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let Ifrael go? I know not the Lord, neither will I let Ifrael go." It is no wonder, however, that Pharaoh fhould hold in abhorrence the God of Mofes; he had no doubt, Gods of his own which he held in higher estimation than he did this Hebrew divinity. Such has been the fact in regard to all nations; and, after manufacturing divinities to please themselves, they generally held in the most fovereign contempt the Gods of their neighbours. But it is fomething more extraordinary that Mofes fhould fall out with the idols of his own choice. This will appear to be the fact by quoting the two last veries of this chapter. "And Mofes returned unto the Lord, and faid, Lord, wherefore hast thou fo evil-entreated this people? why is it that thou hast fent me? for fince I came to Pharaoh to speak in thy name, he hath done evil to this people: neither hast thou delivered thy people at all." This is very pretty language indeed for man to make ufe of to his maker; it is upbraiding of him with a witnefs, and calling in question all the moral attributes of his character. It is telling him in plain terms, that he had treated them very ill, and that no firm reliance could be placed upon the properties of his existence. Another thought arifes, however, which will in fome measure folve the difficulty. We ought to remember that Mofes and his God are not upon good terms; for in the very preceding chapter we have an account of a quarrel which they had at an Egyptian tavern, where God tried to kill Mofes, but could not make it out. This was commented upon in our last number; we mention it now only to fhow that that circumstance might have been the cause of fixing in the breast of Mofes a fentiment of rancarous revenge. But the whole bufinefs, the fracas at the tavern and the manner in which Mofes addreffes his God, instead of being divine revela. tion, has been made by very stupid and fuperstitious men, and deferves from the prefent generation neither credit nor attachment.

Profession of faith of a Savoyard Curate, from
Rousseau, continued from our last.

I perceive the Deity in all his works, I feel him within me, and behold him in every object around me: but, I no fooner endeavour to contemplate what he is in himfelf; I no fooner enquire where he is, and what is his fubstance, than he eludes the strongest efforts of my imagination; and my bewildered understanding is. convinced of its own weaknefs.

For this reafon I fhall never take upon me to argue about the nature of God, farther than I am obliged to it by the relation he appears to stand in to my felf There is fo great a temerity in fuch difquifitions, that a wife man will never enter on them without trembling, and being fully affured of his incapacity to proceed far on fo fublime a fubject: for it is lefs injurious to the Deity to entertain no idea of him at all, than to harbour those. which are depreciating and unjust..

After having difcovered thofe of his attributes, by which I am convinced of his existence, I return to my felf, and confider the place I occupy in that order of things, which is directed by him, and fubjected to my examination. Here I find my fpecies stand incontestibly in the first rank; as man, by virtue of his will and the instruments he is poffeffed of to put it in execution, has greater power over the bodies by which he is furrounded,. than they, by mere phyfical impulfe, have over him by virtue of his intelligence alfo I find he is the only created being here below that can take a general furvey of the whole fystem. Is there one among them, except man, who knows how to obferve all others? to weigh, to calculate, to foresee their motion, their effects, and to join, if I may fo express myself, the fentiments of a general existence to that of the individual?

For my own part, who have no fystem to maintain, I am only a fimple, honest man, attached to no party, anambitious of being the founder of any fećt, and con

tented with the fituation in which God hath placed me, I fee nothing in the world, except the Deity, better than my own fpecies; and were I left to choose my place in the order of created beings, I fee none that I could prefer to that of man.

This reflection, however, is lefs vain than affecting; for my state is not the effect of choice, and could not be due to the merit of a being that did not before exist. Can I behold my felf, nevertheless, thus distinguished, without thinking my felf happy in occupying fo honourable a post; or without blefsing the hand that placed me here? From the first view I thus took of myfelf, my heart began to glow with a fenfe of gratitude towards the author of our being; and hence arofe my first idea of the worship due to a beneficent Deity. I adore the fupreme power, and melt into tenderness at his goodnefs. I have no need to be taught artificial forms of worship; the dictates of nature are fufficient. Is it not a natural confequence of felf love, to honour those who protect us, and to love fuch as do us good?

