must be abolished. Marriage is property in woman; therefore marriage must be abolished, and free love alone must rule. Religion is only a scheme of priests and the upper classes to help one another to keep property; therefore religion must be abolished. All existing institutions are only fit for destruction; down with property, marriage, family, religion and everything! But Having thus summarily dealt with existing institutions, we must begin again to build up the social order upon an altruistic basis. who is going to do the building up, Boissel does not say; and as "the stupid and fatal power of custom" stands in the way, he does not think the outlook very hopeful. There is no criticism of the economic state of France in Boissel's writings, or of production under capitalism, or of the other subjects of discussion generally found in modern Socialistic works. In fact, Boissel is very crude, very French, and hardly deserves the serious estimate of him as "a thinker who represents the last phase of development from the old Utopian socialism to its modern form." But, of course, one cannot expect the eighteenth century to rise all at once to the altitude of "Fabian Essays;" and Dr. Grünberg has rendered valuable service by his careful monograph on an interesting example of Socialist influences in the French Revolution. H. DE B. GIBBINS. PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION. By DAVID RICARDO. Edited, with Introductory Essay, Notes and Appendices, by E. C. K. GONNER, M.A., Lecturer on Economic Science, University College, Liverpool. [lxii., 455 pp. Bell. London, 1891.] Professor Gonner has succeeded in adding a really valuable book to the standard works of Bohn's well-known library. Apart from his own special contributions, of which something must be said presently, we have a carefully edited reprint of Richardo's famous work, arranged in numbered paragraphs, and furnished with an analytical table of contents. To this we have appended two bibliographies, one of Ricardo's own works, the second of the chief works on Ricardo arranged under the several heads of Biographical, General Criticism, Criticism of Particular Theories. Fortunately the editor contents himself with imitating De Quincey in drawing out a suggested rearrangement of the work, and does not attempt to "improve upon " Ricardo, or to bring him up to date by forcing us to read the book in the suggested order. The whole of this work, done as it is by a master of his subject, will be welcomed by the future student in the devious path of economic theory. But a reprint or a new edition of a standard work is meaningless without a preface, and such preface is generally cast in a tone of apology or vindication. Professor Gonner proves no exception; indeed, not content with an exposition, forty pages long, of Ricardo's views, as he conceives them, in which he takes occasion by the way to dissipate popular errors about his hero, he returns to the charge at the end of the book, and, singling out three prominent critics of Ricardo's work-namely, Jevons, Ingram, and Held-demolishes their criticism, or in turn criticizes their attitude, in an appendix of some dozen pages more. It is, no doubt, of immense importance at the present moment that we should arrive at a correct and appreciative estimate of the work which Ricardo did. His name has become identified with a system, and, as Professor Gonner justly says, "the mere suggestion that such and such a view was held by Ricardo sounds an initial note of discredit," while critics think they are at liberty "to set up a figure called by his name in order to exhibit their skill in knocking it down." Under these circumstances, while on the one side the editor lays stress, almost to unnecessary exaggeration, on his author's obscurity and inaccuracy of language, and on his lamentable want of method, on the other side he takes pains to bring him before us as a man of large mind and of singularly sympathetic temper. It is Ricardo's open-mindedness rather than his critical acuteness, his tenacity of aim rather than his logical accuracy, on which we are encouraged to dwell. The body of the introductory essay is occupied with an exposition of the two portions into which the book, under Professor Gonner's rearranging hand, naturally falls, one dealing with the laws affecting the distribution of wealth, the other confined to the subject of taxation. Professor Gonner writes in a close concentrated style, which is at times difficult to disentangle. Want of space withholds us from following him in his careful attempt to weave together and, where necessary, to interpret Ricardo's loosely arranged and often inadequately expressed ideas. Of the two portions that call for most remark, one is the discussion of Ricardo's theory of value, in which Professor Gonner seems to think that Ricardo applied it to his theory of distribution in a completer manner than probably most critics would acknowledge. Most readers will, however, prefer to turn from these mazy paths of the theory of value to the plainer and more practical account of the origin of the celebrated theory of rent. Here the chief point made is the demolition of any claim on the part of Malthus to have assisted in the discovery of the true law. Professor Gonner's final judgment is that, despite all adverse criticism, and despite the very serious defects of Ricardo's writings, his work "in the development of theory is of the very highest order." To him we owe, "for the first time, a definite solution of the relations between price and remuneration," a simplification of the mysteries of foreign exchange, a development and restatement of the law of rent, and an indication of the connection between wages and profits, so far as the apportionment of value is concerned. Professor Gonner closes most appropriately by briefly pointing out the series of misunderstandings on which are based the socialistic interpretations of Ricardo's two theories noted above. The only complaint to be found is that they are not sufficiently explicit or detailed. D. J. MEDLEY. A SYSTEM OF POLITICAL OR COMPARATIVE ECONOMY, BY IMPUTATION OF VALUE. By ARTHUR M. SMITH. [Third edition. Williams and Norgate. 