of metaphysical speculations, concerning the nature and essence of God, the Spirit of the world, or anima mundi, the operations and essence of the soul of man, together with the existence and power of angels, or created spirits. But before he hath advanced many steps into this system, he strikes into objections against the divinity of Christ and the Holy Spirit; works up his own metaphysical principles with what is revealed in the Old and New Testament; and then cements the whole together with those impure traditions of the Rabbies, which originally made the word of God of none effect, and were insisted upon by the Jews, after their dispersion, on purpose to deface the doctrines of the primitive Christian church.

It is not my intention to confront his system with another of the like nature; in doing which, I should only fight as one that beateth the air; and instead of shewing his errors, nothing could hereby be manifested but my own weakness. I shall therefore meddle with this system no farther than as it interferes with revealed truth; and shall remark, as I go along, his abuse of Heathen learning, and misapplication of the Holy Scriptures; whence it will appear, that his speculations, however

new

new they may be thought, are very ancient, and of Pagan original.

If, in the course of these remarks, I should sometimes be obscure and immethodical, I hope it will be chiefly owing to the author's less perspicuous manner of treating his subject for when I peruse his book, I confess myself often puzzled to perceive the connection; and his arguments are frequently so dispersed, that it is no easy matter to collect them. However, that I may the more readily be understood, I shall divide my answer into several chapters: the first of which shall comprehend his notions concerning the nature and essence of God, the Spirit of the universe, and the human soul-the second, those relating to the existence and power of created spirits-the third, his objections against the divinity of the Son-the fourth, his objections against that of the Holy Spirit-the fifth, the extent and validity of his conclusion-the sixth, his enquiry into the sentiments of the primitive Fathers-the seventh, his misapplication of the Heathen Trinities—the eighth and last, his remarks upon the Athanasian and Nicene Creeds.

CHAP.

1

CHAP. I,

In which his Notions concerning the Nature and Essence of God, the Spirit or Instinct of the Universe, and the Soul of Man, are considered.

IT

T must give us some surprise, to see the first scene of this Essay open with an atheist giving his definition of God. The author tells us, "The opinion of Spinosa

was, that there is no other substance in "nature but God: that modes cannot sub"sist, or be conceived, without a substance: "that there is nothing in nature but modes " and substances: and that therefore every "thing must be conceived as subsisting in "God." By which, if I am so happy as to understand him, he means---that as there is nothing in nature but modes, or various modifications of action; and as these modes cannot subsist without a substance, therefore all the motion or action which appears in nature, must proceed from the intimate presence of

Essay, p. 1.-Spin. Op. Posth. Eth, par, I. p. 12.

God's

God's substance, expanded through the universe. Which opinion of Spinosa, hath been supposed to terminate in atheism; because it asserts in other words, that the universal substance of Nature is God: which substance being really nothing more than inanimate matter, and the modes therein observable owing to material or second causes, under the direction and influence of the supreme: this opinion leaves us without any God at all, except that which all idolaters have allowed, the creature rather than the Creator.

How far the author's opinion coincides with this of Spinosa, will appear as we proceed. For according to him, "It may be asserted, "that there is in nature but one self-existent being, subsistence, or substance, which, by

བ་

way of eminence, may therefore be called "the substance, or, figuratively and compa"ratively speaking, the only being, subsist

ence, or substance in nature "." As to the first part of this sentence, we grant that there is but one self-existent being; but it cannot follow from hence, that there is but one subsistence or substance; because a substance (except when it is improperly used for the word

• P. 2.

essence)

essence) always implies something material; whereas a being may be either material or immaterial. However, to make this somewhat plausible, he "would be understood to mean

6.6

by these three words (being, subsistence, "and substance) one and the same thing". that when the words are granted to be synonymous, whatever is proved of a being, may hold good of a substance. I take notice of this, because, in the next page, the Scripture is introduced giving its verdict in favour of this opinion. "When Moses (says he) en

quired of God, by what name he should "make him known to the children of Israel, "God said, thus shalt thou say-I AM hath

sent me unto you--which is rendered by the

Sept. εyw εifer o wv, I am he that is, or that "exists; as if, comparatively speaking, there

was no other being or existence but God"." In this comment, the Essay-writer hath dropt the words subsistence and substance, and introduced only those of being and existence: but as he would be understood to mean the same thing by all of them, we have his own authority for substituting one for the other as we think proper; and then his paraphrase upon

c P 2.

a P. 3.

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