ARTICLE III.

ANSELM'S DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION AND ATONEMENT.

A TRANSLATION OF THE

CUR DEUS HOMO."

By James Gardiner Vose, Milton, Mass. [Concluded from Vol. XI. p. 776.]

BOOK SECOND.

СНАР. І. How man was made holy by God, so as to be happy in the enjoyment of God.

Anselm. It ought not to be disputed, that rational nature was made holy by God, in order to be happy in enjoying Him. For to this end is it rational, in order to discern justice and injustice, good and evil, and between the greater and the lesser good. Otherwise it was made rational in vain. But God made it not rational in vain. Wherefore, doubtless, it was made rational for this end. In like manner is it proved that the intelligent creature received the power of discernment for this purpose, that he might hate and shun evil, and love and choose good, and especially the greater good. For else in vain would God have given him that power of discernment, since man's discretion would be useless, unless he loved and avoided according to it. But it does not befit God to give such power in vain. It is, therefore, established, that rational nature was created for this end, viz. to love and choose the highest good supremely, for its own sake and nothing else; for if the highest good were chosen for any other reason, then something else and not itself would be the thing loved. But intelligent nature cannot fulfil this purpose without being holy. Therefore that it might not in vain be made rational, it was made, in order to fulfil this purpose, both rational and holy. Now, if it was made holy in order to choose and love the highest good, then it was made such in order to follow sometimes what it loved and chose, or else it was not. But if it were not made holy for this end, that it might follow what it loves and chooses, then in vain was it made to love and choose holiness; and there can be no reason why it should be ever bound to follow holiness. Therefore, as long as it will be holy in loving and choosing the supreme good, for which it was made, it will be miserable;

because it will be impotent despite of its will, inasmuch as it does not have what it desires. But this is utterly absurd. Wherefore rational nature was made holy, in order to be happy in enjoying the supreme good, which is God. Therefore man, whose nature is rational, was made holy for this end, that he might be happy in enjoying God.

CHAP. II. How man would never have died, unless he had sinned.

Anselm. Moreover, it is easily proved, that man was so made as not to be necessarily subject to death; for, as we have already said, it is inconsistent with God's wisdom and justice to compel man to suffer death without fault, when He made him holy to enjoy eternal blessedness. It therefore follows, that had man never sinned, he never would have died.

CHAP. III. How man will rise with the same body which he has in this world.

Anselm. From this the future resurrection of the dead is clearly proved. For if man is to be perfectly restored, the restoration should make him such as he would have been, had he never sinned. Boso. It must be so. Anselm. Therefore, as man,

had he not sinned, was to have been transferred with the same body to an immortal state, so when he shall be restored, it must properly be, with his own body as he lived in this world. Boso. But what shall we say to one who tells us that this is right enough with regard to those in whom humanity shall be perfectly restored, but is not necessary as respects the reprobate? Anselm. We know of nothing more just or proper than this, that as man, had he continued in holiness, would have been perfectly happy for eternity, both in body and in soul; so, if he persevere in wickedness, shall be likewise completely miserable forever. Boso. You have promptly satisfied me in these matters.

CHAP. IV. How God will complete, in respect to human nature, what he has begun.

Anselm. From these things, we can easily see, that God will either complete what he has begun with regard to human nature, or else he has made to no end so lofty a nature, capable of so great good. Now if it be understood, that God has made nothing more valuable than rational existence capable of enjoying

Him; it is altogether foreign from his character to suppose that he will suffer that rational existence utterly to perish. Boso. No reasonable being can think otherwise. Anselm. Therefore is it necessary for him to perfect in human nature what he has begun. But this, as we have already said, cannot be accomplished save by a complete expiation of sin, which no sinner can effect for himself. Boso. I now understand it to be necessary for God to complete what he has begun, lest there be an unseemly falling off from his design.

CHAP. V. How, although the thing may be necessary, God may not do it by a compulsory necessity; and what is the nature of that necessity which removes or lessens gratitude, and what necessity increases it.

