that her influence on the fate and the affairs of that empire did not rest on them, but on the sympathy between herself and her 'co-religionaires,' on her physical power to give effect to that sympathy, and on the thousand facts which made the one an advancing and the other a declining empire. At the late Conferences she found it convenient to use precisely the opposite argument, and to urge that, when she gives up her treaties, she abandons everything that could give just alarm to Turkey, and everything on which her preponderance' depends. We have no hesitation in saying that of these two arguinents the first is by far the nearest to the truth; and consequently, that the security in which Mr. Gladstone and Mr. S. Herbert see a fulfilment of all the original objects of the war is one which, however important in itself, would yet be wholly insufficient, if it stood alone. We cannot prevent a large amount of sympathy from existing between the different populations belonging to the Eastern Church, nor can we altogether prevent the influence which that sympathy must enable the Government of Russia to exert on Turkey. If, therefore, in addition to this influence, which is inseparable from the condition of things, we leave her undiminished means of backing it with overpowering physical force, we shall do nothing towards settling the difficult problem with which we have to deal. We do not now care to argue whether those means would have been sufficiently reduced by the late proposal of the Allies. We are quite prepared to accept the conclusion that the limitation of fleets ought to be carried to the point of extinction. But on the essential value of the principle of curtailing Russian power, with reference to her naval rather than with reference to her territorial or military power, we entertain no doubt whatever. Every plan for putting an end to Russian preponderance which does not include an effectual limitation, or extinction, of her fleets in the Euxine, will be wanting not merely in one important, but in the most essential, element of security. Russia has experienced, now more than once, the difficulty of attacking Turkey with success, and the impossibility of rendering that success speedy or sudden on the side of the Danube and the Balkan. But a powerful fleet would render an attack by water both easy, speedy, and com paratively safe. Nor is it true to say that such an expedition could as readily be conducted in mere transport ships. The liability of having the communications of an army so conveyed cut off by the entry in the Black Sea of the armed vessels of other Powers, or even of Turkey itself, would be an effectual dissuasive from such attempts. We hold, therefore, that the arguments in favour of accepting the Russian proposal of the 26th of April, as a satisfactory solution of the problem how best to put an end to Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, have thoroughly broken down. We do not deny that Mr. Gladstone and the Peace party, represented by Mr. Cobden, have done some service, in showing how great has been the advance of the Allies in bringing down the pretensions of Russia, and in establishing principles fatal to those on which she has been so long stealing towards exclusive dominion in the East of Europe. Service not less good has been done by Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, in his able speech on the 5th of June, in exposing the fatal danger of extending the circle of the war, with a view to issues towards which it is not in man to direct his steps' with even tolerable certainty that he is walking straight. We ought to keep as strictly as we can to the original objects of the war; securing these by conditions. as stringent and effective as we may be able to command. On these grounds, we hold that the Four Bases are useful definitions of the principles we have engaged to establish; for they are large enough to allow for any amount of change or of extension which, humanly speaking, can be placed within our reach by the events of even the most successful war. Our belief is, that, if we adhere to them, we shall yet have plenty of fighting to secure them well. There is far more probability that by insisting on them all, and enforcing them all by efficient means, we shall necessitate a long course of war, than that by refusing to introduce new elements of strife, we shall too early or too easily secure a peace. At the present time their character is rather negative than positive. They exclude that appeal to the suppressed nationalities' of Europe which we firmly believe would prove a fatal weapon to any power resorting to it; they exclude plans for the dismemberment of Russia, though they do not exclude such local changes of territory as are strictly connected with the objects they define; and they omit all mention of the expenses of the war. But in all the acts and protocols of the Allied Powers an express resolution has been made in favour of such ulterior measures as the course of events and the results of our operations may justify or require; and it is only upon the termination of the campaign that the Governments of Europe now engaged in this great enterprise can determine the precise extent of the conditions necessary to the restoration of peace. No. CCVIII. will be published in October. Sor yes? ho? yes. THE EDINBURGH REVIEW, OCTOBER, 1855. No. CCVIII. ART. I.-Mémoires et Correspondance Politique et Militaire du Roi Joseph. Publiés, annotés, et mis en ordre par A. Du CASSE, Aide-de-Camp de S. A. R. le Prince Jérome Napoléon. 10 vols. 8vo. Paris: 1853.