by the fecretary of the embaffy; and the minifters here prevailed on the QUEEN to execute a ratifica tion of articles, which only one part had signed. This was an abfurdity in form, as well as in reafon; because the ufual form of a ratification is with a preamble, fhewing; that whereas our minifters, and thofe of the allies, and of the enemy, have figned, &c. We ratify, &c. The [2] person, who brought over the articles, faid in all companies

(and perhaps believed) that it was a pity we had not demanded more; for the French were in a difpofition to refufe us nothing we would ask. One of our plenipotentiaries affected to have the fame concern; and particularly, that we had not obtained fome further fecurity for the empire on the Upper Rhine.

What could be the defign of all this grimace, but to amuse the people, and to raise ftocks for their friends in the fecret to fell to advantage? I have too great a respect for the abilities of those, who acted in this negotiation, to believe they hoped for any other iffue from it, than that we found by the event. Give me leave to fuppofe, the continuance of the war was the thing at heart among thofe in power, both abroad and at home; and then I can eafily fhew the confiftency of their proécedings; otherwife they are wholly unaccountable and abfurd. Did thofe, who infifted on fuch wild demands, ever fincerely intend a peace? Did they

[n] Horatio Walpole, secretary to that embaffy.

really

really think, that going on with the war was more eligible for their country, than the least abatement of those conditions? Was the fmalleft of them worth fix millions a year, and an hundred thoufand men's lives? Was there no way to provide for the fafety of Britain, or the fecurity of its trade, but by the French king's turning his arms to beat his own grandfon out of Spain? If these able ftatesmen were fo truly concerned for our trade, which they made the pretence of the war's beginning, as well as continuance; why did they fo neglect it in those very preliminaries, where the enemy made fo many conceffions, and where all that related to the advantage of Holland, or the other confederates, was exprefly fettled? But whatever concerned us was to be left to a general treaty; no tariff agreed on with France or the Low-countries, only the Schelde was to remain fhut, which must have ruined our commerce with Antwerp. Our trade with Spain was referred the fame way; but this they will pretend to be of no consequence, because that kingdom was to be under the house of Auftria, and we have already made a treaty with king Charles. I have indeed heard of a treaty made, by Mr. Stanhope, with that prince, for fettling our commerce with Spain: but whatever it were, there was another between us and Holland, which went hand in hand with it, I mean that of Barrier, wherein a claufe was inferted, by which all advantages proposed for Britain are to be in common with Holland.

VOL. IX.

K

Another

Another point, which I doubt those have not confidered, who are against any peace without Spain, is, that the face of affairs in Christendom, fince the Emperor's death, hath been very much changed. By this accident, the views and interests of feveral princes and ftates in the alliance have taken a new turn, and, I believe, it will be found that ours ought to do so too. We have fufficiently blundered once already, by changing our measures with regard to a peace, while our affairs continued in the fame pofture; and it will be too much in confcience to blunder again by not changing the firft, when the others are fo much altered.

To have a prince of the Auftrian family on the throne of Spain is, undoubtedly, more defirable than one of the house of Bourbon; but to have the empire and Spanish monarchy united in the fame person is a dreadful confideration, and directly oppofite to that wife principle on which the eighth article of the alliance is founded.

To this, perhaps, it will be objected, that the indolent character of the Auftrian princes, the wretched œconomy of that government, the want of a naval force, the remote diftance of their feveral territories from each other, would never suffer an emperor, although at the fame time king of Spain, to become formidable: on the contrary, that his dependance muft continually be on GreatBritain; and the advantages of trade, by a peace founded upon that condition, would foon make us amends for all the expences of the war.

In

In answer to this, let us confider the circumftances we must be in, before fuch a peace could be obtained, if it were at all practicable. We muft become not only poor for the present, but reduced, by further mortgages, to a state of beggary for endless years to come. Compare such a weak condition as this with fo great an acceffion of ftrength to Auftria; and then determine how much an emperor, in fuch a ftate of affairs, would either fear or need Britain.

Confider that the comparifon is not formed between a prince of the house of Austria, Emperor and king of Spain, and with a prince of the Bourbon family, king of France and Spain; but between a prince of the latter only king of Spain, and one of the former uniting both crowns in his own perfon.

What returns of gratitude can we expect, when we are no longer wanted? Hath all that we have hitherto done for the imperial family been taken as a favour, or only received as the due of the auguftiffima cafa?

Will the house of Austria yield the least acre of land, the leaft article of ftrained and even ufurped prerogative, to refettle the mind of thofe princes in the alliance, who are alarmed at the confequences of this turn of affairs occafioned by the Emperor's death? We are affured it never will. Do we then imagine that thofe princes, who dread the overgrown power of the Auflrian as much as that of the Bourbon family, will continue in our alliance upon a fyftem

K 2

a fyftem contrary to that which they engaged with us upon? For inftance: what can the duke of Savoy expect in fuch a cafe? Will he have any choice left him but that of being a slave and a frontier to France; or a vassal, in the utmost extent of the word, to the imperial court? Will he not therefore of the two evils chufe the leaft; by submitting to a mafter who hath no immediate claim upon him, and to whofe family he is nearly allied; rather than to another, who hath already revived feveral claims upon him, and threatens to revive more?

Nor are the Dutch more inclined than the reft of Europe, that the Empire and Spain fhould be united in king Charles, whatever they may now pretend. On the contrary, it is known to feveral perfons, that upon the death of the late emperor Joseph, the States refolved that those two powers should not be joined in the fame perfon; and this they determined as a fundamental maxim by which they intended to proceed. So that Spain was firft given up by them; and fince they maintained no troops in that kingdom, it fhould feem that they understand the duke of Anjou to be lawful monarch.

Thirdly, Those who are against any peace without Spain, if they be fuch as no way find their private account by the war, may perhaps change their fentiments if they will reflect a little upon our prefent condition.

I had two reafons for not fooner publishing this difcourfe; the first was, because I would give way

to