Boso. But if it be so, then God seems, as it were, compelled, for the sake of avoiding what is unbecoming, to secure the salvation of man. How, then, can it be denied that he does it more on his own account than on ours? But if it be so, what thanks do we owe him for what he does for himself? How shall we attribute our salvation to his grace, if he saves us from necessity? Anselm. There is a necessity which takes away or lessens our gratitude to a benefactor, and there is also a necessity by which the favor deserves still greater thanks. For when one does a benefit from a necessity to which he is unwillingly subjected, less thanks are due him, or none at all. But when he freely places himself under the necessity of benefiting another, and sustains that necessity without reluctance, then he certainly deserves greater thanks for the favor. For this should not be called necessity but grace, inasmuch as he undertook or maintains it, not with any constraint, but freely. For if what you promise to-day, of your own accord, that you will give to-morrow, you give to-morrow with the same willingness; though it be necessary for you, if possible, to redeem your promise, or make yourself a liar; notwithstanding, the recipient of your favor is as much indebted for your precious gift, as if you had not promised it; for you were not obliged to make yourself his debtor, before the time of giving it. Just so is it, when one undertakes, by a vow, a design of holy living. For though after his vow he ought necessarily to perform, lest he suffer the judgment of an apostate, and, although he may be compelled to keep it even unwillingly, yet, if he keep his vow cheerfully, he is not less but more pleas

ing to God than if he had not vowed. For he has not only given up the life of the world, but also his personal liberty for the sake of God; and he cannot be said to live a holy life of necessity, but with the same freedom with which he took the Vow. Much more, therefore, do we owe all thanks to God for completing his intended favor to man, though, indeed, it would not be proper for him to fail in his good design, because wanting nothing in himself, he begun it for our sake and not his own. For what man was about to do was not hidden from God at his creation, and yet by freely creating man, God, as it were, bound himself to complete the good which he had begun. In fine, God does nothing by necessity, since he is not compelled or restrained in anything. And when we say that God does anything to avoid dishonor, which he certainly does not fear, we must mean that God does this from the necessity of maintaining his honor; which necessity is after all no more than this, viz. the immutability of his honor, which belongs to Him in himself, and is not derived from another; and therefore it is not properly called necessity. Yet we may say, although the whole work which God does for man is of grace, that it is necessary for God, on account of his unchangeable goodness, to complete the work which he has begun. Boso. I grant it.

CHAP. VI. How no being, except the God-man, can make the atonement by which man is saved.

Anselm. But this cannot be effected, except the price paid to God for the sin of man be something greater than all the universe besides God. Boso. So it appears. Anselm. Moreover, it is necessary that he who can give God anything of his own, which is more valuable than all things in the possession of God, must be greater than all else but God himself. Boso. I cannot deny it. Anselm. Therefore none but God can make this satisfaction. Boso. So it appears. Anselm. But none but a man ought to do this, otherwise man does not make the satisfaction. Boso. Nothing seems more just. Anselm. If it be necessary, therefore, as it appears, that the heavenly kingdom be made up of men, and this cannot be effected unless the aforesaid satisfaction be made, which none but God can make and none but man ought to make, it is necessary for the God-man to make it. Boso. Now blessed be God! we have made a great discovery with regard to our question. Go on, therefore, as you have

begun. For I hope that God will assist us. we inquire, how God can become man.

Anselm. Now must

CHAP. VII. How necessary it is for the same being to be perfect God and perfect man.

Anselm. The Divine and human natures cannot alternate, so that the Divine should become human, or the human Divine; nor can they be so commingled as that a third should be produced from the two, which is neither wholly Divine, nor wholly human. For, granting that it were possible for either to be changed into the other, it would in that case be only God and not man, or man only and not God. Or, if they were so commingled, that a third nature sprung from the combination of the two (as from two animals, a male and a female, of different species, a third is produced, which does not preserve entire the species of either parent, but has a mixed nature derived from both), it would neither be God nor man. Therefore the God-man, whom we require to be of a nature both human and Divine, cannot be produced by a change from one into the other, nor by an imperfect commingling of both in a third; since these things cannot be, or, if they could be, would avail nothing to our purpose. Moreover, if these two complete natures are said to be joined somehow, in such a way that one may be Divine while the other is human, and yet that which is God not be the same with that which is man, it is impossible for both to do the work necessary to be accomplished. For God will not do it, because He has no debt to pay; and man will not do it, because he cannot. Therefore, in order that the God-man may perform this, it is necessary that the same being should be perfect God and perfect man, in order to make this atonement. For he cannot and ought not to do it, unless he be very God and very man. Since, then, it is necessary that the God-man preserve the completeness of each nature, it is no less necessary that these two natures be united entire in one person, just as a body and a reasonable soul exist together in every human being; for otherwise it is impossible that the same being should be very God and very man. Boso. All that you say is satisfactory to me.

CHAP. VIII. How it behoved God to take a man of the race of Adam, and born of a woman.

Anselm. It now remains to inquire whence and how God shall