litions which Motives excite, it chufes to be fo. It chufes whether it will comply with the Motive, which prefents itself in View, or not; and when various Motives are prefented, it chufes which it will yield to, and which it will reject. So p. 256. Every Man bas Power to act, or to refrain from a&ting agreeably with, or contrary to, any Motive that prefents. P. 257. Every Man is at Liberty to act, or refrain from acting agreeably with, or contrary to, what each of thefe Motives, confidered fingly, would excite bim to. Man has Power, and is as much at Liberty to reject the Motive that does prevail, as he has Power, and is at Liberty, to reject thofe Motives that do not. And fo p. 310, 311. In order to constitute a moral Agent, it is necessary, that he should have Power to act, or to refrain from acting, upon fuch moral Motives as he pleafes. And to the like Purpose in many other Places. According to thefe Things, the Will acts first, and chufes or refuses to comply with the Motive that is prefented, before it falls under its prevailing Influence: And 'tis first determined by the Mind's Pleasure or Choice, what Motives it will be induced by, before it is induced by them.

Now, how can thefe Things hang together? How can the Mind first act, and by its Act of Volition and Choice determine what Motives fhall be the Ground and Reafon of its Volition and Choice? For this fuppofes, the Choice is already made, before the Motive has its Effect; and that the Volition is already exerted, before the Motive prevails, fo as actually to be the Ground of the Volition; and makes the prevailing of the Motive, the Confequence of the Volition, which yet it is the Ground of. If the Mind has already chofen to comply with a Motive, and to yield to its Excitement, it don't need to yield to it after

this for the Thing is effected already, that the Motive would excite to, and the Will is beforehand with the Excitement; and the Excitement comes in too late, and is needlefs and in vain afterwards. If the Mind has already chofen to yield to a Motive which invites to a Thing, that implies and in Fact is a chufing the Thing invited to; and the very Act of Choice is before the Influence of the Motive which induces, and is the Ground of the Choice; the Son is before-hand with the Father that begets him. The Choice is fuppofed to be the Ground of that Influence of the Motive, which very Influence is fupposed to be the Ground of the Choice. And fo Vice verfa, The Choice is supposed to be the Confequence of the Influence of the Motive, which Influence of the Motive is the Confequence of that very Choice.

And befides, if the Will acts firft towards the Motive before it falls under its Influence, and the prevailing of the Motive upon it to induce it to act and chufe, be the Fruit and Confequence of its Act and Choice, then how is the Motive a PREVIOUS Ground and Reafon of the Act and Choice, fo that in the Nature of the Thing, Volition cannot take Place without fome PREVIOUS Reafon and Motive to induce it; how is it that this Act is confequent upon, and follows the Motive? Which Things Mr. Chubb often afferts, as of certain and undoubted Truth: So that the very fame Motive is both previous and confequent, both before and after, both the Ground and Fruit of the very fame Thing!

II. Agreeable to the fore-mention'd inconfiftent Notion of the Will's first acting towards the Motive, chufing whether it will comply with it, in order to its becoming a Ground of the Will's acting,

acting, before any Act of Volition can take Place, Mr. Chubb frequently calls Motives and Excitements to the Action of the Will, the paffive Ground or Reafon of that Action. Which is a remarkable Phrafe; than which I prefume there is none more unintelligible, and void of diftinct and confiftent Meaning, in all the Writings of Duns Scotus, or Thomas Aquinas. When he represents the Motive to Action or Volition as paffive, he muft mean— paffive in that Affair, or paffive with Respect to that Action which he fpeaks of; otherwife it is Nothing to his Purpose, or relating to the Design of his Argument: He must mean (if that can be called a Meaning) that the Motive to Volition is first acted upon or towards by the Volition, chufing to yield to it, making it a Ground of Action, or determining to fetch its Influence from thence; and fo to make it a previous Ground of its own Excitation and Existence. Which is the fame Abfurdity, as if one fhould fay, that the Soul of Man, or any other Thing fhould, previous to its exifting, chufe what Cause it would come into Existence by, and fhould act upon its Caufe, to fetch Influence from thence, to bring it into Being; and fo its Caufe fhould be a paffive Ground of its Existence !

