nearest moral agent. We need not be perplexed by cases in which the cause happens to co-exist with the effect. The subjects of scientific observation, and the grounds of universals in science were above suggested to be causation, composition, organization, and functional activity; and in the power of distinguishing real from apparent instances of these, consists the difference between science and empiricism. If sunrise once produces day, it will always; if one specimen of air is composed of oxygen and nitrogen, so are all; if one man has distinct nerves of sense and motion, or distinct faculties of imagination and calculation, so have all; if the functional activity of one pair of lungs is respiration, or of one mind thought, so is that of all. In the case of the external world our organs of observation are our senses, or the senses of other people with whom we communicate by speech or writing. In the case of the mind our organ of observation is consciousness, or the mind itself introverted and self reflecting. The observations of this organ are as sure and sound as those of sense, though they are more limited. All that we can observe directly in the mind are instances of causation, such as association and conviction, or of functional activity, such as thought and imagination. We can only infer the existence of mental organs from their functional activities, and this will not tell us whether they are material or immaterial, separate or blended. Separate derangement however may indicate that the organ is separate, and material derangement, or derangement from material causes, that it is either material or dependent on matter. There is but one thing which absolutely defies all observation, and that is the sovereign cause of human action. The above division of the subjects of science is suggested with extreme submission. With like submission, is suggested the division of the objects of thoughts into those which are respectively denoted by substantives, adjectives, and verbs, for which there seem to be no better names than substances, qualities, and events. At all events this classification is based upon a real foundation, viz. an ultimate division of that which is given us for the purpose of embodying and expressing our thoughts. Classifications of the objects of thought based upon the possible modes of conceiving them, considering the ambiguities of philosophical language and the facilities which they afford for selfdeception, may be multiplied ad infinitum; and the attempt to obtain a practical understanding of them is like an attempt to have other people's dreams. G. S. NOTES ON SOME PASSAGES IN THE ORESTEIA. βοσκόμενοι λαγίναν ἐρικύμονα φέρματι γένναν, ἐσθημάτων τιθέντες ἔνθηρον τρίχα.—Ag. 56062. It seems clear that these passages are parallel, and that in both the participle is to be taken as of two terminations. The same explanation may fit the common reading in and ὅπως ἐπίστα, τήνδε κυρώσων δίκην.—Εum. 580, 1. — νεανίδων τ' ἐπηράτων ἀνδροτυχεῖς βιότους δότε, κυρι ̓ ἔχοντες δαίμονες ὀρθονόμοι, παντὶ δόμῳ μετάκοινοι.—Εum. 958-64. We cannot be surprised at such fluctuations of form when we see passages like Soph. Ed. Col. 1675, 6. ἐν πυμάτῳ δ ̓ ἀλόγιστα παροίσομεν ἰδόντε καὶ παθούσα. Perhaps we may be able to emend on the same principle the much vexed passage, Choeph. 283, 5.— ἄλλας τε φωνεῖ προσβολὰς Ερινύων, ἐκ τῶν πατρῴων αἱμάτων τελουμένας, ὁρῶντα λαμπρὸν ἐν σκότῳ νωμῶντ ̓ ὀφρύν. If we read νωμῶν instead of νωμῶντα, the words will construe "having an eye which sees clear in the darkness (of futurity).” νωμώντ' may well have arisen from ὁρῶντα. The passages Pind. Olymp. 6. 15.; Eurip. Troad. 531, may be construed in another way. The passage Agamem. 312. 15 τοιοίδε τοί μοι λαμπαδηφόρων νόμοι, has been encumbered with an unnecessary difficulty. There is no contrast, but a parallel. As in the line of torch-racers, who handed along the torch, all shared the victory, so does every beacon in the line of beacons. G. S. OXFORD: PRINTED BY E. W. MORRIS. AI IA We have been encouraged by friends out of Oxford to make this periodical less local; and, consequently, we have dropped that part of the title which indicated an exclusively local connection. We have also determined to confine ourselves to Scholarship and Antiquities; and we shall thankfully receive any brief notes or communications on those subjects. With our present limits we look to affording a vehicle rather for detached thoughts and suggestions than for any thing more complete or systematic. THE EDITORS. Ib. μείζω ξυνενεχθῆναι. The subject is δύναμιν. This power became by subsequent additions still greater.' Ib. εἴ τῳ ἱκανός. Satisfactory to any,' lit. in the judgment of any,' a common use of the dative. Ch. 19. ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις. Such as that from it any power was gained.' This was the effect of the wars by sea, by which islands were reduced. Ch. 19. idiá Taраσкevý. The entire strength of the two several parties-i. e. the Athenian and Lacedemonian, is meant. auroîs refers to both, and TоTè therefore to the time of the Persian war. Ch. 28. μᾶλλον. Instead of them.' Not to be taken with τῶν νῦν ὄντων, which is governed by ἑτέρους. Really, tôv vûv ovrov is to be supplied again after μᾶλλον. Ch. 29. парà поλú. to be thus explained. This is one of a class of phrases, H We cannot be surprised at such fluctuations of form when we see passages like Soph. Ed. Col. 1675, 6. άλλος παρ αλλου διατύχαις πληρουμενοι νικᾷ δ ̓ ὁ πρῶτος καὶ τελευταῖος δραμών. has been encumbered with an unnecessary difficulty. There is no contrast, but a parallel. As in the line of torch-racers, who handed along the torch, all shared the victory, so does every beacon in the line of beacons. G. S. OXFORD: PRINTED BY E. W. MORRIS. |