poetical bursts, had their acuteness sharpened by his fine analysis, went away with a high idea of the spirituality of the soul, and retained through life a lively recollection of his sketches of the operations of the human mind. This, we venture to affirm, is a more wholesome result than is likely to be produced by what some would substitute for psychology in these times, à priori discussions derived from Germany,'or demonstrated idealisms spun out by an exercise of human ingenuity. what too fastidious, not to say finical and feminine, for a philosopher; but the youths who wait on his lectures are disposed to overlook this, when they fall under the influence of his gentleness, so fitted to win, and of the authority which he has to command. Expectation was on the tiptoe, and he fully met and gratified it. His amiable look, his fine elocution, his acuteness and ingenuity, his skill in reducing a complex subject into a few elements, his show of originality and independence, the seeming comprehensiveness of his system, and above all, His biographer tells us that, on his aphis fertility of illustration, and the glow, pointment to the chair, he had retired into like that of stained glass, in which he set the country in order that fresh air and exforth his refined speculations, did more than ercise might strengthen him for his labours, delight his youthful audience-it entranced and that, when the session opened, he had them; and, in their ecstacies, they declared only the few lectures of the previous winthat he was superior to all the philosophers ters; but such was the fervour of his genius who had gone before him, and, in particular, and the readiness of his pen, that he gener that he had completely superseded Reid, and ally commenced the composition of a lecthey gave him great credit, in that he gener- ture after tea and had it ready for delivery ously refrained from attacking and over- next day by noon, and that nearly the whelming Stewart. He had every quality whole of the lectures contained in the first fitted to make him a favourite with students. three of the four volumed edition were His eloquence would have been felt to be written the first year of his professorship, too elaborate by a younger audience, and and the whole of the remaining next session. regarded as too artificial and sentimental by Nor does he appear to have re-written any an older audience, but exactly suited the portion of them, or to have been disposed tastes of youths between sixteen and twenty. to review his judgments, or make up what A course so eminently popular among was defective in his philosophic reading. students had not, we rather think, been de- He seems to have wasted his life in sendlivered in any previous age in the Univer- ing forth volume after volume of poetry, sity of Edinburgh, and has not, in a later which is, doubtless, beautifully and artistage, been surpassed in the fervour excited by ically composed, after the model of the Chalmers or Wilson. There are men of English poets of the eighteenth century, but sixty, still spared to us, who fall into rap its pictures are without individuality, and tures when they speak of his lectures, and they fail to call forth hearty feeling. Far assure the modern student, that, in compari- more genuine poetical power comes out inson with him, Wilson was no philosopher, cidentally in certain paragraphs of his philoand Hamilton a stiff pedant. It should be sophic lectures than in whole volumes of added, that, when the students attending his elaborate versification. him were asked what they had got, not! The incidents of his remaining life are a few could answer only by exclama- few, but are sufficient to bring out the linetions of admiration, "How fine!" "How aments of his character. His chief enjoybeautiful!" "How ingenious!" In those ments lay in his study, in taking a quiet large classes in the Scottish colleges which walk in some solitary place, where he would are taught exclusive by written lectures, watch the smoke curling from a cottage large numbers, including the dull, the idly chimney, or the dew illuminated with suninclined, and the pleasure-loving, are apt to shine on the grass, and in the society of his pass through without receiving much benefit family and a few friends. Never had a -unless, indeed, the professor be a very mother a more devoted son, or sisters a systematic examiner and laborious exacter more affectionate brother. In his disposiof written exercises; and this, we rather tion there is great gentleness, with a tendthink, Brown was not. As he left the im- ency to sentimentality; thus, on the occapression on his students, that there was little sion of his last visit to his native place, he' wisdom in the past, and that his own sys- is thrown into a flood of sensibility, which, tem was perfect, he did not, we suspect, when it is related in future years to Chalcreate a spirit of philosophic reading such mers, on his happening to be in the place, as Hamilton evoked in select minds in a the sturdier Scotch divine is thrown into a later age. But all felt the glow of his spirit, fit of merriment. We perceive that he is had a fine literary taste awakened by his fond of fame and