind, and what it is as understood and maintained by Arminians; I proceed to confider the Arminian Notion of the Freedom of the Will, and the fuppofed Neceffity of it in Order to moral Agency, or in Order to any One's

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