ty confifts in the Soul's having Power and Opportunity to have what Determinations of the Will it pleases or chufes. And if the Determinations of the Will, and the laft Dictates of the Understanding be the fame Thing, then Liberty confifts in the Mind's having Power to have what Dictates of the Understanding it pleases, having Opportunity to chufe its own Dictates of Underftanding. But this is abfurd; for it is to make the Determination of Choice prior to the Dictate of Understanding, and the Ground of it; which can't confift with the Dictate of Understanding's being the Determination of Choice itself.

Here is no way to do in this Cafe, but only to recur to the old Abfurdity, of one Determination before another, and the Cause of it; and another before that, determining that; and fo on in infinitum. If the laft Dictate of the Understanding be the Determination of the Will itself, and the Soul be free with regard to that Dictate, in the Arminian Notion of Freedom; then the Soul, before that Dictate of its Understanding exifts, voluntarily and according to its own Choice determines, in every Cafe, what that Dictate of the Underftanding fhall be; otherwife that Dictate, as to the Will, is neceffary; and the Acts determined by it, must also be neceffary. So that here is a Determination of the Mind prior to that Dictate of the Understanding, an Act of Choice going before it, chufing and determining what that Dictate of the Understanding fhall be: and this preceding Act of Choice, being a free Act of Will, must also be the fame with another laft Dictate of the Understanding: And if the Mind also be free in that Dictate of Understanding, that must be determined ftill by another; and so on for ever.

Befides, if the Dictate of the Understanding, and Determination of the Will be the fame, this confounds the Understanding and Will, and makes them the fame. Whether they be the fame or no, I will not now difpute; but only would obferve, that if it be fo, and the Arminian Notion of Liberty confifts in a Self-determining Power in the Understanding, free of all Neceffity, being independent, undetermined by any Thing prior to its own Acts and Determinations; and the more the Understanding is thus independent, and fovereign over its own Determinations, the more free: then of course, the Freedom of the Soul, as a moral Agent, must confift in the Independence of the Understanding on any Evidence or Appearance of Things, or any Thing whatsoever that ftands forth to the View of the Mind, prior to the Understanding's Determination. And what a Sort of Liberty is this! confifting in an Ability, Freedom and Easiness of judging, either according to Evidence, or against it; having a fovereign Command over itfelf at all Times, to judge, either agreeably or difagreeably to what is plainly exhibited to its own View. Certainly, 'tis no Liberty that renders Perfons the proper Subjects of perfuafive Reasoning, Arguments, Expoftulations, and fuch like moral Means and Inducements: The Ufe of which with Mankind, is a main Argument of the Arminians, to defend their Notion of Liberty free of all Neceffity: For according to this, the more free Men are, the lefs they are under the Government of fuch Means, lefs fubject to the Power of Evidence and Reason, and more independent on their Influence, in their Determinations.

However, whether the Understanding and Will are the fame or no, as Dr. Clark feems to fuppofe,

yet,

yet, in order to maintain the Arminian Notion of Liberty without Neceffity, the free Will muft not be determined by the Understanding, nor neceffarily connected with the Understanding; and the further from fuch Connection, the greater the Freedom. And when the Liberty is full and complete, the Determinations of the Will must have no Connection at all with the Dictates of the Understanding. And if fo, in vain are all Applications to the Understanding, in order to induce to any free virtuous Act; and fo in vain are all Inftructions, Counfels, Invitations, Expoftulations, and all Arguments and Perfuafives whatfoever: For these are but Applications to the Understanding, and a clear and lively Exhibition of the Objects of Choice to the Mind's View. But if, after all, the Will must be self-determined, and independent on the Understanding, to what Purpose are Things thus reprefented to the Understanding, in order to determine the Choice?

SECTION N X.

Volition neceffarily connected with the Influence of Motives; with particular Obfervations on the great Inconfiftence of Mr. Chubb's Affertions and Reajonings, about the Freedom of the Will.

HAT every Act of the Will has fome Caufe, and confequently (by what has been already proved) has a neceffary Connection with its Caufe, and fo is neceffary by a Neceffity of Connection and Confequence, is evident by this, That every Act of the Will whatsoever, is excited by fome Motive: Which is manifeft, because, it I 3

the

the Will or Mind, in willing and chufing after the Manner that it does, is excited fo to do by no Motive or Inducement, then it has no End which it propofes to itself, or purfues in fo doing; it aims at Nothing, and feeks Nothing. And if it feeks Nothing, then it don't go after any Thing, or exert any Inclination or Preference towards any Thing. Which brings the Matter to a Contradiction; Because for the Mind to will fomething, and for it to go after fomething by an Act of Preference and Inclination, are the fame Thing.

But if every Act of the Will is excited by a Motive, then that Motive is the Cause of the A& of the Will. If the Acts of the Will are excited by Motives, then Motives are the Causes of their being excited; or, which is the fame Thing, the Cause of their being put forth into Act and Exiftence. And if fo, the Exiftence of the Acts of the Will is properly the Effect of their Motives. Motives do Nothing as Motives or Inducements, but by their Influence; and fo much as is done by their Influence, is the Effect of them. For that is the Notion of an Effect, fomething that is brought to pafs by the Influence of another Thing.

And if Volitions are properly the Effects of their Motives, then they are neceffarily connected with their Motives. Every Effect and Event being, as was proved before, neceffarily connected with that which is the proper Ground and Reafon of its Existence. Thus it is manifeft, that Volition is neceffary, and is not from any Self-determining Power in the Will: The Volition which is caused by previous Motive and Inducement, is not caused by the Will exercifing a fovereign Power over itself, to determine, caufe and excite

Volitions

Volitions in itself. This is not confiftent with the Will's acting in a State of Indifference and Equilibrium, to determine itfelf to a Preference; for the Way in which Motives operate, is by biaffing the Will, and giving it a certain Inclination' or Preponderation one Way.

Here it may be proper to obferve, that Mr. Chubb, in his Collection of Tracts on various Subjects, has advanced a Scheme of Liberty, which is greatly divided against itself, and thoroughly fubverfive of itfelf; and that many Ways.

I. He is abundant in afferting, that the Will, in all its Acts, is influenced by Motive and Excitement; and that this is the previous Ground and Reafon of all its Acts, and that it is never otherwife in any Inftance. He fays, p. 262. No Action can take Place without fome Motive to excite it. And in p. 263. Volition cannot take Place without Some PREVIOUS Reafon or Motive to induce it. And in p. 310. Action would not take Place without fome Reafon or Motive to induce it; it being abfurd to fuppofe, that the alive Faculty would be exerted without Some PREVIOUS Reafon to difpofe the Mind to Action. So alfo p. 257. And he fpeaks of these Things as what we may be abfolutely certain of, and which are the Foundation, the only Foundation we have of a Certainty of the moral Perfections of God. P. 252, 253, 254, 255, 261, 262, 263, 264.

And yet at the fame Time, by his Scheme, the Influence of Motives upon us to excite to Action, and to be actually a Ground of Volition, is confequent on the Volition or Choice of the Mind. For he very greatly infifts upon it, that in all free Actions, before the Mind is the Subject of thofe Volitions

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