sensitive of blame, but seeking to cherish both as a secret flame; | been completely reviewed. Now that he has and that he is by no means inclined to allow passed through a period of undeserved popuany one to offer him counsel. In 1819, he larity, and a period of unmerited disparageprepared his "Physiology of the Mind," as ment, the public should be prepared to a text-book for his students, and put it into listen with candour to an impartial critithe press the following winter. By the cism. Christmas of that year he was rather unwell; in spring he removed for the benefit of his health to London, and died at Brompton in April 1820. His remains were deposited in the churchyard of his native place, beside those of his father and mother. The psychology of Brown may be summarily described as a combination of the Scottish philosophy of Reid and Stewart, and of the analysis of Condillac, Destutt de Tracy, and the higher philosophers of the Sensational school of France, together with His lectures were published shortly after views of the association of ideas derived his death, and excited an interest wherever from a prevailing British school. To Reid the English language is spoken, quite equal and Stewart he was indebted more than he to that awakened by the living lecturer was willing to allow, and it would have among the students of Edinburgh. They been better for his ultimate reputation continued for twenty years to have a popu- had he imbibed more of their spirit, and adlarity in the British dominions and in the hered more closely to their principles. He United States greater than any philosophical admits every where with them the existence work ever enjoyed before. During these of principles of irresistible belief; for exyears most students were introduced to me- ample, he comes to such a principle when taphysics by the perusal of them, and at- he is discussing the beliefs in our personal tractive beyond measure did they find them identity, and in the invariability of the reto be. The writer of this article would lation between cause and effect. But acgive much to have revived within him the enthusiasm which he felt when he first read them. They had never, however, a great reputation on the Continent, where the Sensational school thought he had not gone sufficiently far in analysis; where those fighting with the Sensational school did not feel that he was capable of yielding them any aid; and where the Transcendental school, in particular, blamed him for not rendering a sufficiently deep account of some of the profoundest ideas which the mind of man can entertain, such as those of space, time, and infinity. His reputation was at its greatest height from 1830 to 1835, from which date it began to decline, partly because it was seen that his analyses were too ingenious, and his omissions many and great; and partly, because new schools were engaging the philosophic mind; and, in particular, the school of Coleridge, the school of Cousin, and the school of Hamilton. Coleridge was superseding him by views derived from Germany, which he had long been inculcating, regarding the distinction between the Understanding and the Reason; Cousin, by a brilliant Eclectic system, which professedly drew largely from Reid and Kant; and Hamilton, by a searching review of Brown's Theory of Perception, and by his own me taphysical views promulgated in his lectures and his published writings. The result of all this was a recoil of feeling in which Brown was as much undervalued as he had at one time been overrated. In the midst of these laudations and condemnations, Brown's psychological system has never knowledging, as he does, the existence of intuitive principles, he makes no inquiry into their nature and laws and force, or (what has never yet been attempted) the relation in which they stand to the faculties. In this respect, so far from being an advance on Reid and Stewart, he is rather a retrogression. His method is as much that of Condillac and Destutt de Tracy as that of Reid and Stewart. He is infected with the besetting sin of metaphysicians, that of trusting to analyses instead of patient observation; and, like the French school, his analysis is exercised in reducing the phenomena of the mind to as few powers as possible, and this he succeeds in doing by omitting some of the most characteristic peculiarities of the phenomena. His classification of the faculties bears a general resemblance to that of M. de Tracy, the metaphysician of the Sensational school.