excluding the affections and desires; for by giving a larger sense to the word will, they include the affections and desires among its acts.

Is it said, as in the Essay, for the purpose of showing that we are not answerable for our desires," that it is God, who, by the constitution of the mind and the ordering of his providence, decides what desires shall exist?" And does he not in the same way decide what volitions shall exist? The author ascribes to God" the power to prevent any given volition, by removing an object of desire, or by substituting some other in its place." He holds that no volitions can take place without motives, and that all motives are under the ordering of God's providence. And it is clearly implied in the Essay, that the influence of motives is made absolutely necessary by the constitution of the mind. Now if all this agency and control of God over volitions does not interfere with their moral nature, nor hinder us from exercising free agency in them; why should we suppose that the same divine agency prevents our free agency in the exercise of affection and desire?

An appeal is often made in the Essay to the consciousness of men. I join in this appeal. If a man has in his heart an emotion of love to his fellow-creatures, and a real desire for their good; is he not conscious that it is right? Or if the emotion of hatred, envy, or revenge rises in his heart; is he not conscious that the emotion is wrong? Does he not disapprove of it as really, as he does of a definite, formal purpose to injure others, or even for an injurious act? And does not the explanation which our Saviour gives of the moral law, Matth. 5: 27, 28, 43, 44, entirely correspond with these remarks?

And yet, according to the principles advanced in some parts of of the Essay, the emotions and desires of the heart are not to be regarded as possessing a moral nature, or as appertaining to moral character. And why? According to the Essay the answer I suppose must be, that they certainly and invariably rise in the mind, when fit objects are presented to view. He holds, as I understand him, that this circumstance shows that our desires are not free, moral, accountable acts of the mind. But he gives no proof. I maintain that this circumstance does not show this, and that the theory of the author on this subject is wide of the truth, I allege, and have

endeavored to show, that the theory is not only destitute of proof, but is opposed to the true sense of the moral law, which reaches to the desires and feelings of the heart; that it is opposed to the consciousness of men, especially of good men; and that it is opposed to the principles of philosophy, even those contained in the Essay.

Again. It is the common doctrine of evangelical ministers and Christians, that there is a certain, invariable connection between the apostacy of Adam and the sinfulness of all his posterity; that his sin is the invariable antecedent of their sinful disposition, their sinful volitions, and their sinful conduct; that it is the divine constitution and the invariable law of our nature, that every one who is born of human parents, will be a sinner. It is the general belief that, according to the Scriptures and according to facts, this law is as invariable, as any law of the physical creation, Now according to the theory of the Essay, this "invariable antecedence," is proof of a producing cause; and the existence of such a producing cause excludes free agency, According to this theory, therefore, one of these two things must be true; either that the common orthodox doctrine is true, and that native depravity, and all our sinful volitions. and actions, as the invariable consequence of Adam's sin, is a matter of Fatalism, entirely precluding free, accountable agency; or else that there is no such invariable connection between Adam's sin and the sin and condemnation of his posterity, and that the doctrine, universally held by evangelical Christians, and taught by Paul, is not true.

And what would become of the doctrine of election and efficacious grace under the operation of this theory? The doctrine as commonly understood, implies, that the repentance of all who are saved, invariably follows the purpose of God, and that special influence of the Spirit which is given to carry the divine purpose into effect. Now the author cannot, consistently with his theory, admit that the repentance and faith of sinners certainly and invariably follow this divine purpose and influence; because the invariableness of such an antecedent cause would preclude the free agency of those brought under its influence. The agency of men in repenting, believing and obeying, cannot, according to this theory, be free agency, if it is the certain, invariable effect of the special purpose and agency of God. And to

secure to men their freedom in this concern, the author, to be consistent, must hold, that there is no invariable connection between this divine cause, and the repentance of sinners, and that it is impossible for God to exert such an influence upon those who are chosen to salvation, as will certainly and invariably bring them to repentance, without violating their free agency; and then he must hold that, to guard their freedom from infringement, their conversion must be left uncertain, so that it may follow the special purpose and agency of God, or not, as their sovereign will shall decide.

If God

The same as to the doctrine of perseverance. should exert such an influence upon the regenerate, as invariably to secure their perseverance in holiness; then according to the theory of the author, they would lose their free agency. Accordingly, every one who embraces the theory and is consistent, must take care not to ascribe to God an influence which certainly and invariably causes perseverance, and must not pray for such an influence, as it would take away free agency.

