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tion;

I answer, That Action and Paffion are doubtlefs, as they are fometimes ufed, Words of oppofite Signification; but not as fignifying oppofite Existences, but only oppofite Relations. The Words Caufe and Effect are Terms of oppofite Significabut nevertheless, if I affert that the fame Thing may at the fame Time, in different Refpects and Relations, be both Cause and Effect, this will not prove that I confound the Terms. The Soul may be both active and paffive in the fame Thing in different Refpects, active with Relation to one Thing, and paffive with Relation to another. The Word Paffion when fet in Oppofition to Action or rather Activeness, is merely a relative term: it fignifies no Effect or Cause, nor any proper Existence; but is the fame with Paffiveness, or a being paffive, or a being acted upon by fomething. Which is a mere Relation of a Thing to fome Power or Force exerted by fome Caufe, producing fome Effect in it, or upon it. And Action, when fet properly in Oppofition to Paffion, or Paffiveness, is no real Existence; it is not the fame with AN Action, but is a mere Relation: 'Tis the Activeness of fomething on another Thing, being the oppofite Relation to the other, viz. a Relation of Power, or Force exerted by fome Caufe, towards another Thing, which is the Subject of the Effect of that Power. Indeed the Word Action is frequently used to fignify fomething not merely relative, but more abfolute, and a real Existence; as when we say An Action; when the Word is not used tranfitively, but abfolutely, for fome Motion or Exercise of Body or Mind, without any Relation to any Object or Effect: And as ufed thus, it is not properly the oppofite of Paffion; which ordinarily fignifies nothing abfolute, but merely the Relation of being acted upon. And therefore if the Word Action be used in the like relative Sense,

then

then Action and Paffion are only two contrary Relations. And 'tis no Abfurdity to fuppofe, that contrary Relations may belong to the fame Thing, at the fame Time, with refpect to different Things. So to fuppofe, that there are Acts of the Soul by which a Man voluntarily moves, and acts upon Objects, and produces Effects, which yet themfelves are Effects of fomething elfe, and wherein the Soul itself is the Object of fomething acting upon, and influencing that, don't at all confound Action and Paffion. The Words may neverthelefs be properly of oppofite Signification: there may be as true and real a Difference between acting and being caused to act, tho' we should suppose the Soul to be both in the fame Volition, as there is between living, and being quicken'd, or made to live. 'Tis no more a Contradiction, to fuppofe that Action may be the Effect of fome other Caufe, befides the Agent, or Being that acts, than to fuppofe that Life may be the Effect of fome other Caufe, befides the Liver, or the Being that lives, in whom Life is caused to be.

The Thing which has led Men into this inconfiftent Notion of Action, when applied to Volition, as tho' it were effential to this internal Action, that the Agent fhould be felf-determined in it, and that the Will fhould be the Cause of it, was probably this; that according to the Senfe of Mankind, and the common Ufe of Language it is fo, with refpect to Men's external Actions; which are what originally, and according to the vulgar Ufe and most proper Sense of the Word, are called Actions. Men in these are felf-directed, felf-determined, and their Wills are the Cause of the Motions of their Bodies, and the external Things that are done; fo that unless Men do 'em voluntarily, and of Choice, and the Action be

deter

determined by their antecedent Volition, it is no Action or Doing of theirs. Hence fome Metaphyficians have been led unwarily, but exceeding abfurdly, to fuppofe the fame concerning Volition itfelf, that That alfo must be determined by the Will; which is to be determin'd by antecedent Volition, as the Motion of the Body is; not confidering the Contradiction it implies.

But 'tis very evident, that in the metaphyfical Diftinction between Action and Paffion, (tho' long fince become common and the general Vogue) due Care has not been taken to conform Language to the Nature of Things, or to any diftinct clear Ideas. As it is in innumerable other Philofophical, Metaphyfical Terms, ufed in thefe Difputes; which has occafion'd inexpreffible Difficulty, Contention, Errour and Confufion.

And thus probably it came to be thought, that Neceffity was inconfiftent with Action, as thefe Terms are applied to Volition. First, these Terms Action and Neceffity are changed from their original Meaning, as fignifying external voluntary Action, and Conftraint, (in which Meaning they are evidently inconfiftent) to fignify quite other Things, viz. Volition itself, and Certainty of Existence. And when the Change of Signification is made, Care is not taken to make proper Allowances and Abatements for the Difference of Sense; but ftill the fame Things are unwarily attributed to Action and Neceffity, in the new Meaning of the Words, which plainly belonged to 'em in their firft Sense; and on this Ground, Maxims are established without any real Foundation, as though they were the most certain Truths, and the most evident Dictates of Reafon.

But

But however strenuously it is maintain'd, that what is neceffary can't be properly called Action, and that a neceffary Action is a Contradiction, yet 'tis probable there are few Arminian Divines, who if thoroughly tried, would ftand to thefe Principles. They will allow, that God is in the highest Sense an active Being, and the highest Fountain of Life and Action; and they would not probably deny, that thofe that are called God's Acts of Righteousness, Holiness and Faithfulness, are truly and properly God's Ats, and God is really a holy Agent in them; and yet I truft, they will not deny, that God neceffarily acts juftly and faithfully, and that it is impoffible for Him to act unrighteously and unholily.

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The Reasons why fome think it contrary to common Senfe, to fuppofe thofe Things which are neceffary, to be worthy of either Praise or

Blame.

"TIS abundantly

IS abundantly affirmed and urged by Arminian Writers, that it is contrary to common Senfe, and the natural Notions and Apprehenfions of Mankind, to fuppofe otherwife than that Neceffity (making no Diftinction between natural and moral Neceffity) is inconfiftent with Virtue and Vice, Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment. And their Arguments from hence have been greatly triumphed in; and have been not a little perplexing to many who have been friendly to the Truth, as clearly revealed in the holy Scriptures: It has feem'd to them indeed difficult, to reconcile Calvinistic Doctrines with the Notions Men commonly have of Justice and Equity. And

the

the true Reasons of it seem to be these that follow.

I. 'Tis indeed a very plain Dictate of common Senfe, that natural Neceffity is wholly inconfiftent with juft Praise or Blame. If Men do Things which in themselves are very good, fit to be brought to pass, and very happy Effects, properly against their Wills, and can't help it; or do them from a Neceffity that is without their Wills, or with which their Wills have no Concern or Connection; then 'tis a plain Dictate of common Sense, that 'tis none of their Virtue, nor any moral Good in them; and that they are not worthy to be rewarded or praised; or at all efteemed, honoured or loved on that Account. And on the other Hand, that if from like Neceffity they do those Things which in Themselves are very unhappy and pernicious, and do them because they can't help it; the Neceffity is fuch, that it is all one whether they will them, or no; and the Reafon why they are done, is from Neceffity only, and not from their Wills; 'Tis a very plain Dictate of common Sense that they are not at all to blame; there is no Vice, Fault, or moral Evil at all in the Effect done; nor are they who are thus neceffitated, in any wife worthy to be punished, hated, or in the leaft direfpested, on that Ac

count.

In like Manner, if Things in themselves good and defirable are abfolutely impoffible, with a natural Impoffibility, the univerfal Reason of Mankind teaches, that this wholly and perfectly excufes Perfons in their not doing them.

And 'tis alfo a plain Dictate of common Senfe, that if the doing Things in themfelves good, or avoid

U

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