* . The *Hereby hangs a tale. Professor James Mylne of Glasgow, resolved all the powers of the mind into Sensation, Memory, and Judgment--Emotion attached. There was a correspondence between this being represented as a conception with a sensation division and that of Brown, and yet neither could have borrowed from the other; Mylne, who never published his system, delivered it in lectures years before Brown was a professor. The general correspondence arose from both being influenced by de Tracy. This came out when the posthumous lectures of Prof. Young of Belfast, on "Intellectual Philosophy." were published (1835). The views there given had such a resemblance to those of Brown, that some of Brown's friends were inclined out acknowledgment. to regard him as having borrowed from Brown withBut the actual state of the case is, that Dr. Young's lectures, written immedi Frenchman's division of the faculties is-(" Elem. of Psychology," p. 78), that the We have already referred to the circumstance, that Brown stands up resolutely for intuitive principles. He calls them by the very name which some prefer as most expressive-" beliefs," and employs the test which Leibnitz and Kant have been so lauded as introducing into philosophy. He everywhere characterizes them as "irresisti ble' -a phrase pointing to the same quality as necessary"-the term used by the German metaphysicians. No one-not even Cousin-has demonstrated, in a more ef fective manner, that our belief in cause and effect is not derived from experience. By this doctrine he has separated himself for ever from Sensationalists, and given great trouble to those classifers of philosophic systems who insist, contrary to the whole history of British philosophy, that all systems must either be sensational or ideal. It is In estimating the influences exercised from without on Brown, we must further take into account, that ever since the days of Hartley, there had been a great propensity in Britain to magnify the power and importance of the Association of Ideas. Not only habit, but most of our conceptions and beliefs had been referred to it; Beattie and Alison, followed by Jeffrey, ascribed to it our ideas of beauty; and, in a later age, Sir James Macintosh carried this tendency the greatest length, and helped to bring about a reaction, by tracing our very idea of virtue to this source. It is evident that Brown felt this influence largely. Our intelligence is resolved by him into Simple and Relative Suggestion. There is a flagrant and inexcusable oversight here. All that Association, or, as he designates it, Suggestion, can explain, is the order of the succession of quite obvious that such men as Butler, our mental states; it can render no account Brown, and Chalmers, cannot be included in of the character of the states themselves. either of the artificial compartments, and It might show, for example, in what circum- hence one ground of their neglect by the stances a notion of any kind arises, say our system-builders of our age. notion of time, or space, or extension, but His whole account of sensation is characcannot explain the nature of the notion itself. terized by fine analysis; and, in particular, But it will be necessary to enter a little his separation of the muscular sense from more minutely into the system of Brown. the sense of touch proper. About the very From the affection which we bear to his time when Sir Charles Bell was demonmemory, and bearing in mind that his views strating, by anatomy, the distinction behave never been used by himself or others tween the nerves of sensation and the nerves to undermine any of the great principles of of motion, Brown was showing, on psychomorality, we would begin with his excel- logical grounds, how, by the muscular sense, lencies. we get knowledge which cannot be had from mere feeling or touch. No doubt, Sir W. Hamilton has been able, by his vast erudition, to detect anticipations of these views (see note D, appended to Reid); but they were never so clearly stated, nor so acutely elaborated. In specifying these, we are inclined to mention, first, his lofty views of man's spiritual being. He every where draws the distinction between mind and body very decidedly. In this respect, he is a true follower of the school of Descartes and Reid, and is vastly superior to some who, while blaming Locke and Brown for holding views tending to sensationalism, or even materialism, do yet assure us, as Mr. Morell does ately after his appointment to the Belfast Academical Institution (1815), are largely taken from his preceptor, Mr. Mylne, who was indebted to de Tracy. It is only justice to add, that all three were men of Nor must we forget his ingenious and felicitous mode of illustrating the succession of our mental states. In this particular, were it only by his happy illustrations, he has made most important contributions to what he called the physiology of the mind. It is not to be omitted, that, while he illustrates the laws of suggestion under the three original and independent minds. Mylne was a clear, Aristotelian heads of Contiguity, Resemcool lecturer, and made his students think; but his blance, and Contrast, he hints at the possi system of morals was a utilitarian one of a low bility of resolving the whole to a finer kind stamp, and, in his account of the human mind, he of contiguity-a doctrine which is an ap overlooked its noblest ideas.. Young's lectures, which do not seem to have been carefully re-written, proach to the law of integration developed gave no adequate view of one who was a man of by Hamilton. It should be added, that he fine parts and an orator, but who wasted his talents has a classification-crude enough, we acin "dining out," and unprofitable speechifying. It knowledge of the secondary laws of sugis a disgrace that there should be no epitaph over his grave but this, put up by some foolish