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15 Choice will be in a Degree fome Way compounded of the Degree of Good fuppofed by the Judgment, the Degree of apparent Probability or Certainty of that Good, and the Degree of the View or Senfe, or Liveliness of the Idea the Mind has, of that Good; because all together concur to conftitute the Degree in which the Object appears at present agreeable; and accordingly Volition will be determined.

I might further obferve, that the State of the Mind that views a propofed Object of Choice, is another Thing that contributes to the Agreeableness or Difagreeableness of that Object; the particular Temper which the Mind has by Nature, or that has been introduced and established by Education, Example, Custom, or fome other Means; or the Frame or State that the Mind is in on a particular Occafion. That Object which appears agreeable to one, does not fo to another. And the fame Object don't always appear alike agreeable to the fame Perfon, at different Times. It is moft agreeable to fome Men, to follow their Reafon; and to others, to follow their Appetites: To fome Men, it is more agreeable to deny a vicious Inclination, than to gratify it: Others it fuits beft to gratify the vileft Appetites. 'Tis more difagreeable to fome Men than others, to counter-act a former Refolution. In thefe Refpects, and many others which might be mention'd, different Things will be most agreeable to different Perfons; and not only fo, but to the fame Perfons at different Times.

But poffibly 'tis needlefs and improper, to mention the Frame and State of the Mind, as a diftinct Ground of the Agreeableness of Objects from the other two mention'd before; viz. The apparent Nature and Circumftances of the Objects view'd, and the Manner of the View: Perhaps if we strictly

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confider the Matter, the different Temper and State of the Mind makes no Alteration as to the Agreeableness of Objects, any other Way, than as it makes the Objects themselves appear differently beautiful or deformed, having apparent Pleasure or Pain attending them: And as it occafions the Manner of the View to be different, caufes the Idea of Beauty or Deformity, Pleasure or Uneafinefs to be more or lefs lively.

However, I think fo much is certain, that Volition, in no one Inftance that can be mentioned, is otherwife than the greatest apparent Good is, in the Manner which has been explain'd. The Choice of the Mind never departs from that which, at that Time, and with Refpect to the direct and immediate Objects of that Decifion of the Mind, appears most agreeable and pleafing, all Things confidered. If the immediate Objects of the Will are a Man's own Actions, then those Actions which appear most agreeable to him he wills. If it be now most agreeable to him, all Things confidered, to walk, then he wills to walk. If it be now, upon the whole of what at prefent appears to him, moft agreeable to speak, then he chufes to speak : If it fuits him beft to keep Silence, then he chufes to keep Silence. There is fcarcely a plainer and more universal Dictate of the Senfe and Experience of Mankind, than that, when Men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what fuits them beft, or what is most agreeable to them. To fay, that they do what they please, or what pleases them, but yet don't do what is agreeable to them, is the fame Thing as to fay, they do what they pleafe, but don't act their Pleafure; and that is to fay, that they do what they pleafe, and yet don't do what they please.

It appears from thefe Things, that in fome Senfe, the Will always follows the laft Dictate of the Under-· Standing; But then the Understanding must be taken in a large Senfe, as including the whole Faculty of Perception or Apprehenfion, and not merely what is called Reafon or Judgment. If by the Dic- tate of the Understanding is meant, what Reason declares to be beft or moft for the Perfon's Happiness, taking in the whole of his Duration, it is not true, that the Will always follows the laft Dictate of the Understanding. Such a Dictate of Reason is quite a different Matter from Things appearing now moft agreeable, all Things being put together which pertain to the Mind's prefent Perceptions, Apprehenfions or Ideas, in any Refpect. However, that Dictate of Reason, when it takes Place, is one Thing that is put into the Scales, and is to be confidered as a Thing that has Concern in the com. pound Influence which moves and induces the Will; and is one Thing that is to be confidered in eftimating the Degree of that Appearance of Good which the Will always follows; either as having its Influence added to other Things, or fubducted from them. When it concurs with other Things, then its Weight is added to them, as put into the fame Scale; but when it is against them, it is as a Weight in the oppofite Scale, where it refifts the Influence of other Things; yet its Refiftance is often overcome by their greater Weight, and fo the Act of the Will is determined in Oppofition to it.

The Things which I have faid may, I hope, ferve, in fome Measure, to illuftrate and confirm the Pofition I laid down in the Beginning of this Section, viz. That the Will is always determined by the strongest Motive, or by that View of the Mind which has the greatest Degree of previous Tendency to excite Volition. But whether I have been fo

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happy as rightly to explain the Thing wherein confifts the Strength of Motives, or not, yet my failing in this will not overthrow the Pofition itfelf, which carries much of its own Evidence with it, and is the Thing of chief Importance to the Purpose of the enfuing Difcourfe: And the Truth of it, I hope, will appear with greater Clearness, before I have finished what I have to fay on the Subject of human Liberty.

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Concerning the Meaning of the Terms Neceffity, Impoffibility, Inability, &c; and of Contingence.

TH

HE Words Neceffary, Impoffible, &c. are abundantly used in Controverfies about Freewill and moral Agency; and therefore the Sense in which they are used, fhould be clearly understood.

Here I might fay, that a Thing is then faid to be neceffary, when it muft be, and cannot be otherwife. But this would not properly be a Definition of Neceffity, or an Explanation of the Word, any more than if I explain'd the Word must, by there being a Neceffity. The Words must, can, and cannot, need Explication as much as the Words necessary, and impoffible; excepting that the former are Words that Children commonly ufe, and know fomething of the Meaning of, earlier than the latter.

The Word neceffary, as used in common Speech, is a relative Term; and relates to fome fuppofed Oppofition made to the Existence of the Thing fpoken of, which is overcome, or proves in vain to hinder or alter it. That is neceffary, in the original and proper Senfe of the Word, which is, or will be, notwithstanding all fuppofable Oppofition.

fition. To fay, that a Thing is neceffary, is the fame Thing as to fay, that it is impoffible it should not be: But the Word impoffible is manifeftly a relative Term, and has Reference to fuppofed Power exerted to bring a Thing to pafs, which is infufficient for the Effect; As the Word unable is relative, and has Relation to Ability or Endeavour which is infufficient; and as the Word Irrefiftible is relative, and has always Reference to Refiftance which is made, or may be made to fome Force or Power tending to an Effect, and is infufficient to withstand the Power, or hinder the Effect. The common Notion of Neceffity and Impoffibility implies fomething that fruftrates Endeavour or Defire.

Here feveral Things are to be noted.

1. Things are faid to be neceffary in general, which are or will be notwithstanding any fuppofable Oppofition from us or others, or from whatever Quarter. But Things are faid to be neceffary to us, which are or will be notwithstanding all Oppofition fuppofable in the Cafe from us. The fame may be obferved of the Word impoffible, and other fuch like Terms.

2. These Terms neceffary, impoffible, irresistibles &c. do especially belong to the Controverfy about Liberty and moral Agency, as ufed in the latter of the two Senfes now mention'd, viz. as neceffary or impoffible to us, and with Relation to any fuppofable Oppofition or Endeavour of ours.

3. As the Word Neceffity, in its yulgar and common Use, is relative, and has always Reference to fome fuppofable infufficient Oppofition; fo when we fpeak of any Thing as neceffary to us, it is with Relation to fome fuppofable Oppofition of our Wills,

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