them in a clear Light, when their Eyes are open'd: fo they affent to the Truth of certain Propofitions, as foon as the Terms are understood; as that two and two make four, that black is not white, that two parallel Lines can never cross one another : fo by a natural Neceffity Men's Bodies move downwards, when there is nothing to fupport them.

But here feveral Things may be noted concerning these two Kinds of Neceffity.

1. Moral Neceffity may be as abfolute, as natural Neceffity. That is, the Effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral Caufe, as a natural neceffary Effect is with its natural Cause. Whether the Will in every Cafe is neceffarily determined by the strongest Motive, or whether the Will ever makes any Refiftance to fuch a Motive, or can ever oppose the strongest present Inclination, or not; if that Matter fhould be controverted, yet I fuppofe none will deny, but that, in fome Cafes, a previous Bias and Inclination, or the Motive prefented, may be fo powerful, that the Act of the Will may be certainly and indiffolubly connected therewith. When Motives or previous Bias are very strong, all will allow that there is fome Difficulty in going against them. And if they were yet ftronger, the Difficulty would be ftill greater. And therefore, if more were ftill added to their Strength, to a certain Degree, it would make the Difficulty fo great, that it would be wholly impoffible to furmount it; for this plain Reason, because whatever Power Men may be fupposed to have to furmount Difficulties, yet that Power is not infinite; and fo goes not beyond certain Limits. If a Man can furmount ten Degrees of Difficulty of this Kind, with twenty Degrees of Strength, because the Degrees of Strength are beyond the Degrees of Difficulty; yet if the Difficulty be increased to thirty, or an hundred, or a thousand

Degrees;

Degrees, and his Strength not alfo increased, his Strength will be wholly infufficient to furmount the Difficulty. As therefore it must be allowed, that there may be fuch a Thing as a fure and perfect Connection between moral Caufes and Effects; fo this only is what I call by the Name of moral Neceffity.

2. When I ufe this Diftinction of moral and natural Neceffity, I would not be understood to fuppofe, that if any Thing comes to pass by the former Kind of Neceffity, the Nature of Things is not concerned in it, as well as in the latter. I don't mean to determine, that when a moral Habit or Motive is so strong, that the Act of the Will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the Nature of Things. But thefe are the Names that thefe two Kinds of Neceffity have ufually been called by; and they must be diftinguished by fome Names or other; for there is a Diftinction or Difference between them, that is very important in its Confequences. Which Difference does not lie fo much in the Nature of the Connection, as in the two Terms connected. The Caufe with which the Effect is connected, is of a particular Kind; viz. that which is of a moral Nature; either fome previous habitual Difpofition, or fome Motive exhibited to the Understanding: And the Effect is alfo of a particular Kind; being likewife of a moral Nature; confifting in fome Inclination or Volition of the Soul or voluntary Action.

I fuppofe, that Neceffity which is called natural, in Diftinction from moral Neceffity, is fo called, because mere Nature, as the Word is vulgarly ufed, is concerned, without any Thing of Choice. The Word Nature is often ufed in Oppofition to Choice; not because Nature has indeed never any Hand in

our

our Choice; But this probably comes to pass by Means that we first get our Notion of Nature from that discernable and obvious Courfe of Events, which we obferve in many Things that our Choice has no Concern in; and especially in the material World; which, in very many Parts of it, we eafily perceive to be in a fettled Courfe; the stated Order and Manner of Succeffion being very apparent. But where we don't readily difcern the Rule and. Connection, (tho' there be a Connection, according to an establish'd Law, truly taking Place) we fignify the Manner of Event by fome other Name: Even in many Things which are feen in the material and inanimate World, which don't difcernably and obviously come to pafs according to any fettled Course, Men don't call the Manner of the Event by the Name of Nature, but by fuch Names as Accident, Chance, Contingence, &c. So Men make a Diftinction between Nature and Choice; as tho' they were completely and univerfally diftinct. Whereas, I fuppofe none will deny but that Choice, in many Cafes, arifes from Nature, as truly as other Events. But the Dependance and Connection between Acts of Volition or Choice, and their Caufes, according to established Laws, is not fo fenfible and obvious. And we obferve that Choice is as it were a new Principle of Motion and Action, different from that establish'd Law and Order of Things which is most obvious, that is feen especially in corporeal and fenfible Things; And alfo that Choice often interpofes, interrupts and alters the Chain of Events in these external Objects, and causes them to proceed otherwife than they would do, if let alone, and left to go on according to the Laws of Motion among themfelves. Hence it is fpoken of as if it were a Principle of Motion entirely diftinct from Nature, and properly fet in Oppofition to it: Names being commonly given to