fellow, gestion, a subject worthy of being further Young moulders here." 64 prosecuted. His manner of classifying the relations | belief in our personal identity and in causwhich the mind can discover, though by no ation, immediately dropping these intuitions, means complete and ultimate, is, at least, and inquiring no more into their nature. worthy of being looked at, and is superior to what has, to some extent, the same end in view-the vaunted categories of Kant. In his analysis he often misses the main element of the concrete or complex phenomenon. In referring so many ideas to Some place higher than any of his other sensation, he omits to consider how much excellencies, his eloquent exposition of the is involved in body occupying space, and emotions-an exposition which called forth how much in body exercising property; and, the laudations both of Stewart and of Chal- in the account of memory, he fails to dismers. We are not inclined, indeed, to cover how much is contained in our idea of reckon the principle which he adopts in time. Often, too, when he has accomdividing them that of time-as the best; plished an analysis of a complex state, does and we are sure that he includes under emo- he forget the elements, and reminds us of the tion much that should be placed under a boy who imagines that he has annihilated a higher faculty; still, his lectures on this piece of paper when he has burnt it, forgetsubject contain much fine exposition, and are ting that the elements are to be found in the radiant all over with poetry, and will repay smoke and in the ashes. Thus, in analysa careful reading, much better than many ing our belief in personal idenity, he comes scholastic discussions such as it is now the to an intuitive belief or instinct, but no custom to teach in the chairs of mental account is taken of that instinct in the sumscience. It would be injustice not to add, mary of mental principles. It is by a most that he has some very splendid illustrations deceitful decomposition-it is by missing of Natural Theism, fitted at once to refine the very peculiarity of the phenomena, that and elevate the soul. We have never heard he is able to derive all our intellectual ideas of any youth being inclined towards scepti- from sensation, and simple and relative cism or pantheism, or becoming prejudiced suggestion. against Christian truth, in consequence of Thus, he looks on consciousness merely attending on, or reading the lectures of as a general term for all the states and afBrown. fections of mind; and then, in order to account for our belief in the sameness of self, he calls in a special instinct, which he would have seen to be involved in consciousness (always with memory), had he taken the proper view of consciousness as an attribute revealing to us self and the states of Over against these excellencies we have to place certain grave deficiencies and errors. First, we take exception to the account which he gives of the very object and end of mental science. It is, according to him, to analyse the complex into the simple, and discover the laws of the succession of our self. mental states. There is a grievous over- His doctrine of Perception has been sesight in this representation. The grand verely criticised by Hamilton, and it is business of mental science is to observe the not needful to dwell on it. According to nature of our mental states, with the view Brown, the mind, in perception through the of classifying them, and rising to the dis senses, looks immediately on a sensation in covery of the laws which they obey, and the the mind, and not on anything out of the faculties from which they proceed. Taking mind. This, says Hamilton, is contrary to this view, analysis becomes a subordinate, consciousness. We may add that, by adthough of course an important, instrument; hering to this doctrine, he finds himself in and we have to seek to discover the faculties great difficulties, in attempting to show how which determine the nature of the states, as well as the laws of their succession. the mind can, from a knowledge of a mental state, which is not extended or solid, ever rise to the knowledge of something extended and solid. He grants that there are intuitive principles of belief in the mind; but he has never so much as attempted an induction of them, In supposing that our conceptions can be or an exposition of their nature, and of the referred to suggestion, he is overlooking laws which regulate them. In this respect the characteristic of the conceptions. He he must be regarded as falling behind his takes no separate account of the fantasy, or predecessors among the Scottish metaphysi- imagining power of the mind, which pictures cians, as he is in a still greater degree infe- and puts in new forms our past experience rior to Hamilton-who succeeded him-in by the senses and by self-consciousness; the estimation of students of mental science, nor does he distinguish sufficiently between The intelligent reader is greatly disappointed a conception, considered as a mere image or to find him, after he has shown so forcibly representation, and the abstract and general that there is an intuition involved in our notion. Nor can his system