with his eyes open! Yet he wishes to be happy, as all men do. How shall we reconcile this contradiction between his judgment and his conduct? The account of it seems to me to be this: The afflicting event draws his attention so strongly, by a natural and blind force, that he either hath not the power, or hath not the vigor of mind to resist its impulse, though he knows that to yield to it is misery, without any good to balance it."1

So simple is the general arrangement of the volume under review, that some of its particular classifications by necessity appear unnatural. Thus in the fourth chapter, Abstraction is made to include, first, analysis, which term is here employed in a peculiar sense, and is synonymous with abstraction itself as ordinarily employed; secondly, generalization, which has been commonly represented as including abstraction, rather than as being included in it; and thirdly, combination, which includes the philosophical conceptions, and also the imagination. It is so unusual to consider the imagination as a species of abstraction, and to speak of analysis as the same with abstraction, that we need a more lengthened statement than Dr. Wayland has made, of the reasons which exist in his own mind for this arrangement. The due proportion of the scientific, to the practical, teachings in his volume, seems also to require a more extended notice than he has given of several questions on the theme of this fourth chapter. We are pleased with his views of a "definition in science," and his remark that "simple objects" "can never be defined" really. But remembering the sad errors which have resulted from the attempt so to define simple terms, we crave a fuller statement of the difference, and of the necessity of always observing the difference, between a nominal and a real definition. We should have been happy to learn more distinctly the mode in which the strong mind of President Wayland answers the question between Nominalism and Realism. The question has so much historical, as well as intrinsic importance, that we expect and desire to see it elucidated in a treatise on Mental Philosophy containing the matured views of a man so eminent as Dr. Wayland for sound judgment. The sum of his teaching on the subject is, that "there is nothing in nature answering to this general conception [of an animal, quadruped, man, etc.], for every individual possesses all the elements which enter into my conception, and also many more." "It is evident that conception is a mode of thought, and that there is in this act nothing numerically distinct from the mental act itself. It is true, as Sir W. Hamilton has observed, that we may in thought make a distinction between the faculty or state of the mind in conception, and the concept or notion in which this act exhibits itself. But there is no existing thing numerically different from the act; and, therefore, it seems evident that both nominalists and realists were equally wide of the truth." But although a general conception, viewed subjectively be a mode of the mind's action, must there not be some object to which this general conception relates? If we say that there is none, do we not sanction an error more untenable than even that of the nominalists? Does the mind think of nothing, when it

1 Hamilton's Reid, p. 538.

2 Pages 191, 192.

thinks of man, animal? Does it not rather think of those elements and properties in one man, in one animal, which are common to every other man, every other animal?

The fifth chapter of this volume is a remarkably truthful and impressive one on memory. Some passages in it are eloquent in quickening the mind of the youthful student; and others, as those on pp. 242, 243 are solemn as a pulpit discourse. But is it advisable to treat of the Association of Ideas under the head of Memory? and is it true, as stated on pp. 247, 248, that without memory there could be no association of ideas, and no conceptions, and no reasoning processes? Must all our associations be of ideas which had been previously in the mind? Must all our conceptions (unless this word be used in Dugald Stewart's sense) be of objects perceived in past time? Can we never draw an inference except from premises formerly noticed and now remembered? Perhaps, however, the remarks of our author on this theme are designed to have a merely general, rather than a strictly universal, application; just as, when he says on p. 179, that "language is made up altogether of words designating classes" of things, qualities or relations, and that our ideas "are all of classes," he doubtless means to allow some exceptions to his remark.

