PREFACE.

W The Conduct of the Allies, I had thoughts

HEN I published the discourse called

either of inferting or annexing the Barrier-treaty at length, with fuch obfervations as I conceived might be useful for public information: but that difcourfe taking up more room than I defigned, after my utmoft endeavours to abbreviate it, I contented myself only with making fome few reflexions upon that famous treaty, fufficient, as I thought, to answer the defign of my book. I have fince heard, that my readers in general feemed to wish I had been more particular, and have discovered an impatience to have that treaty made public, efpecially fince it hath been laid before the House of Commons.

That I may give fome light to the reader, who is not well yerfed in thofe affairs, he may pleafe to know that a project for a treaty of barrier with the States was tranfmitted hither from Holland; but being difapproved of by our court in several parts, a new project or scheme of a treaty was drawn up here with many additions and alterations. This laft was called The Counter-project; and was the measure, whereby the duke of Marlborough and my lord Townshend were commanded and instructed to proceed in negotiating a treaty of Barrier with the States.

I have added a tranflation of this Counter-proje in thofe articles where it differs from the Barriertreaty, that the reader, by comparing them together, may judge how punctually those negotiators obferved their inftructions. I have likewife fubjoined the fentiments of prince Eugene of Savoy, and the count De Sinzendorf, relating to this treaty, written (I fuppofe) while it was negotiating. And Jaftly, I have added a copy of the reprefentation of the Britif merchants at Bruges, fignifying what inconveniencies they already felt, and further apprehended, from this Barrier-treaty.

SOME

SOME

REMARKS

ON THE

BARRIER TREATY, &c.

IMA

MAGINE a reasonable person in China reading the following treaty, and one who was ignorant of our affairs, or our geography: he would conceive their high mightineffes the States-general to be fome vaft powerful commonwealth, like that of Rome; and HER MAJESTY to be a petty prince, like one of those to whom that republick would fometimes fend a diadem for a prefent, when they behaved themselves well, otherwife could depofe at pleasure, and place whom they thought fit in his ftead. Such a man would fink, that the States had taken our prince' and us into their protection; and, in return, honoured us fo far, as to make ufe of our troops as fome fmall affiftance in their conquefts, and the enlargement of their empire, or to prevent the incurfions of Barbarians upon fome of their out-lying provinces. But how muft it found in an European ear, that Great-Britain, after maintaining a war for fo many years, with fo much glory and fuccefs, and fuch prodigious expence, after faving the Empire, Holland, and Portugal, and

almoft

156 SOME REMARKS ON

almoft recovering Spain, fhould, towards the close of a war, enter into a treaty with seven Dutch provinces, to secure to them a dominion larger than their own, which she had conquered for them; to undertake for a great deal more, without ftipulating the leaft advantage for herself; and accept, as an equivalent, the mean condition of thofe States affifting to preferve the QUEEN on the throne, whom, by God's affiftance, fhe is able to defend against all her majesty's enemies and allies put together?

Such a wild bargain could never have been made for us, if the States had not found it their interest to ufe very powerful motives with the chief advifers (I fay nothing of the perfon immediately employed); and if a party here at home had not been refolved, for ends and purposes very well known, to continue the war as long as they had any occafion for it.

The Counter-project of this treaty, made here at London, was bad enough in all conscience: I have faid fomething of it in the preface; her majesty's minifters were inftructed to proceed by it in their negotiation. There was one point in that project, which would have been of confequence to Britain, and one or two more where the advantages of the States were not fo very exorbitant, and where fome care was taken of the house of Austria. Is it poffible, that our good allies and friends could not be brought to any terms with us, unlefs by ftriking out every particular that might do us any good,

and

and adding still more to those whereby so much was already granted? For instance, the article about demolishing Dunkirk furely might have remained; which was of fome benefit to the States, as well as of mighty advantage to us; and which the French king hath lately yielded in one of his preliminaries, although clogged with the demand of an equivalent, which will owe its difficulty only to this treaty.

But let me now confider the treaty itself: Among the one and twenty articles, of which it confifts, only two have any relation to us, importing that the Dutch are to be guarantees of our fucceffion, and are not to enter into any treaty until the QUEEN is acknowledged by France. We know very well, that it is in confequence the intereft of the States as much as ours, that Britain fhould be governed by a proteftant prince. Befides, what is there more in this guarantee, than in all common leagues offenfive and defenfive between two powers, where each is obliged to defend the other against any invader with all there ftrength? Such was the grand alliance between the Emperor, Britain, and Holland; which was, or ought to have been, as good a guarantee of our fucceffion to all intents and purposes, as this in the Barrier-treaty, and the mutual engagements in fuch alliances have been always reckoned fufficient without any feparate benefit to either party.

It is, no doubt, for the intereft of Britain, that the States fhould have a fufficient barrier against

France;