admit of his giving any account of the genesis of some of holding the reputation of the Scottish Colthe profoundest notions which the mind of leges for metaphysical pursuits: each had an man can entertain-such as those of space, ambition to be independent, to appear oriand time, and substance, and infinity. In ginal, and establish a system of his own; his view of cause, he is obliged to call in both were possessed of large powers of inan intuitive belief; but he does not see that genuity and acuteness, and delighted to rethis belief declares that there is power in the duce the compound into elements; and substance, acting as a cause, to produce the each, we may add, had a considerable aceffects. His analysis of reasoning has been quaintance with the physiology of the senses; declared defective, even by Mr. J. S. Mill, but in nearly all other respects they widely and must be held as erroneous by all who diverge, and their points of contrast are maintain that there is need, in every argu- more marked than their points of corre ment, of a major term, explicit or implicit. spondence. But his view of the motive and moral They differed even in their natural dispopowers of man is still more defective than sition. The one was amiable, gentle, somehis view of the intellectual powers. Dr. what effeminate, and sensitive, and not much Chalmers has shown that he has overlooked addicted to criticism; the other, as became the great truth brought out by Butler, that the descendant of a covenanting hero, was conscience is not only a power in the mind, manly, intrepid, resolute-at times passionbut claims supremacy and authority over ate-and abounding in critical strictures, all the others. We hold that his account of even on those whom he most admires. the moral faculty is altogether erroneous, As to their manner of expounding their inasmuch as he represents it as a mere pow-views, there could not be a stronger coner of emotion, overlooking the necessary trast. Both have their attractions; but the conviction and judgment involved in it. He one pleases by the changing hues of his fanis guilty of an equally fatal mistake, in de- cy and the glow of his sentiment, whereas scribing will as the prevailing desire, and the other stimulates our intellectual activity desire as a mere emotion. Nor is it to be by the sharpness of his discussions, and the omitted, that he does not bring out fully variety and 'aptness of his erudition. The that the moral faculty declares man to be a one abounds in illustrations, and excites sinner. He thus constructed an ethical sys- himself into eloquence, and his readers into tem, and delivered it in Edinburgh-which enthusiasm; the other is brief and coolsometimes claims to be the metropolis of seldom giving us a concrete example-reevangelical theology-without a reference to straining all emotion, except it be passion at redemption or grace. This has been the times-never deigning to warm the students grand defect of the academic ethical systems, and especially of the systems taught in the Moral Philosophy Chairs of Scotland. No teachers ever inculcated a purer moral system than Reid, Stewart, and Brown; but they do not seem willing to look at the fact, that man falls infinitely beneath the purity of the moral law. They give us lofty views of the moral power in man, but forget to tell us that man's moral faculty condemns him. It is at this place that we may expect important additions to be made to the ethics of Scotland. Taking up the demonstrations of the Scottish metaphysicians in regard to the conscience, an inquiry should be made, how are they affected by the circumstance that man is a sinner? This was the grand topic started by Chalmers, and which will be prosecuted, we trust, by other inquirers. by a flash of rhetoric-and presenting only the naked truth, that it may allure by its own charms. If we lose the meaning of the one, it is in a blaze of light, in a cloud of words, or in repeated repetitions: the quickest thinkers are not always sure that they understand the other, because of the curtness of his style, and the compression of his matter; and his admirers are found poring over his notes, as the ancients did over the responses of their oracles. The one helps us up the hill, by many a winding in his path, and allows us many a retrospect, when we might become weary, and where the view is most expanded; whereas the other conducts us straight up the steep ascent, and, though he knows all the paths by which others have mounted, he ever holds directly on; and if there be not a path made for him, he will clear one for himself. Both were We are now to turn to a thinker of a dif- eminently successful lecturers: but the one ferent stamp. Brown and Hamilton are called forth an admiration of himself in the alike in the fame which they attained-in minds of his whole class; whereas the other the influence which they exercised over succeeded in rousing the energies of select young and ardent spirits-in the interest minds, in setting them forth on curious rewhich they exercised in the study of the search, and in sharpening them for logical Human Mind-and in their success in up-dissection. One feels, in reading Brown, as |