Things, according to what is moft obvious, and is fuggefted by what appears to the Senses without Reflection and Research.

3. It must be obferved, that in what has been explain'd, as fignified by the Name of moral Neceffity, the Word Neceffity is not used according to the original Defign and Meaning of the Word: For, as was obferved before, fuch Terms neceffary, impoffible, irrefiftible, &c. in common Speech, and their most proper Senfe, are always relative; having Reference to fome fuppofable voluntary Oppofition or Endeavour, that is infufficient. But no fuch Oppofition, or contrary Will and Endeavour, is fuppofable in the Cafe of moral Neceffity; which is a Certainty of the Inclination and Will itself; which does not admit of the Suppofition of a Will to oppose and refift it. For 'tis abfurd, to fuppofe the fame individual Will to oppose itfelf, in its prefent Act; or the prefent Choice to be oppofite to, and refifting prefent Choice: as abfurd as it is to talk of two contrary Motions, in the fame moving Body, at the fame Time. And therefore the very Cafe fuppofed never admits of any Trial, whether an oppofing or refifting Will can overcome this Neceffity.

What has been faid of natural and moral Neceffity, may serve to explain what is intended by natural and moral Inability. We are faid to be naturally unable to do a Thing, when we can't do it if we will, because what is most commonly called Nature don't allow of it, or because of fome impeding Defect or Obftacle that is extrinfic to the Will; either in the Faculty of Understanding, Constitution of Body, or external Objects. Moral Inability confifts not in any of these Things; but either in the Want of Inclination; or the Strength

of a contrary Inclination; or the Want of fufficient Motives in View, to induce and excite the Act of the Will, or the Strength of apparent Motives to the contrary. Or both thefe may be refolved into one; and it may be faid in one Word, that moral Inability confifts in the Oppofition or Want of Inclination. For when a Perfon is unable to will or chufe fuch a Thing, through a Defect of Motives, or Prevalence of contrary Motives, 'tis the fame Thing as his being unable through the Want of an Inclination, or the Prevalence of a contrary Inclination, in fuch Circumftances, and under the Influence of fuch Views.

To give fome Inftances of this moral Inability.A Woman of great Honour and Chastity may have a moral Inability to prostitute herself to her Slave. A child of great Love and Duty to his Parents, may be unable to be willing to kill his Father. A very lafcivious Man, in Cafe of certain Opportunities and Temptations, and in the Abfence of fuch and fuch Restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his Luft. A Drunkard, under fuch and fuch Circumstances, may be unable to forbear taking of ftrong Drink. A very malicious Man may be unable to exert benevolent Acts to an Enemy, or to defire his Profperity: Yea, fome may be fo under the Power of a vile Difpofition, that they may be unable to love those who are most worthy of their Efteem and Affection. A strong Habit of Virtue, and great Degree of Holinefs may cause a moral Inability to love Wickedness in general, may render a Man unable to take Complacence in wicked Perfons or Things; or to chufe a wicked Life, and prefer it to a virtuous Life. And on the other Hand, a great Degree of habitual Wickedness may lay a Man under an Inability to love and chufe Holinefs; and render him utterly unable