posed to many evils, both imaginary and real, from which the brutes are exempted, he does also from the same sources derive innumerable delights, that are far beyond the reach of every other animal. That our preeminence in pleasure should thus in some degree, be counterbalanced by our preeminence in pain, was necessary to exercise our virtue, and wean our hearts from sublunary enjoyment; and that beings thus beset with a multitude of sorrows should be supplied from so many quarters with the means of comfort, is suitable to that benign economy which characterises every operation of nature.

When a brute has gratified those few appetites that minister to the support of the species, and of the individual, he may be said to have attained the summit of happiness, above which a thousand years of prosperity could not raise him a single step. But for man, her favourite child, nature has made a more liberal provision. He, if he have only guarded against the necessities of life, and indulged the animal part of his constitution, has experienced but little of that felicity whereof he is capable. To say nothing at present of his moral and religious gratifications, is he not furnished with faculties that fit him for receiving pleasure from

almost every part of the visible universe? Even to those persons, whose powers of observation are confined within a narrow circle, the exercise of the necessary arts. may open inexhaustible sources of amusement, to alleviate the cares of a solitary and laborious life. Men of more enlarged understanding, and more cultivated taste, are still more plentifully supplied with the means of innocent delight. For such, either from acquired habit, or from innate propensity, is the soul of man, that there is hardly any thing in art or nature from which we may not derive gratification. What is great overpowers with pleasing astonishment; what is little may charm by its nicety of proportion, or beauty of colour; what is diversified, pleases by supplying a series of novelties; what is uniform, by leading us to reflect on the skill displayed in the arrangement of its parts; order and connection gratify our sense of propriety; and certain forms of irregularity and unsuitableness raise within us that agreeable emotion whereof LAUGHTER is the outward sign.

RISIBILITY, considered as one of the characters that distinguish man from the inferiour animals, and as an instrument of harmless, and even of profitable recreation, to every age, condition, and capacity of human creatures, must

be allowed to be not unworthy of the philosopher's notice. Whatever is peculiar to rational nature, must be an object of some importance to a rational being; and Milton has observed,

that

Smiles from reason flow,

To brutes denied:

Whatever may be employed as a means of discountenancing vice, folly, or falsehood, is an object of importance to a moral being, and Horace has remarked,

Ridiculum acri

Fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res.* Let this apology suffice at present for my choice of a subject. Even this apology might have been spared: for nothing is below the attention of philosophy, which the Author of nature has been pleased to establish.

In tracing out the cause of laughter, I mean rather to illustrate than to censure the opinions of those who have already written on the same subject. The investigation has been several times attempted; nor is the cause altogether

Ridicule shall frequently prevail,

And cut the knot when graver reasons fail.

FRANCIS.

unknown. Yet notwithstanding former discoveries, the following essay may perhaps be found to contain something new; to throw light on certain points of criticism that have not been much attended to; and even to have some merit (if I execute my purpose) as a familiar example of philosophical induction carried on with a strict regard to fact, and without any previous bias in favour of any theory.

To provoke laughter, is not essential either to wit or to humour. For though that unexpected discovery of resemblance between ideas supposed dissimilar, which is called wit, and that comick exhibition of singular characters, sentiments, and imagery, which is denominated humour, do frequently raise laughter, they do not raise it always. Addison's poem to sir Godfrey Kneller, in which the British kings are likened to heathen gods, is exquisitely witty, and yet not laughable. Pope's Essay on Man abounds in serious wit; and examples of serious humour are not uncommon in Fielding's history of Parson Adams, and in Addison's account of sir Roger de Coverly. Wit, when the subject is grave, and the allusions sublime, raises admiration instead of laughter: and if the comick singularities of a good man appear in circumstances of real distress, the imitation of those

singularities, in the epick or dramatick comedy, will form a species of humour, which if it should force a smile, will draw forth a tear at the same time. An inquiry, therefore, into the distinguishing characters of wit and humour, has no necessary connection with the present subject. I did, however, once intend to have touched upon them in the conclusion of this discourse: but Dr. Campbell's masterly disquisition concerning that matter, in the first part of his Philosophy of Rhetorick, makes it improper for me to attempt it. I was favoured with a perusal of that work in manuscript, when I had finished the three first chapters of this essay for the press; and was agreeably surprised to find my notions, in regard to the cause or object of laughter, so fully warranted by those of my very learned and ingenious friend. And it may not perhaps be improper to inform the publick, that neither did he know of my having undertaken this argument, nor I of his having discussed that subject, till we came mutually to exchange our papers, for the purpose of knowing one another's sentiments in regard to what we had written.

Some authors have treated of ridicule, without marking the distinction between ridiculous and ludicrous ideas. But I presume the natų