SUMMARY. It is a morality deduced merely from physical law, grounded solely on what is called "experience," and on analysis of and deductions from experience; holding only of the positive sciences, and rejecting all pure reason, all philosophy, in the proper sense of the word This new morality is, in short, Hedonism; it conceives of man as an animal for whom pain and pleasure are "the sole and the ultimate causes of action " It accounts of Right, not as absolute, but as relative: the accord of the individual instinct with the social instinct and of Wrong, as the absence of such accord. It finds in general utility the only scientific and experimental criterion of human action : And as it deduces Right from the physical fact of living together, so does it deduce Duty from the physical necessity of living together Virtue it resolves into conduct tending to the general good, and therefore consecrated by public opinion It repudiates free-will as in manifest contradiction with the law of mechanical causality, and by its identification of moral with physical necessity it is led to Determinism Objections to this new morality: (1) It is devoid of obligation, in place of which it (2) In a world of mechanism Right is a meaningless xi PAGE 38 39 42 45 46 47 48 . 51 PAGE (3) Physical laws give us mere facts, the authority (4) Public opinion, with its "uniformities of appro- (5) The application of the laws of natural history (6) "The agreeable consciousness resulting from the (7) Whether morality be regarded objectively or Consequences, although not a criterion of morality, are an element in ratiocination. A reductio ad absurdum is a good logical process, because man consists in reason . And the fact that the doctrines of Materialism issue in unreason, is enough to discredit them: for the universe is reasonable: it is cosmos not chaos No compromise is possible between the two schools of But a wider physic would not hurt our metaphysic SUMMARY. CHAPTER III. EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS. xiii Mr. Spencer's ethical teaching deserves special attention, as the most noteworthy attempt to establish the rules of right conduct upon a new basis: and therefore this chapter is devoted to the consideration of it He regards "moral phenomena" as phenomena of evolution: and evolution he defines as constituted by a redistribution of Matter and Motion": his method in morals is therefore purely physical PAGE 66 68 Like "the men of science," whose teachings were considered in the last chapter, he reduces all knowledge to experience and all morality to expedience. 69 That this is so, is often denied, and Mr. Spencer's vigorous criticism of Bentham and Mill is urged in support of the denial 70 It is perfectly true that Mr. Spencer does not confine himself to the experience of the individual, or adopt the bald empiricism which sums up morality as enlightened self-interest. His point of departure is not the individual, but the race: and his "laws of conduct" are evolved not from personal, but from tribal selfishness. But, however complicated the process, to experience and expediency he comes at last It is absolutely clear from his own statements, first, that he dissents utterly from the transcendental school as to the foundation of morals: insisting that 70 there can be no eternal principle of right and wrong: Equally clear is it, in the second place, that he denies free-will in every possible sense and subordinates morality to the laws of life, which laws he accounts. of as purely physical, his argument resting mainly upon what is really a sophism about conformity to law And, thirdly, no less evident is it that he identifies moral goodness with pleasure, by a grave metaphysical error, while, by an error not less serious, he abstracts moral obligation in general from a representation of "the natural consequences" of certain acts He has no sort of rational answer to give to the question what is the obligation to right conduct: no valid reason to offer why the individual should ever sacrifice himself He tells us that his arguments are valid only for optimists, but experience, to which he appeals, does not yield him optimism: hence he is compelled to invent a Laputa, which he calls the "ideal," wherein he hopes his ethics will be verified: but this is to put himself altogether out of court His evolutionary ethics, are, in fact, a house of cards, built upon a foundation of sand PAGE 71 74 80 88 90 94 SUMMARY CHAPTER IV. RATIONAL ETHICS. XV PAGE The true basis of Ethics must be sought in Reason: which is " the power of universal and necessary convictions; the source and substance of truths above sense, and having their evidence in themselves" Upon its testimony we believe in Natural Right, as immutable truth, wherein every man shares who comes into the world: in Justice, as prior to all experience, and wholly independent of empirical deductions: in the Moral Law, as supreme over the totality of exist ence Our intuitions of Right and Wrong are first principles anterior to all systems. They are self-evident and categorical, and from them ethical science starts. Thus its principles are, in the strictest sense, transcendental. The moral "ought' appeals, not to experience, but to the reason of things Hence, in its own sphere, morality is autonomous: it is absolutely independent, both of religious systems and of the physical sciences The rule of ethics is a natural and permanent revelation of the Reason The most certain portion of all my knowledge is that Ithe thinking being-exist But as surely as I am conscious of myself, so am I conscious of ethical obligation. The sense of duty is a primary fact of human nature 96 97 98 99 99 100 100 . 101 |