enlightened to promote the progress, not of individuals, but of the mass, and sufficiently gross to be capable of popularization. If we add to the picture of ancient society given by M. Guizot the idea that the gifted few were much further removed from the many than is the case in modern society, we shall be able to appreciate the changes that have taken place. In ancient society we see a splendid intellectual growth affecting a small number of men, and very little effort to make society conform to the ideal which existed in its foremost minds. In mediæval society the intellectual splendour is feebler, but the endeavour to unite the ideal and the actual vigorous and pervading. But the ideal of the priest was not capable of permanence. It could not satisfy the growing aspirations of the human heart, nor could it control the expansive powers of the intellect, which, acting in conformity with its own laws, was constantly overleaping the appointed boundaries. A movement of emancipation was inevitable: science could not remain the slave of theology, and one by one the Church has had to abandon dogmas and beliefs that reason could not approve, and to accept facts and doctrines which all its anathemas were unable to suppress. Guizot says truly, "the religious form has ceased to hold exclusive dominion in human thought: scientific and rational development has recommenced; and yet what has come to pass? ? Have philosophers thought, have they wished to trust pure knowledge in the same manner as those of antiquity have done ?" "No! human reason aspires in the present day to govern and reform societies after its own conceptions, to rule the exterior world according to general principles: that is to say, thought, again become philosophical, has preserved the pretensions it held under the religious form; with this immense difference, it is true, that it would unite the liberty of thought with its power, and that even whilst it tries to take possession of societies, to govern them and place the power in the hands of intelligence, it does not wish intelligence to be organized in subjection to forms and a legal yoke. It is in the alliance of intellectual liberty, as is shown in antiquity, with the intellectual power as it showed itself in Christian societies, that we find the great and original character of modern civilization." If we contemplate the vast amount of work that we can now see ought to be done, we shall feel that we are only on the threshold of modern civilization. Filled as the world is with stupid convention alities and superstitions, it is a hard struggle to preserve and extend the modicum of intellectual liberty that has already been won; and in England especially we need a vigorous and concerted movement to get rid of the fanatical dislike to theory, and to all efforts to make institutions thoroughly conformable to principles known to be true. As a corollary to the propositions laid down by Guizot, we should be able to deduce the fact that society is steadily marching towards democracy and self-government, which are not always identical. Under the ecclesiastico-political system of the middle ages, ideas rather than persons obtained a recognized right to rule; but the business of ideamaking was, so far as authority could accomplish such a result, confined to the governing powers, and heresy or individual divergence was the greatest crime. In modern society the supremacy of ideas remains, but each mind claims the right of developing them, and no hierarchy is avowedly permitted to obstruct or control the process. But where thought is to become sovereign, and all may think, government can no longer represent the interests and reflect the will of the few; it must, in opposition to this, display solicitude for the welfare of the many, and attempt to realize their ideal of a commonwealth. Thus we see that a philosophical survey of the broad features of the past enables us to predict the broad features of the future. We can discern tendencies to good, and promote their development. We can also discover tendencies to evil, and obstruct their growth. These considerations, however, belong to other chapters, and we now pass to an interesting fact in social philosophy, which is the prefiguration of beneficial changes that are to come. Take, for example, the Republic of Athens: it was not only a glorious fact when present among men, but a prophecy of the noble condition that they would hereafter reach. To understand this we cannot do better than take the idealized picture presented by Pericles, and commented upon by Mr. Grote. Addressing the Athenians, their great leader told them, "We live under a constitution such as no way to envy the laws of our neighboursourselves an example to others, rather than an imitation. It is called a democracy, since its aim tends towards the many, not towards the few: in regard to private matters and disputes, the laws deal equally with every one; while in respect to public dignity and importance, the position of each is determined, not by a class influence, but by worth according as his reputation stands in his particular department; nor does poverty or obscure station keep him back if he has any capacity of benefiting the state; and our social march is free, not merely in regard to public affairs, but also in regard to tolerance of each other's diversity of tastes and pursuits. For we are not angry with our neighbour for what he does to please himself, nor do we put on those sour looks which are offensive, though they do no positive damage." Upon the speech from which this extract is taken, Mr. Grote remarks, "the stress which he (Pericles) lays upon the liberty of thought and action at Athens, not merely from excessive restraint of law, but also from practical intolerance between man and man, and tyranny of the majority over individual dissenters in tastes and pursuits, deserves serious notice, and brings out one of those points in the national character upon which the intellectual development of the time mainly depended. The national temper was indulgent in a high degree to all the varieties of positive impulses; the peculiar promptings in every individual bosom were allowed to manifest themselves and bear fruit, without being suppressed by external opinion, or trained into forced conformity with some assumed standard; antipathies against any one of them formed no part of the habitual morality of the citizen." We have unfor D |