fary, than that immortality promifed us in a future ftate, where we fhall be liable to no decadency. Had that been the cafe, the Creator must have produced at once all the human race that were ever to inhabit the earth. This however, would not have been confonant to that benevolent purpose which Paul holds out to our notice, namely, that all men are of one blood, that by the manner of their origin and propagation they might all be connected together, and be brothers and fifters.

PROP. LIX. p. 253.

On the Lawfulness of studying the Polite Arts.

THE fentence of our author on the polite arts, that they are scarcely to be allowed, except when employed to religious purposes, seems to be carried too far, at least if it be his meaning, that these arts are to be reprobated, unless immediately dedicated to religion. How many instructive, useful, and edifying works of tafte must then vanish! The didactic poems of philofophy, the inftructive fables of an Afop, hiftorical pictures, defcriptions of the works of nature, landscapes, and gay, animating and pleas ing mufic, muft all fall together. Such an unreafonable and fevere judgment, however, I cannot ascribe to our author. Muft he not have confidered that a man could not dedicate his talents to religion with any fuccefs, unless he had previously exercised them on lighter fubjects? and that it would be neceffary for him to read and ftudy the beft works of the ancients and moderns, few of which are confined to religion, in order to form his mind, obtain a just, nice, and folid tafte, and acquire a capacity of expreffing himself properly, clearly, accurately, fmoothly. and nobly? Muft he not have known how the study

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of the polite arts increases our knowledge of the human heart, and unlocks the paffages to its moft fecret receffes? And how neceffary, or at least useful it is, to enter the road to philofophy through the gate of the fine arts? Finally, muft he not have reflected, that to understand and excel in facred poetry, a man must be no stranger to the other kinds of it, or to its fifter arts? I will rather fuppofe that, as it frequently happens with the zealous, led away by his juft indignation against the immoral abufes of the polite arts, of which the best heads have been too frequently guilty, he has expreffed himself fomewhat too loosely and incautiously. I am far from defending against him the caufe of dilettanti, who, by their labours in the polite arts, excite irreligious levity, recommend to us the fatisfaction of our sensual defires as our fupreme good, and the great end of our exiftence, and pourtray the pleafures of love and debauchery with a too feducing pencil. Still I cannot perfuade myself that all images of these pleasures are abfolutely immoral and unallowable: rather, in my opinion, must they be confidered as permiffible, whilft the pleasures of the fenfes are painted only in fuch a degree and manner as they are innocent, and ennobled by being allied to moral purposes; and in fuch colours only as pleafe the imagination, and exalt the moral fenfe, without feducing the heart. I muft confefs, that a good compofition, under fuch restraints, would be no easy work, as the fear of being immoral would be too liable to occafion a deficiency of intereft; and on the other hand, to avoid leaving the heart cold and unmoved, morality might be facrificed to the defire of giving delight. Extreme circumfpection, therefore,, must be recommended to the young artist, if he would not lay the foundations of repentance in his more ferious and riper age. I fay, to the young artift, as in general this doubtful employment of the fine arts may perhaps be pardonable

in the gayety of youth, as a preliminary to more useful and ferious compofitions: but it is highly improper at least, to ufe no harfher term, when old men and gray-beards continue to dedicate their talents to Bacchus and Venus, and, with one foot in the grave, indulge in the frolicfomeness of youth. A gray-headed Anacreon amongst chriftians, however we may admire the heathen bard, is a ftrange and fhocking phænomenon.

PROP. LXVII. p. 280.

On the pure Love of God.

It appears, from the preceding propofition, as well as from other parts of his work, that Hartley is a defender of the pure love of God, which fo many have disputed, and which moft moralifts have banished to the kingdom of chimeras. He not only maintains its poffibility, but holds it up, with its adjunct felf-annihilation, as the laft point of perfection, and the fummit of happiness to all rational beings. That he may not be too precipitately condemned, and claffed with those enthusiasts, whofe defences of the point he maintains have met with no favourable reception, it will be neceffary to exhibit his explanation of the nature of felf-annihilation, and the pure love of God, and the manner in which they are produced. For this purpose I will endeavour to collect the fcattered lights appearing here and there in his work, particularly in his theory of affociation. The following confiderations include what he has faid of most importance on the subject, and are calculated to elucidate his ideas.

All our inclinations and exertions, as foon as we become confcious of felf, begin with a view to this self: and, indeed, whilst we are merely fenfitive, they

arife from a fenfual felf-intereft. When we have once received pleasing and unpleafing perceptions, from the impreffions made by objects on our fenfes, we defire the return of the former, and dread the return of the latter. So long as we experience the pleasures and pains of sense alone, and, in confequence of this experience, endeavour to reproduce or avoid them, it is fenfual felf-intereft merely that excites us to action. When by degrees we become acquainted with higher and nobler pleasures, we in like manner defire and feek a repetition of thofe pleasures; and then, as our author obferves, we fubftitute a more refined` felf-intereft, instead of that merely fenfual, with which we began. If, from all the pleasures we have hitherto enjoyed, we collect a general idea of happiness, without confining ourfelves to the defire of one particular kind of pleasure, and bend all our defires and endeavours to this general happiness, we act from a rational felf-intereft. But felf-intereft is ever the firft motive of our exertions, inafmuch as whatever we defire, we firft defire with a view to felf, and as the means of felf-fatisfaction. Our defires and endeavours are felf-interested alfo, fo far as they are founded on objects that are pleafing and defirable to us only through the medium of felf, by means of which we became acquainted with them. If, however, an object pleafe us of itself, and for its own fake, without the leaft view of any fatisfaction to be expected from it to ourselves; and if it be no longer confidered as the means of pleasure, but the poffeffion or enjoyment of it be an immediate fatisfaction to us; the defire thence arifing is, according to Hartley, difinterested, and the love of the object pure love. Experience proves, that we are capable of loving and defiring in this difinterefted manner. A very obvious and remarkable example of this is given by our author, with regard to the love of money, in the former part of his work, containing the hiftory

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of affociation, which example we fhall by and by make use of, to elucidate our fubject. Unqueftionably, too, there are ftill more noble inftances of dif interested love. From the foregoing definitions of felf-intereft and difinterestedness, how can we deem the love an affectionate mother bears to a young, helpless, and fick child, felf-intereft, when to nurfe and watch over him the forgets herfelf, regardless of her own eafe, convenience, and health, nay frequently facrificing her life, and, if death free her from the toilfome task, mourning as if bereft of all the joys of life. Certain, however, it is, that this difinterested love could only have originated from confiderations of self, and that it was selfish before it was difinterefted.

The laws of affociation explain how this remarkable converfion of felf-interested defires and inclinations into difinterested ones is effected, in the following manner. When defire is affociated for a fufficient length of time with an object, by means of fome pleasure, or felf-fatisfaction, which it procures, and the object, remaining the fame, gives us various pleasures, and affords us fatisfaction in many different ways, the defire is united with the object in fuch a manner, that, after repeated affociations, the intervention of the idea of pleasure, which first made the object desirable, becomes lefs and lefs neceffary to produce the defire, in time fuperfluous, and finally unheeded, fo that in many cafes it is no longer perceived, or fuppofed, to be the medium which unites the defire with the object. This may be explained by the difinterefted love of money, which actually takes place in the mifer. The various advantages, benefits, and pleasures, which he promised himself from the poffeffion of money, firft make it pleafing to him, and an object of defire. The more he learns to know and value thofe advantages, benefits, and pleasures that gold can procure to its poffeffors, and

the