grafted upon the original quarrel by the intrigues of a faction among us, who prevailed to give it the fanction of a vote in both houses of parliament, to juftify those whofe intereft lay in perpetuating the war. And as this proceeding was against the practice of all princes and ftates, whofe intentions were fair and honourable; fo is it contrary to common prudence as well as juftice, I might add, that it was impious too, by prefuming to controul events which are only in the hands of God. Ours and the States complaint against France and Spain are deduced in each of our declarations of war, and our pretenfions specified in the eighth article of the grand alliance; but there is not in any of these the least mention of demanding Spain for the house of Austria, or of refufing any peace without that condition. Having already made an extract from both declarations of war, I fhall here give a tranflation of the eighth article in the grand alliance, which will put this matter out of dispute.

The EIGHTH ARTICLE of the GRAND ALLIANCE.

WHEN the war is once undertaken, none of the parties fhall have the liberty to enter upon a treaty of peace with the enemy, but jointly and in concert with the others. Nor is peace to be made without having first obtained a just and reasonable fatisfaction for his Cæfarean majesty, and for his royal majesty of GreatBritain, and a particular fecurity to the lords the States-general of their dominions, provinces, titles,

navigation

navigation and commerce: and a fufficient provision, that the kingdoms of France and Spain be never united, or come under the government of the same person, or that the fame man may never be king of both kingdoms; and particularly, that the French may never be in poffeffion of the Spanish Weft-Indies; and that they may not have the liberty of navigation for conveniency of trade, under any pretence whatsoever, neither directly nor indirectly; except it is agreed, that the Subjects of Great-Britain and Holland may have full power to use and enjoy all the fame privileges, rights, immunities, and liberties of commerce by land and fea in Spain, in the Mediterranean, and in all the places and countries which the late king of Spain, at the time of his death, was in poffeffion of, as well in Europe as elsewhere, as they did then ufe and enjoy; or which the fubjects of both, or each nation, could use and enjoy, by virtue of any right, obtained before the death of the faid king of Spain, either by treaties, conventions, custom, or any other way whatsoever.

Here we fee the demands intended to be infifted on by the allies upon any treaty of peace are, a juft and reasonable fatisfaction for the Emperor and king of Great Britain, a fecurity to the States-general for their dominions, &c. and a fufficient provifion, that France and Spain be never united under the fame man as king of both kingdoms. The rest relates to the liberty of trade and commerce for us and the Dutch; but not a fyllable of engaging to difpoffefs the duke of Anjou.

But

But to know how this new language of no peace without Spain, was first introduced, and at laft prevailed among us, we must begin a great deal higher.

It was the partition treaty, which begot the will in favour of the duke of Anjou; for this naturally led the Spaniards to receive a prince supported by a great power, whofe intereft, as well as affection, engaged them to preserve that monarchy entire, rather than to oppose him in favour of another family, who must expect affistance from a number of confederates, whofe principal members had already difpofed of what did not belong to them, and by a previous treaty parcelled out the monarchy of Spain.

Thus the duke of Anjou got into the full poffeffion of all the kingdoms and states belonging to that monarchy, as well in the old world as the And whatever the house of Auftria pretended, from their memorials, to us and the States, it was, at that time, but too apparent, that the inclinations of the Spaniards were on the duke's fide.

new.

However, a war was refolved; and, in order to carry it on with great vigour, a grand alliance formed, wherein the ends propofed to be obtained are plainly and diftinctly laid down, as I have already quoted them. It pleafed God, in the course of this war, to blefs the arms of the allies with remarkable fucceffes; by which we were foon put into a condition of demanding and expecting such terms of peace, as we propofed to ourselves when

we

we began the war. But, inftead of this, our victories only served to lead us on to further vifionary prospects; advantage was taken of the fanguine temper, which fo many fucceffes had wrought the nation up to; new romantic views were propofed, and the old, reasonable, fober defign was forgot.

This was the artifice of thofe here, who were fure to grow richer, as the publick became poorer; and who, after the refolutions which the two houses were prevailed upon to make, might have carried on the war with fafety to themselves, till malt and land were mortgaged, till a general excife was established, and the dizieme denier raised by collectors in red coats. And this was just the circumftance, which it fuited their intereft to be in.

The house of Austria approved this scheme with reafon; fince whatever would be obtained by the blood and treasure of others, was to accrue to that family, while they only lent their name to the caufe.

The Dutch might, perhaps, have grown refty under their burthen; but care was likewife taken of that by a Barrier-treaty made with the States, which deferveth fuch epithets as I care not to beflow; but may perhaps confider it, at a proper occafion, in a [m] difcourfe by itself.

By this treaty, the condition of the war, with refpect to the Dutch, was wifely altered; they fought no longer for fecurity, but for grandeur;

[m] Which difcourfe follows next in this volume.

and

and we, instead of labouring to make them safe, must beggar ourselves to make them formidable.

Will any one contend, that, if at the treaty of Gertruydenburgh, we could have been fatisfied with fuch terms of a peace, as we proposed to ourselves by the grand alliance, the French would not have allowed them? It is plain they offered many more, and much greater, than ever we thought to infift on when the war began; and they had reason to grant, as well as we to demand them; fince conditions of peace do certainly turn upon events of war. But furely there is fome measure to be obferved in this; thofe, who have defended the proceedings of our negotiators at the treaty of Gertruydenburgh, dwell very much upon their zeal and patience in endeavouring to work the French up to their demands; but fay nothing to justify those demands, or the probability that France would ever accept them. Some of the articles in that treaty were fo very extravagant, that, in all human probability, we could not have obtained them by a fuccessful war of forty years. One of them was inconfiftent with common reafon; wherein the confederates referved to themselves full liberty of demanding what further conditions they should think fit; and, in the mean time, France was to deliver up feveral of their ftrongeft towns in a month. These articles were very gravely figned by our plenipotentiaries, and thofe of Holland; but not by the French, although it ought to have been done interchangeably; nay, they were brought over

by