chaos of conflicting authority; in London each ward was an independent unit, in Chester and Norwich the intermingling of jurisdiction seems very puzzling. The new-comers were not always welcomed by the older ratepayers, and they might perhaps find it convenient to secure a measure of status by obtaining a royal charter for their gild. Just as the Jews or the Hansards were in the city and yet not citizens, but had an independent footing, so to some extent were the weavers situated, and apparently for similar reasons; they seem to have had status as weavers, which they held directly from the king, which marked them out from other townsmen, and which possibly delayed their complete amalgamation with the other inhabitants.

There is yet another feature about these weavers' gilds; the business in which they are engaged was one which was from an early time regulated by royal authority. King Richard I. issued an assize of cloth, defining the length and breadth which should be manufactured.1 The precise object of these regulations is not clear: they may have been made in the interests of the English consumer; they may have been made in the interests of the foreign purchaser, and the reputation of English goods abroad; they may have been framed in connection with a protective policy, of which there are some signs. But amid much that is uncertain, these three things seem very probable: 1. That there were no craft gilds before the Conquest. 2. That there were many craft gilds in connection with the newly introduced weavers' craft in the twelfth century. 3. That they exercised their powers under royal authority in a craft which was the subject of royal regulation.

So far for weavers; I wish now to turn to another craft in which we hear of craft gilds very early-the Bakers. There is a curious parallelism between these two callings. In the first place, baking was, on the whole, a domestic art before the Conquest, not a separate employment; in the next place, it was a matter of royal regulation ; the king's bakers doubtless provided the Court supplies, and they gave their experience for the framing of the assize of bread, under Henry II. and under King John. It may, I think, be said that in both of the trades in which gilds were first formed, there was felt to be a real need for regulation as to the quality of the goods sold to the public; and it also appears that this regulation was given under royal authority. But as the powers of local self-government increased and were consolidated, there was no need, and there was, perhaps, less opportunity, for direct royal interference in matters of internal trade, and craft gilds sprung 1 Richard of Hoveden, Rolls Series, iv. 33.

2 Cambridge University Library, Mm. i. 27. British Museum, Add. 14,252, f. 118 b.

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up which exercised their powers under municipal, and not under royal authority. One craft gild of this type which still exists, and which is said to have been formed by the authority of the leet in the sixth year of King John, is the Bakers' Gild at Coventry; it still consists of men who actually get their living by this trade, for it does not appear to have received so many love brothers as to destroy the original character of the body; it still has its hall-or, at least, room-and chest where the records are kept. There are, probably, not many other bodies in England which have had such a long existence, and which have altered so little during all these centuries from their original character.

In default of other evidence, there are two inferences which may be drawn tentatively from the history of these earliest-mentioned craft gilds. It seems that the first bodies which were authorized to regulate an English industry were concerned with a manufacture which had been newly introduced into England, and that their gilds were only gradually absorbed into the general life of the English towns; from this it seems fair to infer that the craft gild was not a native institution, but was imported from abroad. But though this may be true of the type, the evidence about the Bakers' business seems to throw some light on the manner in which such gilds may probably have been formed in the first instance. We know of the king's bakers as the men who devised the reasonable ordinances which were embodied in the Assize of Bread. Was not a craft gild, in so far as it emanated from royal authority, an actual department of the royal household, engaged in catering for the requirements of the Court? The royal bakers, laying down the reasonable ordinances for the baking trade under royal authority, are, at all events, the very type of the good men of some craft, who laid down remarkable ordinances for the exercise of that craft under municipal authority in the fourteenth century. Dr. Gross appears to reject the view expressed by Dr. Brentano, that the gilds emanated from family groups. But if family is interpreted in the larger sense of familia, as I believe Dr. Brentano would now do, the opinion deserves to be most carefully considered before it is dismissed. It certainly seems sensible to look for the origin of these industrial gilds, not in the fortuitous and unaccountable association of individual workers, but in the organized departments of the households of a king or other great man. Could this opinion be established, we might feel that there was a fairly harmonious explanation of the real problem in regard to these different types of gilds,-how did private associations, if they were merely private associations, come to aspire and come to 1 Fretton on Bakers' Gild in Mid-England, p. 124.

exercise coercive powers? If the earlier craft gilds sprang from the organized departments of great households the origin of these powers is explained; and the conflict between the royally authorized craft gilds and the burgesses in later days becomes more intelligible. From this point of view the fourteenth-century craft gilds may be regarded as popular institutions for regulating industry, which took over the powers previously exercised by the men of the royal household; while, on the other hand, the gild merchant appears to have been a popular institution to which was transferred the responsibility of regulating trading, which had been previously exercised by the propositus of the king.

But we need not press the matter farther: spinning hypotheses is tempting, and Dr. Gross has shown admirable self-repression in resisting a temptation before which so many previous workers in the same field have succumbed. But hypotheses need not be misleading. if we always bear in mind that suggestions are only suggestions, and not ascertained facts. Nor are they wholly useless, if we are ready to return with our speculations and submit them to the test of facts, and thus to set the facts themselves in a clearer light.

