or fome voluntary Exertion or Effort of ours to the contrary: For we don't properly make Oppofition to an Event, any otherwife than as we voluntarily oppofe it. Things are faid to be what must be, or neceffarily are, as to us, when they are, or will be, though we defire or endeavour the contrary, or try to prevent or remove their Existence: But fuch Oppofition of ours always either confifts in, or implies Oppofition of our Wills. 'Tis manifeft that all fuch like Words and Phrafes, as vulgarly used, are used and accepted in this Manner. A Thing is faid to be necessary, when we can't help it, let us do what we will. So any Thing is faid to be impoffible to us, when we would do it, or would have it brought to pafs, and endeavour it; or at least may be fuppofed to defire and feek it; but all our Defires and Endeavours are, or would be vain. And that is faid to be irresistible, which overcomes all our Oppofition, Refiftance, and Endeavour to the contrary. And we are to be said Unable to do a Thing, when our fuppofable Defires and Endeavours to do it are infufficient. We are accustomed, in the common Ufe of Language, to apply and understand these Phrases in this Senfe: We grow up with fuch a Habit; which by the daily Use of these Terms, in fuch a Senfe, from our Childhood, becomes fix'd and fettled ; fo that the Idea of a Relation to a fuppofed Will, Defire and Endeavour of ours, is ftrongly connected with these Terms, and naturally excited in our Minds, whenever we hear the Words used. Such Ideas, and thefe Words, are fo united and affociated, that they unavoidably go together; one fuggefts the other, and carries the other with it, and never, can be feparated as long as 21 as we live. And if we use the Words, as Terms of Art, in another Senfe, yet, unless we are exceeding circumfpect and wary, we shall infenfibly flide into the vulgar Ufe of them, and fo apply the Words in a very inconfiftent Manner: this habitual Connection of Ideas will deceive and confound us in our Reasonings and Discourses, wherein we pretend to use these Terms in that Manner, as Terms of Art. 4. It follows from what has been obferved, that when these Terms neceffary, impoffible, irrefiftible, unable, &c. are used in Cafes wherein no Opposition, or infufficient Will or Endeavour, is fuppofed, or can be fuppofed, but the very Nature of the fuppofed Cafe itself excludes, and denies any fuch Oppofition, Will or Endeavour; these Terms are then not used in their proper Signification, but quite beside their Use in common Speech. The Reafon is manifeft; namely that in fuch Cafes we can't ufe the Words with Reference to a fuppofable Oppofition, Will or Endeavour. And therefore if any Man uses these Terms in fuch Cafes, he either ufes them nonfenfically, or in fome new Senfe, diverfe from their original and proper Meaning. As for Inftance; If a Man fhould affirm after this Manner, That it is neceffary for a Man, and what must be, that a Man fhould chufe Virtue rather than Vice, during the Time that he prefers Virtue to Vice; and that it is a Thing impoffible and irrefiftible, that it fhould be otherwife than that he should have this Choice, fo long as this Choice continues; fuch a Man would use these Terms muft, irrefiftible, &c. with perfect Infignificance and Nonfenfe, or in fome new Sense, diverse from their common Ufe; which is with Reference, as has been obferved, to fuppofable Oppofition, Unwillingness and Refistance; whereas, here, the very Suppofition excludes and denies any C 3 fuch fuch Thing for the Cafe fuppofed is that of being willing, and chufing. 5. It appears from what has been faid, that these Terms neceffary, impoffible, &c. are often ufed by Philofophers and Metaphyficians in a Senfe quite diverse from their common Ufe and original Signification: For they apply them to many Cafes in which no Oppofition is fuppofed or fuppofable. Thus they ufe them with Refpect to God's Exiftence before the Creation of the World, when there was no other Being but He: fo with regard to many of the Difpofitions and Acts of the divine Being, fuch as his loving himself, his loving Righteousness, hating Sin, &c. So they apply these Terms to many Cafes of the Inclinations and Actions of created intelligent Beings, Angels and Men; wherein all Oppofition