barism lingers in society-a barbarism capable of gradual extinction, not by the repression of bad qualities, but by the development of those which are good. The history of progress is the history of successful struggles against coercion and authoritative direction, and in favour of human spontaneity and free motion. It is astonishing how any community could have tolerated the minute and vexatious legislation of former times, which scarcely left any room for individual life. Take, for example, an ordinance of Philip le Bel, in the year 1294. It decreed that,

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"1. No citizen shall keep a car.

"2. No citizen, male or female, shall wear fur, gray or ermine, and they shall discontinue such as they now have within a year from next Easter. They shall not wear any ornaments of gold nor precious stones, nor gold nor silver fillets.

"4. A duke, count, or baron of six thousand livres a year and upwards from land, may have three suits a year, and no more. Their ladies as many, and no more.

"8. A knight or banneret, with three thousand livres and upwards from land, may have three suits a year, and no more, and one of them shall be a summer suit.

11. Boys shall only have one suit a year.

"14. No one shall have more at dinner than two dishes and a potage au lard, and at supper one dish and a side dish; and if be a fast day, two dishes of herrings and soup, and two other dishes, or three dishes and one soup, and each dish shall only consist of one piece of meat, or one sort of soup."*

Our own country was not exempt from legislation equally vicious in principle and not less vexatious: thus, in 1551, a statute was passed, prohibiting any clothier, not residing in a city, from having more than one woollen loom, and declaring that for the future clothiers should only make cloth in cities. In 1557 they were ordered not to practise their industry in any city or town in which it had not been carried on for the ten previous years. How they were to make their cloth, and how to dye it, was also prescribed. In 1543 the pinmakers were ordered to make their pins in a particular manner, and to sell them at the prices of the last two years. In 1544, pins becoming scarce, this clause was repealed.

Many other instances might be given, especially the statutes of labourers. Thus, even in Elizabeth's time, it was decreed by an act of Parliament, that "no one should be retained for less than a

* Guizot. 'Hist. Civil.'

year in various trades therein mentioned, and every person unmarried, and every married person under thirty years of age, brought up in the said trades, or having exercised them for three years, not having lands, freehold or copyhold, for term of life at least, of clear 40s. per annum, nor goods to the value of 10l., and so allowed by two justices of the peace, or the mayor or head officer of the place where he last dwelt for a year, nor being retained in husbandry or the above trades, nor in any other, nor in the service of any nobleman, gentleman, or other, nor having a farm whereon to employ himself in tillage; such person shall serve in the trade he has been brought up in if required."*

The belief in meddling with industry is dying out, but the desire to diminish social evils by direct legislation is on the increase, and the wish to regulate modes of thought and action by conventional standards is still a rampant disorder in the moral world. A complete state of liberty would be that in which neither public opinion nor legislation, nor other external power, prescribed any limitations or restrictions upon actions of individuals that could be performed without injury to their neighbours, and in which nothing was attempted by compulsory co-operation that could be

* Reeve's Hist. English Law.'

accomplished by voluntary private exertion, and in which, when compulsory co-operation could not be avoided, its governance was as much as possible left to local representative bodies.

There are two great disadvantages of legislative meddling: first, that the people meddled with lose habits of independence and opportunities for the exercise of their faculties; and secondly, that the governing individuals or class are tempted to mistake their legitimate functions, and try to constitute themselves as a sort of special Providence, without whose aid public affairs would go to ruin. It is, however, impossible to lay down one set of boundaries of legislative action applicable to all times and circumstances, and the only safeguard is to stimulate personal independence, and excite a constant jealousy of centralizing power. It is not impossible to lay down principles of action, but it is impossible to secure their being wisely carried out without the counteracting force of the influence last named. Mr. J. S. Mill, in his admirable work on Liberty, has done much to elucidate this question, and he contends with great force and reason that "one very simple principle is entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion or control, whether the means used be

physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.'

This principle possesses so much inherent reason that it is impossible to doubt its final acceptation; but unless there be in society a real love of individuality and diversity, and a strong hatred of all state interference with private concerns, many who adopt it in theory will continually find excuses for its violation in practice, on the ground of the connection between individual conduct and the general good. Mr. J. S. Mill cites the Maine Liquor Law agitation as an instance of flagrant disregard of individual rights for the assumed benefit of society at large. The process adopted in this agitation is very characteristic of the times, and is unfortunately aided by the prevalent habit of stopping short at the first proximate cause of an acknowledged evil that offers a conveni