How manifest it is, that the theory which we have considered, stands in direct opposition to the most devout dispositions and prayers of good men. What do sincere Christians desire and pray for so earnestly, as for such an influence of the Holy Spirit, as will certainly and invariably secure them from sin, and lead them to persevering love and obedience? But if God should answer their prayers, and should give the influence which they seek,-if in their love and obedience they should act under so powerful an ab extra cause, a cause so efficaciously producing holiness; then, according to the Essay, we should lose our free moral agency. Now I cannot but think, that every humble, pious man will be inclined to say, I desire no such freedom as would exclude the effectual operations of the Holy Spirit. Let this divine cause govern me invariably; let it direct and control my understanding, my heart and my will, certainly and entirely. I crave it as the choicest blessing, that God would efficaciously work in me both to will and to do, so that, in consequence of that influence, I may uniformly will and do what is pleasing in his sight. Let my agency be constantly and wholly governed by the almighty agency of God. Then I shall have a freedom truly precious,-freedom

from the bondage of sin,-freedom from the influence of my own perverse will and desperately wicked heart,— the glorious freedom of the children of God.

I may add some further remarks at a convenient time. For the present I shall close, after answering very briefly the very brief questions at the close of the Essay.'

1. "In what does fatalism consist ?"

But why does the author put this question at the end of his Essay, after he has so clearly and fully and confidently answered it himself? The fundamental doctrine of fatalism is, he says, that we choose and act invariably according to the strongest motive, or that the strongest desire or motive is the certain and constant antecedent of our volitions.

2." What are the different forms of speech in which the doctrine is expressed?"

These will be found in the books, mentioned below, in which the doctrine is taught.

3. "Is there any difference in the real meaning conveyed by these forms?"

This any discerning man can determine, who has time to make the comparison.

4. "Is not fatalism a most pernicious doctrine in its tendencies ?"-Answer. The author has settled this also."And does it make any difference in the evil, whether it is taught by a wise and pious man, or by the skeptic ?"—Answer. It is, in some respects, evidently worse for a pernicious error to be taught by a wise and pious man, than by a skeptic.

5. "What are the books in which fatalism is taught, and by whose influence and authority are they sustained?"

Answer. According to our author, it is taught in Calvin's Institutes, the Westminster Confession of Faith and Catechisms, the works of Edwards, father and son, the works of West, Smally, Bellamy, Dwight, Day, Beecher, and such like. And this same doctrine of fatalism, and the books which teach it, are sustained by the influence of almost all the Presidents of our Colleges, almost all our Theological Professors, almost all the ministers and Christians in New England, almost all the Old School and New School Presbyterians, and almost all the orthodox of other denominations.

SECOND SERIES, VOL. III. NO. I.

17

ARTICLE VIII.

REVIEW OF THE MEMOIR OF MRS. SARAH LANMAN SMITH.

By the Rev. N. Adams, Boston, Mass.

Memoir of Mrs. Sarah Lanman Smith, late of the Mission in Syria, under the direction of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. By Edward W. Hooker, Pastor of the First Congregational Church, Bennington, Vt. Boston: Perkins & Marvin. Philadelphia: Henry Perkins. 1839. pp. 407.

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We have seldom, if ever, read a volume of Christian biography which has interested us more than the one before We were personally unacquainted with Mrs. Smith, and, though we had heard her spoken of with commendation, we were not prepared for the intense interest with which we perused this volume. We found ourselves, immediately, in communion with a mind of high order; our pleasure increased with the progress of her history; her dying scene left an impression on our mind almost like that of ascending angels on Jacob's mind at Bethel.

She was born in Norwich, Connecticut, June 18, 1802, and was the daughter of Jabez Huntington, Esq. Her own mother died when Sarah was 7 years old. Her paternal grandfather, Gen. Jedediah Huntington, of New London, an American Officer in the war of the Revolution, was one of the first Corporate Members of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.

The first thing which drew our attention in the memoir, was the interesting character of Miss Huntington's conversion. We naturally looked for something in the manner and circumstances of it, corresponding with her subsequently marked and interesting history. In teaching that a knowledge of the time and circumstances of conversion is unimportant, and in attempting, thereby, to encourage those who, in their own cases, cannot identify them, we are in danger of overlooking another truth,-that a clear experience at conversion is eminently useful in the progress of the Christian life. No doubt, there is danger, in dwelling much upon this truth, of encouraging the expectation of vivid impressions, and of leading the attention from the substantial