of the Will is fhut out and denied, in the very Suppofition of the Cafe, Metaphyfical or Philofophical Neceffity is nothing different from their Certainty. I speak not now of the Certainty of Knowledge, but the Certainty that is in Things themfelves, which is the Foundation of the Certainty of the Knowledge of them; or that wherein lies the Ground of the Infallibility of the Propofition which affirms them. What is sometimes given as the Definition of Philofophical Neceffity, namely, That by which a Thing cannot but be, or whereby it cannot be otherwife, fails of being a proper Explanation of it, on two Accounts: First, the Words Can, or Cannot, need Explanation as much as the Word Neceffity; and the former may as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by the former. Thus, if any one asked us what we mean, when we fay, a Thing cannot but be, we might explain ourselves by fay ing, we mean, it must neceffarily be fo; as well as explain Neceffity, by faying, it is that by which a Thing cannot but be. And Secondly, this Definition is liable to the fore-mention'd great Inconvenience: The Words cannot, or unable, are properly relative, and have Relation to Power exerted, or that may be exerted, in order to the Thing spoken of; to which, as I have now observed, the Word Neceffity, as used by Philofophers, has no Reference. Philofophical Neceffity is really Nothing else than the full and fix'd Connection between the Things fignified by the Subject and Predicate of a Propofition, which affirms Something to be true. When there is fuch a Connection, then the Thing affirmed in the Propofition is neceffary, in a Philofophical Senfe; whether any Oppofition, or contrary Effort be fuppofed, or fuppofable in the Cafe, or no. When the Subject and Predicate of the Propofition, which affirms the Existence of any Thing, either Subftance, Quality, Act or Circumftance, have a full and certain Connection, then the Existence or Being of that Thing is faid to be neceffary in a metaphyfical Senfe. And in this Senfe I ufe the Word Neceffity, in the following Discourse, when I endeavour to prove that Neceffity is not inconfiftent with Liberty, The Subject and Predicate of a Propofition, which affirms Exiftence of Something, may have a full, fix'd, and certain Connection feveral Ways. (1.) They may have a full and perfect Connection in and of themselves; because it may imply a Contradiction, or grofs Abfurdity, to fuppofe them not connected. Thus many Things are neceffary in their own Nature, So the eternal Exiftence of Being C 4 Being generally confidered, is neceffary in itself: because it would be in itself the greatest Absurdity, to deny the Exiftence of Being in general, or to fay there was abfolute and univerfal Nothing; and is as it were the Sum of all Contradictions; as might be fhewn, if this were a proper Place for it. So God's Infinity, and other Attributes are neceffary. So it is neceffary in its own Nature, that two and two fhould be four; and it is neceffary, that all right Lines drawn from the Center of a Circle to the Circumference fhould be equal. It is neceffary, fit and fuitable, that Men fhould do to others, as they would that they fhould do to them. So innumerable Metaphyfical and Mathematical Truths are neceffary in Themfelves: The Subject and Predicate of the Propofition which affirms them, are perfectly connected of themselves. (2.) The Connection of the Subject and Predi cate of a Propofition, which affirms the Exiftence of Something, may be fix'd and made certain, because the Existence of that Thing is already come to pafs; and either now is, or has been; and fo has as it were made fure of Exiftence. And therefore, the Propofition which affirms present and paft Existence of it, may by this Means be made certain, and neceffarily and unalterably true; the past Event has fix'd and decided the Matter, as to its Exiftence; and has made it impoffible but that Existence should be truly predicated of it. Thus the Existence of whatever is already come to pafs, is now become neceffary; 'tis become impoffible it fhould be otherwife than true, that fuch a Thing has been. (3.) The Subject and Predicate of a Propofition which affirms Something to be, may have a real and certain Connection confequentially; and fa |