Dr. Wayland's sixth chapter is devoted to the operations of the reasoning power. He uses the word Reason habitually to denote "that faculty by which, from the use of the knowledge obtained by the other faculties, we are enabled to proceed to other and original knowledge." Throughout his volume, he encourages a spirit of manly and well-guarded reliance upon the rationative, as, indeed, upon all the powers with which God has endued us. He is not unmindful of our mental frailties; but, amid all our liabilities to error, he gives no sanction to those sceptical tendencies which have been fostered by the misdirected humility of some good men. "Suggestions," he says, “will arise in our minds, if we will only heed them, and they will arise the more abundantly, the more carefully we heed them. We should attend

to our own intuitions, examine their character, determine their validity, and follow them to their results. We should have due respect for the teachings of our own individual intelligence. What other men have thought is valuable, but its chief value is, not to save us from the labor of thinking, but to enable us to think the better for ourselves. If, with patient earnestness, we thus follow out the suggestions of our own minds, we shall find them enriched and invigorated. Instead of drinking forever at the fountains of other men, the mind will thus discover a fountain within itself. If,' said Sir Isaac Newton, 'I am in any respect different from other men, it is in the power of patient thought.'" "If we are deficient in reliance on the decisions of our own intellect, no matter how clearly we may comprehend our position, we shall never reach a deliberate conclusion." In agreement with the spirit of these rules, Dr. Wayland elevates moral evidence to an equality, in all practical respects, with the demonstrative, and gives a prominent place

1 Page 13.

2 Page 175.

* Page 251; see also pp. 379, 418.

to "first truths," or intuitive beliefs of the mind. Unnumbered theological disputes have been urged with regard to those ultimate facts, which are so evident that nothing more obvious can be adduced in proof of them. The teachings of this volume on these fundamental laws of our belief, are fitted to give a healthful tone to theological speculation. We are not prepared to follow our author, in classing among first truths, the principles " that rational beings act from motives, and that a change of action must proceed from a change of motives," and that the human will is free; still these principles are but one step removed from axioms, and whoever admits the validity of our intuitions is predisposed thereby to admit the correctness of these fundamental doctrines. Neither are we prepared to make some comparisons which Dr. Wayland has made with regard to the evidence in favor of different propositions. We prefer not to adopt, at least as a scientific formula, the remark: "We as perfectly believe that- there are now standing the cities of London, Paris and Vienna, as we believe that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles." We prefer to make the distinction which Dr. Wayland himself intimates on p. 290: “I know that the exterior angle of a triangle is equal to the two interior and opposite angles. I believe that there are such cities as London, Paris and Washington." Were it not better for our author to recognize more openly and uniformly the distinction between knowledge and belief, as he has recognized the distinction between belief and opinion. Is not knowledge that assent which we give to a proposition against which there is no objection, and for which there is conclusive evidence; and is not assurance or assured belief that assent which we give, when there is a merely unimportant objection against the evident proposition; and is not mere belief that assent which follows a decided preponderance of the reasons in favor of a proposition over the important reasons in opposition to it; and is not an opinion that assent which results from a slight preponderance of argument over objection; and is not suspicion a yet lower degree of assent, in which there is scarcely an appreciable difference between the reasons for and those against an announcement? In all practical respects we assent to some merely moral proofs, as firmly as we assent to a mathematical axiom; but in a scientific aspect the mathematical axiom demands the fuller credence. We coincide with Dr. Wayland, however, in admitting that there are as many possibilities of error in some mathematical demonstrations, as in some of what are technically called probable truths. In the main he has been eminently felicitous in vindicating the authority of moral argument.

The seventh chapter in this volume is singularly rich, and is, perhaps, the most original part of the treatise. It is on the Imagination. Perhaps it would have been improved, if it had commented on the various distinctions, especially on that drawn by Mr. Wordsworth, between the Imagination and the Fancy.

The concluding chapter, on Taste, is suggestive and animating. Taste is 1 Page 317; see also pp. 37, 94. 2 See pp. 20, 22.

defined as "that sensibility by which we cognize the beauties and deformities of nature and art, — enjoying pleasure from the one, and suffering pain from the other."1 "From this definition it is evident that the function of taste is twofold: first, it discriminates between beauty and deformity; and, secondly, it is a source of pleasure and pain." If, then, taste has the office of "cognizing" and "discriminating" beauty and deformity, why do we read, on pp. 387, 388, that taste is "a sensibility rather than a faculty? A faculty is the power of doing something, of putting forth some act, or accomplishing some change. Such is not the nature of taste." But is not judgment a faculty? Is not the discriminating act of taste an act of judgment? Is not the "recognizing" of a quality, the doing of something? Again, we read on p. 391: "The emotion of conscience is complicated with a variety of other emotions, as, for instance, of moral approbation or disapprobation, the conviction of good or ill-desert,” etc. If these be emotions, are they not emotions of conscience? Why are they called other emotions?

