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into the field against the common enemy; when Flanders, the feat of war, was on our fide, and his majesty, a prince of great valour and conduct, at the head of the whole confederate army; yet we had no reason to boaft of our fuccefs; how then should we be able to oppofe France with those powers against us, which could carry fixty thoufand men from us to the enemy; and fo make us upon the balance weaker by one hundred and twenty thousand men at the beginning of this war, than of that in 1688?

On the other fide, thofe, whofe opinion or fome private motives inclined them to give their advice for entering into a new war, alledged how dangerous it would be for England that Philip should be king of Spain; that we could have no fecurity for our trade while that kingdom was fubject to a prince of the Bourbon family, nor any hopes of preferving the balance of Europe, becaufe the grandfather would, in effect, be king, while his grandfon had but the title, and thereby have a better opportunity than ever of pursuing his defign for univerfal monarchy. Thefe and the like arguments prevailed; and fo, without offering at any other remedy, without taking time to confider the confequences, or to reflect on our own condition, we haftily engaged in a war, which hath coft us fixty millions; and after repeated, as well as unexpected, fuccefs in arms, hath put us and our pofterity in a worfe condition, not only than any

of

of our allies, but even our conquered enemies themselves.

The part we have acted in the conduct of this whole war, with reference to our allies abroad, and to a prevailing faction at home, is what I fhall now particularly examine; where, I prefume, it will appear by plain matters of fact, that no nation was ever so long or fo fcandalously abused by the folly, the temerity, the corruption, and the ambition of its domeftic enemies; or treated with fo much infolence, injustice, and ingratitude by its foreign friends.

This will be manifeft by proving the three following points:

First, that against all manner of prudence or common reason we engaged in this war as principals, when we ought to have acted only as auxiliaries.

Secondly, that we spent all our vigour in purfuing that part of the war, which could leaft anfwer the end we proposed by beginning it; and made no efforts at all, where we could have moft weakened the common enemy, and, at the fame time, enriched ourselves.

Laftly, that we fuffered each of our allies to break every article in thofe treaties and agreements by which they were bound, and to lay the burthen upon us.

Upon the first of these points, that we ought to have entered into this war only as auxiliaries, let any man reflect upon our condition at that

time: just come out of the moft tedious, expenfive, and unsuccessful war that ever England had been engaged in [d]; finking under heavy debts, of a nature and degree never heard of by us or our ancestors; the bulk of the gentry and people heartily tired of the war and glad of a peace, although it brought no other advantage but itself; no fudden profpect of leffening our taxes, which were grown as neceffary to pay our debts as to raise armies; a fort of artificial wealth of funds and stocks in the hands of thofe, who, for ten years before, had been plundering the publick; many corruptions in every branch of our government that needed reformation. Under thefe difficulties, from which twenty years peace and the wifest management could hardly recover us, we declare war against France, fortified by the acceffion and alliance of those powers I mentioned before, and which, in the former war, had been parties in our confederacy. It is very obvious, what a change must be made in the balance by fuch weights taken out of our scale and put into theirs; fince it was manifeft, by ten years experience, that France, without thofe additions of ftrength, was able to maintain itself against us. So that human probability ran with mighty odds on the other fide; and in this cafe nothing under the most extreme neceflity fhould force any ftate to engage in a war. had already acknowledged Philip for king of Spain;

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[d] I was then lean, being juft come out of a fit of sickness, John Bull.

neither

neither does the QUEEN's declaration of war take notice of the duke of Anjou's succeffion to that monarchy as a subject of quarrel, but the French king's governing it as if it were his own; his feizing Cadiz, Milan, and the Spanish Low-countries, with the indignity of proclaiming the Pretender. In all which we charge that prince with nothing directly relating to us, excepting the last: and this, altho' indeed a great affront, might eafily have been redreffed without a war; for the French court declared they did not acknowledge the Pretender, but only gave him the title of king, which was allowed to Auguftus by his enemy of Sweden, who had driven him out of Poland, and forced him to acknowledge Stanislaus.

It is true indeed, the danger of the Dutch, by so ill a neighbourhood in Flanders, might affect us very much in the confequences of it; and the lofs of Spain to the House of Auftria, if it fhould be governed by French influence and French politicks, might, in time, be very pernicious to our trade. It would therefore have been prudent, as well as generous and charitable, to help our neighbour; and fo we might have done without injuring ourselves; for, by an old treaty with Holland, we were bound to affist that republick with ten thousand men,whenever they were attacked by the French; whofe troops, upon the king of Spain's death, taking poffeffion of Flanders in right of Philip, and securing the Dutch garrifons till they would acknowledge him, the VOL. IX.

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States

States-general, by memorials from their envoys here, demanded only the ten thousand men we were obliged to give them by virtue of that treaty. And I make no doubt but the Dutch would have exerted themfelves fo vigorously, as to be able, with that affiftance alone, to defend their frontiers; or, if they had been forced to a peace, the Spaniards, who abhor difmembring their monarchy, would never have fuffered the French to poffefs themselves of Flanders. At that time, they had none of those endearments to each other, which this war hath created; and whatever hatred and jealousy were natural between the two nations would then have appeared. So that there was no fort of neceffity for us to proceed further, although we had been in a better condition. But our politicians, at that time, had other views; and a new war must be undertaken upon the advice of thofe, who, with their partizans and adherents, were to be the fole gainers by it. A grand alliance was therefore made between the Emperor, England, and the States-general; by which, if the injuries complained of from France were not remedied in two months, the parties concerned were obliged mutually to affift each other with their whole ftrength.

Thus we became parties in a war in conjunction with two allies, whofe fhare in the quarrel was beyond all proportion greater than ours. However, I can fee no reason from the words of the grand alliance, by which we were obliged to make

those

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