Mr. Chubb does very plainly suppose Motive or Excitement to be the Ground of the Being of Volition. He speaks of it as the Ground or Reason of the EXERTION of an Act of the Will, p. 391, and 392. and exprefly fays, that Volition cannot TAKE PLACE without fome previous Ground or Motive to induce it, p. 363. And he speaks of the Act as FROM the Motive, and FROM THE INFLUENCE of the Motive, p. 352. and from the Influence that the Motive has on the Man, for the PRODUCTION of an Action, p. 317. Cer

tainly,

tainly, there is no need of multiplying Words about this; 'Tis eafily judged, whether Motive can be the Ground of Volition's being exerted and taking Place, fo that the very Production of it is from the Influence of the Motive, and yet the Motive, before it becomes the Ground of the Volition, be paffive, or acted upon by the Volition. But this I will fay, That a Man who infifts fo much on Clearnefs of Meaning in others, and is fo much in blaming their Confufion and Inconfiftence, ought, if he was able, to have explained his Meaning in this Phrafe of paffive Ground of Action, fo as to fhew it not to be confufed and inconfiftent.

If any should suppose, that Mr. Chubb, when he fpeaks of Motive as a paffive Ground of Action, don't mean paffive with Regard to that Volition which it is the Ground of, but fome other antecedent Volition (tho' his Purpose and Argument, and whole Difcourfe, will by no Means allow of fuch a Suppofition) yet it would not help the Matter in the leaft. For, (1.) If we fuppofe that there is an Act of Volition or Choice, by which the Soul chufes to yield to the Invitation of a Motive to another Volition, by which the Soul chufes fomething elfe; both thefe fuppofed Volitions are in Effect the very fame. A Volition, or chufing to yield to the Force of a Motive inviting to chufe fomething, comes to just the fame Thing as chufing the Thing which the Motive invites to, as I obferved before. So that here can be no Roomto help the Matter, by a Distinction of two Volitions. (2.) If the Motive be paffive with Refpect, not to the fame Volition that the Motive excites to, but one truly diftinct and prior; yet, by Mr. Chubb, that prior Volition can't take Place, without a Motive or Excitement, as a previous Ground

of

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of its Existence: For he infifts, that it is abfurd to fuppofe any Volition should take Place without fome previous Motive to induce it. So that at last it comes to just the fame Abfurdity: for if every Volition must have a previous Motive, then the very first in the whole Series must be excited by a previous Motive; and yet the Motive to that firft Volition is paffive; but can't be paflive with Regard to another antecedent Volition, because, by the Suppofition, it is the very firft: Therefore if it be paffive with Refpect to any Volition, it must be fo with Regard to that very Volition that it is the Ground of, and that is excited by it.

III. Tho' Mr. Chubb afferts, as above, that every Volition has fome Motive, and that, in the Nature of the Thing, no Volition can take Place without fome Motive to induce it; yet he afferts, that Volition does not always follow the ftrongest Motive; or in other Words, is not governed by any fuperiour Strength of the Motive that is followed, beyond Motives to the contrary, previous to the Volition itself. His own Words, p. 258, are as follows: "Tho' with regard to phyfical Caufes, "that which is ftrongeft always prevails, yet it is "otherwife with regard to moral Causes. Of "thefe, fometimes the ftronger, fometimes the "weaker, prevails. And the Ground of this "Difference is evident, namely, that what we "call moral Caufes, ftrictly fpeaking, are no "Caufes at all, but barely paffive Reatons of, or "Excitements to the Action, or to the refrain"ing from acting: which Excitements we have "Power, or are at Liberty to comply with or re

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ject, as I have fhewed above." And fo throughout the Paragraph, he, in a Variety of Phrafes, infifts, that the Will is not always determined by the strongest Motive, unlefs by ftrongest we pre

pofte