An essay on Consciousness; or, a series of evidences of a distinct mind. The second edition enlargedLongman, 1812 - 380 pages |
Contents
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Other editions - View all
An Essay on Consciousness: Or, a Series of Evidences of a Distinct Mind John Fearn No preview available - 2016 |
An Essay on Consciousness, Or a Series of Evidences of Distinct Mind ... John Fearn No preview available - 2019 |
Common terms and phrases
Action admit Affections appears apposited argued asafoetida Attention Berkeley Bishop Berkeley Brain called certainly Chap co-existent Colour complex conceive conscious Fact consequent consideration contrary convey degree Desire Distension distinct doctrine dulations elementary Body equally Evidence exist extended impressions extended Mind Extensionist external Senses farther Feeling from Extension Figure Flexures Hypothesis Ideal Theory Ideas Imagination impulses incontinent inference intellectual intelligence Judgment Knowledge Locke Memory Modes Motions Motivity necessary inference Nerves nervous never observe occasion operate physically operation Optic Nerve Passions perceive Perception Percipient perhaps Philosophers Pleasure and Pain Power primary Feeling Process produce Professor Stewart proper quality of Body Reason Reid remark repetition SECT Sensation Sense fail Sense of Touch sensual Pain sensual Pleasure shew Sight sion Smell sort Sound Species spherule Mind Substance Succession suffer suppose supposition Surface synchronous Taste thing Third Ventricle tion Uneasiness Vibrations Vision visual Volition whilst
Popular passages
Page 22 - But our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, which cease to be any thing, when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory, signifies no more but this, that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before.
Page 338 - In time the mind comes to reflect on its own operations about the ideas got by sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, which I call ideas of reflection.
Page 23 - The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself: And it requires art and pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own object.
Page 169 - As no two points, however, of the outline are in the same direction, every point, by itself, constitutes just as distinct an object of attention to the mind, as if it were separated by an interval of empty space from all the rest. If the doctrine therefore formerly stated be just, it is impossible for the mind to attend to more than one of these points at once ; and as the perception of the figure of the object implies a knowledge of the relative situation of the different points,with respect to...
Page 243 - Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, ie by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, &c.
Page 25 - They who talk thus may, with as much reason, if it be necessary to their hypothesis, say, that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it : whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks.
Page 25 - If they say the man thinks always, but is not always conscious of it, they may as well say his body is extended without having parts; for it is altogether as intelligible to say that a body is extended without parts, as that anything thinks without being conscious of it, or perceiving that it does so.
Page 42 - The former expresses merely that change in the state of the mind which is produced by an impression upon an organ of sense ; (of which change we can conceive the mind to be conscious, without any knowledge of external objects) : the latter expresses the knowledge we obtain, by means of our sensations, of the qualities of matter.
Page 247 - When we think or speak of any particular colour, however simple the notion may seem to be which is presented to the imagination, it is really in some sort compounded. It involves an unknown cause and a known effect. The name of colour belongs indeed to the cause only, and not to the effect.
Page 103 - This self-command is very different at different times. A man in health possesses more of it than one languishing with sickness. We are more master of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening : Fasting, than after a full meal. Can we give any reason for these variations, except experience? Where then is the power, of which we pretend to be conscious...