In conclusion, we cannot forbear to commend this volume highly for its lucid style, apt illustrations, fertility of thought, good practical tendency, healthful religious influence, and general adaptedness to the wants of the youthful student; and, if the criticisms which we have offered are well founded, they refer to minor faults which may be easily removed by the alteration of a few paragraphs, and the addition of some more abstruse discussions.

III. THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY CONSIDERED IN ITS RELATION TO CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

THIS is a course of eight Bampton Lectures delivered before the University of Oxford in 1832 by Dr. Hampden, now Bishop of Hereford. We call attention to this work, not because it is altogether accurate or entirely self-consistent, but because it is by far the best English treatise with which we are acquainted upon a subject that is not much examined by the modern student. One who has read Hallam, e. g. after having made himself at all acquainted with the Scholastic systems, is surprised to find how little one of the best educated of modern English literary historians knew of one of the most comprehensive and remarkable systems of speculation the world has yet seen.

These lectures of Bishop Hampden are more valuable for their indirect influence than for their particular views and opinions. They evince a respectful and earnest study of the Schoolmen, as well as of the Patristic literature in connection with the systems of Plato and Aristotle; and, although the estimate formally made of the value of Scholasticism is on the whole depreciatory, the impression actually made is the correct one, that the Scholastic systems and methods are well worthy of the study of the modern Protestant theologian. We subjoin a brief synopsis of the contents of these

1 Page 387.

2 Page 413.

lectures, together with such negative criticisms as have occurred in a rapid perusal.

I. The First Lecture is upon The Origin of the Scholastic Philosophy. The author traces it, first and more generally, to the practical spirit of the Latin theologian as contradistinguished from the speculative temper of the Greek divines; and secondly and more particularly, to the conflict between Reason and Authority which sprang up in the Middle Ages after the consolidation of the Papacy was complete.

II. The Second Lecture treats of The Formation of the Scholastic Theology; the key to which process Bishop Hampden finds in the endeavor to construct theology demonstratively rather than historically; i. e. by the use of abstract ideas, propositions, deductions, and technical terms, instead of by a constant recurrence to Revelation itself as a body of fact rather than of dogma. The author would find, in the employment of the Aristotelo-Platonic Philosophy by the Mediaeval theologian, the source of the same sort of errors in theological science that appear in the natural science of the Middle Ages, viz. fictions and baseless hypotheses, having no correspondents in the world of reality; and contends that the employment of an à priori method, and consequent rise of a "Logical Theology," have been a source of great evil, which still lives in modern Protestantism itself.

The views of the author in this lecture are indiscriminating, and tend to the destruction of theological science. We cannot particularize, but would, in passing, direct attention to the fact, that this estimate of the Scholastic Theology and of the modern "Logical Theology" which has sprung from it, does not harmonize with the position of the first lecture, that the Scholastic system and method took its origin in two such head-springs as the practicality of the Latin mind, and the reaction of Reason and Intelligence against Tradition and blind Belief.

The author's estimate of the Scholastic method would have been higber and more just, had he taken, as representatives, that class of the Schoolmen upon whom the two systems of Plato and Aristotle in combination exerted their joint and harmonious influence. As it is, Bishop Hampden erroneously conceives the two Grecian systems to be intrinsically irreconcilable with each other, and then selects, as specimens of the Scholastic mind, the extreme men like Abelard and Duns Scotus, rather than Anselm and Bernard. If we have not misapprehended him, he also attributes to Realism those doctrines and influences which belong to Nominalism. It was, of course, the latter and not the former which employed the universal term as an abstraction, and denied that it had any objective correspondent in the world of real being; and it was the Nominalist, and not the Realist, who used technical terms that were hollow and unmeaning. The theory of Realism substantiated its universals, and filled them with the most solid reality of existence, and hence its technics were more than fictions and abstractions.

III. The Third Lecture discusses the Trinitarian Controversies, and treats more of the Patristic than of the Scholastic Philosophy. The reader will