by wealth and numbers, should result in a great attempt at constitutional, social, and economical reform, under the mediatorial dictatorship of a sage like Servius, and that the attempt to compromise between irreconcileable interests should fail, and end in a tyranny. The analogy of Attica is exact. The chronology and genealogy of the Tarquins has of course been already overthrown.

If Lucius Tarquinius Priscus, surnamed Superbus, was the name of the tyrant, Priscus being taken to mean old, he might be easily turned into two. And as the tradition was strong that Servius had been murdered by Superbus, Priscus could not come in between them, and was placed before Servius. The murder of Priscus, by the sons of Ancus, and so much of the story of Servius as relates to his being the favourite of Priscus, serve to account for the breach in the succession.

(To be continued.)

G. S.

NOTES ON LOGIC.

A DISTINCTION ought to be drawn between inquiry and argument. They are different functions of the mind.

The object of the first is knowledge; that of the second conviction. The result of the first cannot be at once sound and false; that of the second may be. The first begins with hypothesis, the second with assertion. Different minds excel in each. The intellectual fault of the first is inaccuracy, of the second inconclusiveness. The moral faults of the first are prejudice and carelessness, that of the second sophistry.

To put argument as inquiry is a sophism. Thus Mr. F. Newman commits a sophism in putting as a history of religious inquiry that which is in fact an argument in support of the proposition Christianity is not from God. He thereby avoids the criteria of argument.

Scientific inquiry proceeds by hypothesis and verification. And when the hypothesis is the conformity or nonconformity of a given proposition to our previous knowledge or to certain principles of the mind, as is always the case in geometry and what are called the deductive sciences, conviction is the verification; and here inquiry and argument coincide.

An assertion to be proved or disproved by argument, need only be intelligible. Hypothesis has other laws. It must be consistent with itself and with our previous knowledge. Thus that man has passed by natural succession through a theological, metaphysical and scientific state is bad, before verification, first for want of homogeneity in the supposed series, theology

being explained to include religion which is a function of different organs or faculties from science, secondly for want of distinctness in the supposed series, metaphysics, as explained, being merely hypothesis without verification or with a verification which is insufficient.

Inquiry and argument are confounded by Mr. Mill, and likewise by Archbishop Whateley, who attempts to force inquiry into the type of argument by making induction a kind of syllogism.

Language is the functional activity of certain organs by which we express our thoughts and communicate them to each other. It is providentially adapted for all the purposes of expression and communication, including those of argument. The organs and their use are natural; not the less so because the use is acquired, like the use of other organs, by imitation. It is natural for the infant to have those around him whom he may imitate.

The connection between the organs of thought and those of language is a physical mystery. That there is no real affinity between the objects of thought and our words for them, is clear from the fact that the words of another language convey no meaning to us. Onomatopoeia is an exception which proves the rule.

There is probably an organ of language in the brain distinct from and commanding the organs of utterance. It is this which so invariably acts with thought that we cannot think without expression, and the defects and abuses of which so much infect our thought, as the defects and abuses of our thought reciprocally infect it. We have in some cases, separate names for the function of thought and language, as judgment and proposition. In most cases we

have not.

Language has undergone a double derangement. First like the other human faculties, it has undergone a derangement which is alike in all men, through

which it is inadequate, ambiguous and irregular, all which defects react on thought. Secondly it has undergone a peculiar derangement which causes it to act quite differently in different races of men. The Bible alone notices and accounts for this.

We have means of partially remedying these evils. We can, under certain rules, supply the place of expressions which are wanting, by coining, borrowing, or combining; and we have a sufficient power of learning foreign languages to keep the different parts of the human race in communication with each other.

Naming, like the rest of language, is spontaneous. "And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field and every fowl of the air, and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them : and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof."

Whatever we believe, feel, or imagine of the thing, attaches itself to the name, and becomes part of its meaning, in our mind; and it is all called up by the name when seen or heard. A proof of this is, that in every affirmative proposition in argument the whole of the predicate must be true of the subject.

There is no difference in this respect between the names of persons and the names of things. The illusion is produced by giving us the names of persons whom we do not know. "Thomas" is unmeaning to me because I do not know which Thomas it is; just as the Chinese word for man would be unmeaning to me if I heard it. But "Shakspeare" or " Napoleon" is full of meaning. I can say that a man is “a Shakspeare" or "a Napoleon" as well as I can that he is a judge.

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Names of all kinds have a double function. They denote both the thing or class of things, and their collective attributes; that is, all that we believe, feel, or imagine of them. Thus, in a syllogism of the first figure, the middle term stands first for the class, and then for the attributes of the class. For we cannot

In

predicate one thing or class of things of another. short names, common, singular or proper, always denote things or classes in the subject and attributes in the predicate. This is the real distinction.

Names express our thoughts and denote the objects of our thoughts.

When men think differently about things, the difference of thought, entering into the meaning of the name in each mind, makes the name ambiguous, of which the word "Church" is the grand example. Then we must define. If the subject of a proposition is to meaning in virtue of which the predicate is said; if the predicate, the definition must give words enough to raise the whole meaning in the mind of him to whom it is given. Two things at least have been confounded with definition; a mixed definition and axiom in geometry, and an analytical proposition of inquiry, such as the definitions in the Ethics and Rhetoric.

Substantives, adjectives, and verbs, is an ultimate division of predicables; that is, of the subjects and predicates of propositions. The same expresses an ultimate division of thoughts.

To argue from names, is to argue from articulate sounds, which is impossible. To argue from the meaning of names, is to argue from other people's thoughts, again impossible. To argue from the use of names, is to argue from the associations in other people's minds, which are good for all that the minds are good for.

Names are so far real that we have no names for things which do not exist. But we have names for imaginary combinations of things which do exist.

Propositions the logician reduces to their logical value by cutting away all that is rhetorical and leaving only the pure assertion, by distinguishing the sign of predication from the verb of existence, and that which is also confused with it, the verb of equipol