W. CUNNINGHAM.

'There were many features in the craft gilds, and possibly, though not apparently so prominent, in the gilds merchant which they shared with other organizations. The members united in common acts of worship, especially in common prayer and masses for departed brethren. Craft gilds, like other gilds, had the character of a friendly society, and gave loans to needy brethren, or bestowed alms on the poor. Like other gilds, they had their feasts, when the brethren drank their gild; and they had hoods, or livery, which they wore at their assemblies. Like other gilds they took their share in civic festivities, and provided pageants at considerable cost. But all these commons bonds, important as they were in cementing men into a real fellowship, and in calling forth such different interests and activities among the members, were of a pious, social, or charitable character. Their distinctive character lay in the special authority they possessed. A gild was not a craft gild unless duly empowered to regulate a particular craft; it might be called into existence for this purpose, or an existing gild might be empowered to exercise such functions, much as the brotherhood of St. Thomas à Becket was changed into the Mercers' Company. The important thing about a craft gild was that it had been empowered to exercise authority in a given area and over certain workmen.

REPORT ON SOCIAL LEGISLATION

IN THE UNITED STATES FOR 1889 AND 1890.

I.

PERHAPS it is not often that a professor finds the work of a student embarrassing by reason of its excellence. I have, however, had that experience in the preparation of the present article. When the editor of the Economic Review requested me to furnish him with an article on Social Legislation in the United States, I requested Mr. L. S. Merriam, a member of my graduate class in economics, and of my economic seminary, to assist me in the laborious work of getting together the provisions of recent American legislatures. It was my intention to use the material in the preparation of the article, giving him credit for the part of the work which belonged to him. Mr. Merriam has, however, performed his task so excellently, that I do not feel like making any changes in the paper which he has handed me, and he has left me nothing to do except to add a few words in this introduction.

The subject of Social Legislation in the United States brings up a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of our federal system with the English unified system of legislation, and that from a new and instructive standpoint. We have in the United States nearly fifty legislatures, and the advantages which we derive from legislation on a small scale have been frequently elaborated and exaggerated. It is true that we have a better opportunity, in some respects, to try legislative experiments, because the application of a law is so limited. On the other hand, it is discouraging to have to fight the same battle for social reform in nearly fifty commonwealths. When a beneficial law is passed in England, the whole country at once derives the benefit. Let the English reader reflect upon the amount of effort and sacrifice required to secure the present excellent English factory legislation. It is worth all it cost, many times over; but suppose after the seventh Earl of Shaftesbury and many others had expended years of toil in their agitation, both within and without Parliament, it had been necessary to repeat the battle nearly fifty times! That is the condition of affairs in the United States. It is true, that after laws have been passed in one state, it is easier to secure their passage in another state. But it

April, 1891. Report on Social Legislation in the United States. 235

requires immense effort and great sacrifice to secure the passage of any beneficial social legislation, particularly if it is supposed to affect injuriously any selfish private interests, no matter how many other states have already passed similar laws. The lessons taught by the experience of one commonwealth are learned only slowly in other commonwealths, Moreover, there is not sufficient talent in the country to secure satisfactory social legislation in every one of our legislatures, nearly fifty in number. The problem before us, in the United States, is not to produce one Earl of Shaftesbury, but fifty Earls of Shaftesbury.

The United States is industrially a unit, and it is obvious that social legislation ought to be unified throughout the length and breadth of the land. If one state is backward in laws designed to protect the working classes and to ameliorate the condition of the masses, that fact is always urged against legislation in other states. This is our experience, for example, in Maryland. If any legislation touching the hours of labour is proposed, our manufacturers will reply to advocates of such legislation : "We would not object to the laws you propose, provided they applied to all our competitors, but they apply only to a very few competitors, namely, those who happen to be engaged in production in Maryland." Others urge that laws which affect manufactures will drive capital out of the state which passes them. It is true that the predictions of calamity to result from labour laws in any state never come true, and that our experience has been in that respect precisely like that of England. Mr. Edward Atkinson, the optimist who thinks our present industrial system perfection, told the working men that the ten-hour law in Massachusetts would drive capital out of the state. After it was passed, more capital was invested in manufactures in Massachusetts than ever before. Notwithstanding that fact, however, the same argument was made to do service a few years later in the neighbouring commonwealth of Rhode Island, and was a serious obstacle to reform. I think this helps to explain why, take it all in all, we of the United States are so far behind England in social legislation, and it is to be hoped that plans in England for federation, and the distribution of the task of legislating for the kingdom or empire among several legislatures, will not be carried into effect without reference to the experience of the United States in social legislation. I am strongly of the opinion that all matters of this kind would best be left to a single legislature, with authority extending throughout the entire country.

One other fact must be borne in mind in every consideration of social legislation in the United States, and that is the influence which our constitutional system gives to judges. Our judges not only interpret