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felves, when we talk of the World's being differently fix'd with Refpect to either of thefe Sorts of Measures. I think, we know not what we mean, if we say, the World might have been differently placed from what it is, in the broad Expanfe of Infinity; or, that it might have been differently fix'd in the long Line of Eternity: And all Arguments and Objections which are built on the Imaginations we are apt to have of infinite Extenfion or Duration, are Buildings founded on Shadows, or Caftles in the Air.

2. The fecond Argument, to prove that the moft High wills one Thing rather than another, without any fuperiour Fitnefs or Preferableness in the Thing prefer'd, is God's actually placing in different Parts of the World, Particles or Atoms of Matter that are perfectly equal and alike. The foremention'd Author fays, P. 78. &c." If one "would defcend to the minute fpecific Particles, "of which different Bodies are compofed, we "fhould fee abundant Reason to believe that there "are Thousands of fuch little Particles or Atoms "of Matter, which are perfectly equal and alike, "and could give no diftin&t Determination to the "Will of God, where to place them." He there inftances in Particles of Water, of which there are fuch immenfe Numbers, which compofe the Rivers and Oceans of this World; and the infi-. nite Myriads of the luminous and fiery Particles, which compofe the Body of the Sun; fo many, that it would be very unreasonable to fuppofe no two of them should be exactly equal and alike.

Anfw. (1.) To this I answer: That as we must fuppofe Matter to be infinitely divisible, 'tis very unlikely that any two of all these Particles are exactly equal and alike; fo unlikely, that it is a

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Thousand to one, yea, an infinite Number to one, but it is otherwife: And that although we fhould allow a great Similarity between the different Particles of Water and Fire, as to their general Nature and Figure; and however fmall we fuppofe those Particles to be, 'tis infinitely unlikely, that any two of them fhould be exactly equal in Dimensions and Quantity of Matter. If we fhould fuppofe a great many Globes of the fame Nature with the Globe of the Earth, it would be very ftrange, if there were any two of them that had exactly the fame Number of Particles of Duft and Water in them. But infinitely lefs ftrange, than that two Particles of Light fhould have juft the fame Quantity of Matter. For a Particle of Light (according to the Doctrine of the infinite Divifibility of Matter) is compofed of infinitely more affignable Parts, than there are Particles of Duft and Water in the Globe of the Earth. And as it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of these Particles fhould be equal, fo it is, that they fhould be alike in other Refpects. To inftance in the Configuration of their Surfaces. If there were very many Globes, of the Nature of the Earth, it would be very unlikely that any two fhould have exactly the fame Number of Particles of Duft, Water and Stone, in their Surfaces, and all pofited exactly alike, one with Refpect to another, without any Difference, in any Part difcernable either by the naked Eye or Microfcope; but infinitely lefs ftrange, than that two Particles of Light fhould be perfectly of the fame Figure. For there are infinitely more affignable real Parts on the Surface of a Particle of Light, than there are Particles of Duft, Water and Stone, on the Surface of the terreftrial Globe.

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Anfw. (2.) But then, fuppofing that there are two Particles or Atoms of Matter perfectly equal and alike, which God has placed in different Parts of the Creation; as I will not deny it to be poffible for God to make two Bodies perfectly alike, and put them in different Places; yet it will not follow, that two different or diftinct Acts or Effects of the Divine Power have exactly the fame Fitness for the fame Ends. For thefe two different Bodies are not different or distinct, in any other Refpects than those wherein they differ: They are two in no other Refpects than those wherein there is a Difference. If they are perfectly equal and alike in themselves, then they can be diftinguifhed, or be diftinct, only in those Things which are called Circumstances; as Place, Time, Reft, Motion, or fome other prefent or paft Circumstances or Relations. For 'tis Difference only that conftitutes Diftinction. If God makes two Bodies in themselves every Way equal and alike, and agreeing perfectly in all other Circumstances and Relations, but only their Place; then in this only is there any Diftinction or Duplicity. The Figure is the fame, the Measure is the fame, the Solidity and Resistance are the fame, and every Thing the fame, but only the Place. Therefore what the Will of God determines, is this, namely, that there fhould be the fame Figure, the fame Extenfion, the fame Resistance, &c. in two different Places. And for this Determination he has fome Reason. There is fome End, for which fuch a Determination and A& has a peculiar Fitness, above all other Acts. Here is no one Thing determined without an End, and no one Thing without a Fitness for that End, fuperiour to any Thing else. If it be the Pleasure of God to cause the fame Refiftance, and the fame Figure, to be in two different Places and Situati

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ons, we can no more juftly argue from it, that here must be fome Determination or Act of God's Will, that is wholly without Motive or End, then we can argue that whenever, in any Cafe it is a Man's Will to speak the fame Words, or make the fame Sounds at two different Times; there must be some Determination or Act of his Will, without any Motive or End. The Difference of Place, in the former Cafe, proves no more than the Difference of Time does in the other. If any one should say with Regard to the former Cafe, that there must be something determined without an End; viz. That of thofe two fimilar Bodies, this in particular fhould be made in this Place, and the other in the other, and should inquire why the Creator did not make them in a Tranfpofition, when both are alike, and each would equally have fuited either Place? The Inquiry fuppofes fomething that is not true; namely, that the two Bodies differ and are diftinct in other Refpects befides their Place. So that with this Diftinction inherent in them, they might in their first Creation have been tranfpofed, and each might have begun its Existence in the Place of the other.

Let us for Clearnefs fake fuppofe, that God had at the Beginning made two Globes, each of an Inch Diameter, both perfect Spheres, and perfectly folid without Pores, and perfectly alike in every Respect, and placed them near one to another, one towards the right Hand, and the other towards the left, without any Difference as to Time, Motion or Reft, past or present, or any Circumftance, but only their Place; and the Queftion should be afk'd, Why God in their Creation placed 'em fo? Why that which is made on the right Hand, was not made on the left, and vice verfa? Let it be well confidered, whether there

be any Sense in such a Question; and whether the Inquiry don't fuppofe fomething falfe and abfurd. Let it be confidered, what the Creator must have done otherwife than he did, what different Act of Will or Power he must have exerted, in order to the Thing propofed. All that could have been done, would have been to have made two Spheres, perfectly alike, in the fame Places where he has made them, without any Difference of the Things made, either in themselves, or in any Circumstance; so that the whole Effect would have been without any Difference, and therefore just the fame. By the Suppofition, the two Spheres are different in no other Refpect but their Place; and therefore in other Refpects they are the fame. Each has the fame Roundness: it is not a distinct Rotundity, in any other Respect but its Situation. There are also the fame Dimensions, differing in nothing but their Place. And fo of their Refiftance, and every Thing elfe that belongs to them.

Here if any chuses to say, chufes to fay, "that there is a Difference in another Respect, viz. That they are not NUMERICALLY the fame: That it is thus with all the Qualities that belong to them: That it is confeffed they are in fome Refpects the fame; that is, they are both exactly alike; but yet numerically they differ. Thus the Roundnefs of one is not the fame numerical, individual Roundness with that of the other." Let this be fuppofed; then the Question about the Determination of the divine Will in the Affair, is, Why did God will, that this individual Roundness fhould be at the right Hand, and the other individual Roundness at the left? Why did not he make them in a contrary Pofition? Let any rational Perfon confider, whether fuch Questions be not Words without a Meaning; as much as if God fhould fee fit for

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