But when I come afterwards to take a view of the particular rank and relation in which I stand, as an individual, among the fellow-creatures of my fpecies; to confider the different ranks of fociety and the perfons by whom they are filled, what a fcene is prefented to me ? Where is that order and regularity before obferved? The scenes of nature prefent to my view the most perfect harmony and proportion: thofe of mankind nothing but confufion and diforder. The phyfical elements of things act in concert with each other, the moral world alone is a chaos of difcord. Mere animals are happy; but man is miferable! Where, fupreme wif dom! are thy laws? Is it thus, O Providence! thou governest the world? What is become of thy power, thou fupreme beneficence! when I fee evil prevailing on the earth?

Would you believe, my good friend, that, from fuch gloomy reflections and apparent contradictions, I should form to myfelf more fublime ideas of the foul, than ever

refulted from my former researches? In meditating on the nature of man, I conceived that I difcovered two distinct principles; the one raifing him to the study of eternal truths, the love of justice and moral beauty, bearing him aloft to the regions of the intellectual world, the contemplation of which yields the truest delight to the philofopher; the other debafing him even below himfelf, fubjecting him to the flavery of fenfe, the tyranny of the paffions, and exciting thefe to counteract every noble and generous fentiment infpired by the former. When I perceive myfelf hurried away by two fuch contrary powers, I naturally concluded that man is not one fimple and individual fubstance. I will, and I will not, I perceive my felf at once free and a flave; I see what is good, I admire it, and yet I do the evil: I am active when I listen to my reason, and paffive when hurried away by my paffions; while my greatest uneafiness is, to find, when fallen under temptations, that I had the power of refisting them.

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Attend, young man, with confidence, to what I fay, you will find I fhall never deceive you. If conscience be the offspring of our prejudices, I am doubtlefs in the wrong, and moral virtue is not to be demonstrated; but if felf-love, which makes us prefer ourselves to every thing else, be natural to man, and if, neverthelefs, an innate fenfe of justice be found in his heart; let thofe, who imagine him to be a fimple uncompounded being, reconcile these contradictions, and I will give up my opinion, and acknowledge him to be one fubstance.

You will pleafe to obferve, that, by the word fubstance, I here mean, in general, a being, poffeffed of fome primitive quality, abstracted from all particular or fecondary modifications. Now, if all known primitive qualities may be united in one and the fame being, we have no need to admit of more than one fubstance; but if fome of thefe qualities are incompatible with, and neceffarily exclusive of each other, we must admit of the existence of as many different fubstances as there are fuch incompatible qualities. You will do well to reflect on

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this fubject; for my part, notwithstanding what Mr. Locke hath faid on this head, I need only to know that matter is extended and visible, to be affured that it cannot think.

Let us suppose that a man, born deaf, fhould deny the reality of founds, because his ears were never fenfible of them. To convince him of his error, I place a violin before his eyes; and, by playing another, concealed from him, give a vibration to the strings of the former. This motion, I tell him, is effected by found. Not at all, fays he, the cause of the vibration of the string, is in the string itself, it is a common quality in all bodies, fo to vibrate. I reply, fhew me then the fame vibration in other bodies, or at least the caufe of it in this string. The deaf man will again reply, in his turn, "I cannot; "but wherefore must I, because I do not conceive how "this string vibrates, attribute the caufe to your pre"tended founds, of which I cannot entertain the least' "idea? This would be to attempt an explanation of "one obfcurity by another still greater. Either make your founds perceptible to me, or I fhall continue to "deny their existence."

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The more I reflect on your capacity of thinking, and the nature of the human understanding, the greater is the refemblance I find between the arguments of our materialists and that of fuch a deaf man. They are, in effect, equally deaf to that internal voice, which, neverthelefs call to them fo loud and emphatically. A mere machine is evidently incapable of thinking, it has neither motion nor figure productive of reflection: whereas in man there exist fomething, perpetually prone to expand, and to burst the fetters by which it is confined. Space itfelf affords not bounds to the human mind the whole universe is not extenfive enough for him; his fentiments, his defires, his anxieties, and even his pride, take rise from a principle different from that body with in which he perceives himself confined.

To be continued.

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