-(Second article.) WE left King Joseph (in a former Number) on his way from Naples to Bayonne, full of misgiving and disquietude, casting back many longing looks towards the pleasant kingdom he had quitted, and little elated at the dangerous promotion in store for himf, but, according to his custom, prepared to yield implicit obedience to the Emperor's will. He arrived at Bayonne on the 7th June, 1808. Napoleon went out to meet him; and explaining the various reasons which made his acceptance of the Crown of Spain indispensable, Joseph consented to take the burthen upon him; indeed it was too late to decline it, for without waiting for his acquiescence the Emperor had already caused him to be proclaimed King. For some time after his arrival at Bayonne his prospects seemed not unpromising, nor could he foresee the enormous difficulties which soon began to gather around him. The elaborate scheme of treachery and perfidy by which the whole Royal Family of Spain had been decoyed to their ruin, and the Spanish nation betrayed and deceived, had No. 204. October, 1854. Joseph was not aware that the Spanish crown had been previously offered by the Emperor to his brother Louis; to whom he wrote on the 27th March, desiring a categorical answer: 'If I de'clare you King of Spain, can I rely on you?' Louis refused, and then Napoleon turned to Joseph. (Thibaudeau, vol. vi. p. 334.; Garden, vol. ii.) VOL. CII. NO. CCVIII. Χ been worked out to its final consummation. The coast was cleared for Joseph. He found himself without a competitor, and accepted with alacrity and apparent satisfaction by all classes of Spaniards as their King; his election was ratified even by the deposed sovereigns themselves, and by all the princes of their house, whose contingent rights had, with their own consent, been set aside. It would require a long and circumstantial narrative to connect the threads of the various intrigues which intermingled with and crossed each other during the months preceding the final transactions at Bayonne; the successive steps by which the affair was led to the state in which Joseph found it may be briefly told. On the 19th of March, after the insurrection of Aranjuez, King Charles abdicated, and on the 20th Ferdinand, amidst the acclamations of the people and the army, assumed the government as King. Murat, who was at Madrid in command of the French army, refused to acknowledge Ferdinand, eluding the pressing entreaties that were made to him to do so, and sent one of his own officers to Aranjuez to sound the disposition of King Charles. The old King gave him a letter addressed to the Emperor, in which he declared that his abdication had been extorted from him by violence and terror, and he protested against its validity. Upon this Murat took him and the Queen under his protection, and gave them a French guard; while Ferdinand, perceiving that he could not establish himself on the throne without the consent and approbation of Napoleon, sent his brother, Don Carlos, to endeavour to obtain his sanction to what had passed. Meanwhile Napoleon, having no confidence in the political dexterity of Murat, and not choosing to intrust the secret of his schemes to his Ambassador Beauharnois, had sent Savary to Madrid to carry on his intrigues, and inveigle the two Kings into his power, whilst he himself resolved to repair to Bayonne, where he arrived in the beginning of April. As soon as Savary got to Madrid he sought an audience of Ferdinand, treated him as 'King,' promised that the Emperor would recognise him, and pressed him to go to Burgos and meet his Majesty, who, as Savary affirmed, was already on his way to visit him at Madrid. The language and assurances of the French Envoy were so plausible that both Ferdinand and his councillors were completely deceived; and he was induced to set off from Madrid on the 10th of April, leaving a junta under the presidence of his uncle Don Antonio to conduct * The French army had entered Spain in virtue of the treaty of Fontainebleau, and Murat had marched to Madrid (without orders) on receiving information of the revolution at Aranjuez. the Government during his absence. He was much surprised on arriving at Burgos to find that the Emperor was not there, but was nevertheless induced to go on to Vittoria. There the truth began to dawn upon him; and shortly after, an ambiguous letter from Napoleon himself revealed to him the danger of his position. Many of his most trusty councillors, particularly Urquijo and Cevallos, now urged him to make his escape while it was still in his power; but the persuasions of some others, and the deceitful promises of Savary induced him to continue his journey, and he entered Bayonne on the 20th of April, the Emperor being already arrived. King Charles, who had remained at the Escurial, was impatient to invoke in person the protection of the Emperor, and Murat had no difficulty in persuading him to repair to Bayonne, where he arrived on the 30th April. The Emperor had now got both the father and the son in his power, each of them soliciting the Crown of Spain at his hands; but although his machinations were so far completely successful, his sagacity perceived the embarrassment of his position, and in a letter to Murat he expressed the perplexity in which he was involved, described with the utmost correctness the disposition of the Spanish people towards himself, and predicted the nature of the resistance with which he was threatened exactly as it eventually took place. Either, however, he thought he had gone too far to recede, or he had such confidence in his political skill and his military power, that he determined to proceed with his designs. Napoleon had given strict injunctions to Murat to observe the utmost caution in his conduct, and to do nothing calculated to excite or exasperate the people of Madrid. But the discontent which was continually fermenting in the capital, produced symptoms of resistance to his authority which provoked Murat, and led him to interfere with the Government in the most arbitrary and insulting manner; while the licentious behaviour of the French soldiery, and the agitation and anger of the people brought about frequent collisions between them. Matters were in this combustible state, when they were brought to a crisis by the demand of Murat that the members of the Royal Family still remaining at Madrid should forthwith proceed to join their relations at Bayonne. After great hesitation, the Government was terrified into submission to this demand; and on the 2nd of May the Infants set out from Madrid. Their departure produced the most violent excitement, and brought about what the French called the revolt, and the Spaniards termed the massacre of Madrid. A conflict ensued, which was * March 29. |