1891.] I have endeavoured in vain to understand why this book was written. The fact that it has reached a third edition puzzles me still more. However, the author apparently means well, though he fails to make his object plain to the average intelligence. The title page bears the motto: "So God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them;" but why this verse of Scripture should have been chosen more than any other we cannot even guess. There follow four books-I. "On Production;" II. "On Exchange," in two chapters-" The Ideal" and "The Real; " III. "On Distribution," before exchange and after exchange; and IV. "On Consumption; " again divided into "The Real" and "The Ideal." The whole amounts to nearly five hundred pages, in the course of which the writer touches on a good many subjects; and, I think, in default of being able to understand his remarks myself, it is fairer to him to select one or two interesting passages for the edification of others more fortunate. To begin with, Mill seems to have been a mistaken sort of person, against whom Mr. Smith levels some scathing attacks. About the poor, Mr. Smith says: "There are too many writers, thinkers, and speakers who act upon the supposition, of which Mill gives us a glimpse, that property and vice go hand in hand. There has probably been no writer who deserves so much from society for exposing the absurdity of these sorts of ideas as Charles Dickens, the moral of whose writings is that man's feelings and tendencies are the same in all grades of society. Riches are obtained by conformity to the scheme of society, he who conforms getting according to the amount of his conformity; and to abuse a man for compliance is foolish, and under the present scheme no one confers so much benefit upon the poor as the rich, and no one confers so much benefit upon the rich as the poor. By inequality is the benefit conferred " (p. 107). The only objection we feel inclined to make to this proof that all is for the best, is to ask, with Mr. Stead, What about the Nonconformist conscience? Mr. Smith's theory of value is, again, a deep mystery, but may be quoted for those who can comprehend it. On p. 182, he says: 66 A Turk or an Indian will be all day over a bargain, with coffee and cigars, when a merchant from Manchester would conclude the matter in five minutes, ergo, the goods bought and sold in Turkey and India are less valuable than those sold in Manchester. With this apparently true conclusion I must leave the reader to carry farther in his mind any casuistical ideas which then are suggested, would call up concerning an ideal measure of value, it would be an interesting and philosophical problem of much attraction but no value, and as I am unfortunately writing on facts I leave the subject, with, however, one remark in conclusion, which is that eternity is an à priori of ideal thought; consequently, to get a measure of ideal value you must get something to measure eternity. Is it possible to get such a measure?" The above passage is exactly as it stands in Mr. Smith's book, punctuation and all; but the "casuistical ideas" suggested thereby as to our own sanity, on trying to grasp its meaning, are too terrible to record. Let us hurry on to another diatribe against the unfortunate Mill, who has raised the ire of Mr. Smith by his arguments on the proposition that industry is limited by capital. "Mill's arguments amounts (sic) to this, that we cannot get more employment than what we can apply capital to, (sic) an argument so remarkably feeble that it is a matter of surprise to me that a man like Mr. J. S. Mill should have ventured to print it." But Mr. Smith "ventures to print " more wonderful arguments still. On p. 315, in speaking of his favourite subject, the Real and the Ideal in Political Economy, he writes: "The real consists in assuming that the smaller the quantity, the greater will be our desire to obtain it, and therefore the greater will be its value, its price. Let the reader, then, mark what I say, that price means other quantity, quantity of other objects in exchange, and therefore price, say of imports, is a guide to quantity (not value mind)" and so on. What the Ideal consists of I candidly cannot understand at all, but it is encouraging to find the statement on p. 381 that "those who think deeply will here see how beautiful is Hegel's philosophy, and that when you are dealing with reality you are at the same time idealizing, The idea is representing itself as thought directly identical, and yet has the power to set itself over against itself, so that it may be in this other only to be by itself." With this cheering assertion I leave Mr. Smith's book in the hands of "those who think deeply." It is utterly beyond my comprehension. H. DE B. GIBBINS. AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. By Jonn S. MACKENZIE. [390 pp. 8vo. 12s. 6d. Maclehose. Glasgow, 1890.] Mr. Mackenzie belongs to the same group of neo-Hegelian thinkers to which we already owe a valuable and suggestive series of Essays in Philosophical Criticism. Like others of the school, it would seem that Mr. Mackenzie has not been altogether satisfied with Hegelianism pure and simple. He has not gone so far as Professor Seth or Mr. Alexander, but he has taken Aristotle as well as Hegel for his master, and his sharply defined analytical classifications are Aristotelian rather that Hegelian. Various contributions from somewhat the same point of view have been made by English writers to Social Philosophy; such as the late Professor Green's masterly Lectures on Political Obligation, parts of Mr. F. H. Bradley's Ethical Studies, and Professor Jones's contribution to Essays in Philosophical Criticism. We miss in Mr. Mackenzie's book the resolute determination to grapple full face with the point and nothing but the point which marks Professor Green's work, and the subtle power of metaphysical discrimination which illuminates Mr. Bradley's Studies. His work cannot stand on a level with theirs, nor does it contain a great deal that is in itself new ; but it is a first attempt to bring "into close relation to each other a number of questions which are usually, at least in England, treated in a more disconnected way." In doing such recombining work, Mr. Mackenzie has made a real contribution to philosophical and social studies. I propose to give a brief account of Mr. Mackenzie's conception of the task and sphere of Social Philosophy, and of his analysis of the central idea of the Social Organism. He begins with a fourfold classification, based on Aristotle's four principles, of the ways in which any given phenomenon or group of phenomena may be regarded. Of these, the investigation of (1) phenomena looked at as facts or events, and (2) phenomena looked at as tendencies, belong to the Sciences. The business of Philosophy is to deal with the fundamental principles and the regulative ideals or ends which underlie phenomena. The task of Philosophy thus appears twofold, but it is really single; for it |