or unjust, in any particular cafe, is brought before the tribunal of perception. What we lofe in clearness by these means, is made up by the quickness and ftrength of our feelings.

It is now time, a little farther to illuftrate the application which Hartley makes of the foregoing hypothefis. He fhews from it the infignificancy of the objection, that, from the fyftem of neceffity, God must be the author of fin. In refpect to God, fays he, what we call fin is nothing but natural evil, fo far as it is modified by, occafioned by, and pervades the voluntary actions of men. We cannot ascribe to the most perfect intelligence, which fees nothing confufedly, but every thing clearly and diftinctly, the perceptions which moral appearances excite in us, fo far at leaft as they differ from those which the view of natural evil is capable of producing. He fees what conftitutes the real ground of these appearances. Hence it follows, that the whole question, whether God be the author of fin, has no meaning, or this: does natural evil in general, and particularly that which arifes from men's voluntary actions, enter into the defign of God? If, however, we attribute to God our perceptions, and what this evil feems to us, the question has no meaning. In finful actions God fees the cause of them, the imperfection and limited faculties of the creatures, which, active or paffive, participate them. He fees the evil thence arifing, previously confidered separately and individually. In and for itself this evil is not his purpose: but as it is connected with the whole scheme of his creation, and this whole scheme is by him approved, as in it particular evil tends to general good, and as the goodness and happinefs of finite creatures without this evil would be impoffible, it must enter into his defign. This defign required the greateft poffible variety of creatures in the scale of being, then, there must have

been

been a place for man; and a certain degree of limitation and imperfection, to diftinguish him, as well from the creatures above as from thofe, below, muft have been effential to him. If the errors, faults, and imperfections of man be deducible from his effential and neceffary limitation, it is not poffible for him to be without these, and ftill be man. His Creator is fully juftified if no human being, the whole confidered, be juftified in defpifing the gift of existence. He is fully juftified, if man be from his nature capable of no happiness, or a happiness of a growing kind. Such a difpofition prefuppofes a growing perfection, and at the beginning of man's exiftence the lowest degree of that perfection which is proper to him. For the fake of brevity I may here refer to what I have said in a preceding remark (p. 481.). If it be now afked: whence arifes the moral evil of human nature? I would anfwer: It is the confequence of man's limited faculties, and capacity for perfection. The latter renders it neceffary, that he should be placed on the lowest step, in order that his faculties may have an opportunity of unfolding themselves gradually: he must be a fenfitive before he is a rational being. But should he have a capacity for reason, or be an agent choofing from his own judgment, he muft poffefs a propenfity to agency as foon as he can act. He must early feel his deftination to act after his own inclination, and on every occafion follow this propensity. He must fly, or at least will to raise himself, before he has wings. I fhall here employ a common remark, yet not the lefs to the purpose: man, whilst a merely fenfitive animal, exerts his agency, in the fame manner as the fteer, that feels himself.deftined to wear, horns, butts with his head before his horns appear. He muft oppofe every thing that tends to obftruct or circumfcribe this propenfity. Every injunction or restraint is an odious compulfion, againft

Now

which his freedom revolts. He will not be led; he will guide himself. But fince he has not yet the neceffary knowledge, which he muft collect from experience, he is expofed to the illufions of his fenfes, and thus muft frequently err, and choose evil for good. From often repeated error he will acquire a readiness of going aftray, which tardy reafon will find difficult to deftroy; and propenfities will arife, which a more just and perfect knowledge of things will not remove without pain and toil. Thus the moral depravity of man proceeds from the limited ftate and conftitution effential to his nature. as moral evil is a confequence of metaphyfical evil, and nothing more than natural evil, the grand question, whence arifes moral evil? may be reduced to this, whence arifes natural evil? and ultimately to this, what is the cause of metaphyfical evil? This queftion of the origin of evil, fo important to the peace of mankind, and so puzzling to human understanding, may, in my opinion, be reduced to this: when God gave existence to beings out of himself, he must have made them limited, or have multiplied himself: if the latter be an impoffibility, we muft grant that his goodness and wisdom might produce beings with more or fewer limitations.

PROP. XVI. p. 66.

Whether philofophical Free-Will be confiftent with the Power and Knowledge of God.

OUR author here fhews in a folid and conclufive manner, that philofophical free-will is inconfiftent with the divine attributes of power and knowledge. It is not confiftent with God's power, fince by it his power would be limited, and hence be no longer infinite for as far as man exercifed this free-will he

would

would be independent of God. It may be faid, indeed, that he receives this free-will from God, and thus is dependent on him with refpect to the poffeffion of it but as foon as he puts it into action, he ceases to be under God's power, and withdraws himfelf from his all-embracing influence. If God have bestowed on man fuch a free-will, he has given him a power of freeing himself from his fubjection and dependency. This fuppofition brings to our minds, in fome measure, what the poet faid of Jupiter, who after he had made gold, was aftonished at the power of his own work, and confeffed, that he had created a divinity more mighty than himself. As this charge may appear too ftrong to the partifans of philofophical free-will, we will fhew in another way, that this free-will places man without the sphere of God's power and influence. We cannot poffibly form any idea of the influence of God's power, but that it acts upon its fubject either mediately, or immediately. Any other way is as inconceivable as power without effect or influence. If man exercise philofophical free-will, God's power cannot act on him immediately, as that would be neceffity. Neither does it act mediately, for then it would act by means of causes and effects, or of fecondary caufes. This is equally inconfiftent with philofophical free-will, by which the chain of caufes is broken. As often as man exercises this free-will he cuts afunder that chain by which God holds and draws all things. Either he is himself the creator of human actions, or chance is the lord and mafter of them, and forms a new chain which lafts till another chance breaks it, or produces nothing but isolated links united to no others. Whatever is effected by philofophical free-will has the original grounds of its poffibility in the will of God, as far as chance is established, and authorized to produce men's actions, by that will: but that of two poffible and oppofite actions one only takes place, is

no

no farther afcribable to the will of God. Whilft God has left this to chance to determine, he has fo far fet limits to his own power, and left himself to prefer a certain action or its oppofite, which ever blind chance, which he has placed by his fide as a fellow-creator, wills to be produced. In fuch an action he can no more have a determinate will, than a man in an event which he leaves to the caft of a die. No one can in this cafe determine whether he fhall win or lose and when he leaves it to chance, to decide which of the two fhall happen, it is evident, that he himself determines neither of the two. So is it with God, on the fuppofition of philofophical free-will. In it there is always a chance, over which he has no power and influence because it is a chance. If we fay, that he can influence the event by the production and connection of circumftances, that can only take place by limiting or altogether removing the affumed chance, or fo far as man is actually determined ab extra in the exercise of his free will. If it be faid God muft have thus limited his power when he willed the creating man a free agent; this is taking for granted, that philofophical free-will is effential to man's agency, a fuppofition which has already been fhewn to be unfounded. If it be faid farther, that man can be fubject to no moral imputation, unless God have fo limited his power; to what has before been faid on the fubject we may add, that, whilft on this fcheme of free-will man's actions are fubject to chance, it is not more proper to impute to him merit or demerit for his actions, than if they were fubject to neceffity. If the atoms

of Epicurus had by their concourfe formed miffhapen maffes, instead of regular bodies, would they have been more culpable or deferving of punifhment, if under the guidance of chance, than if fubject to the laws of neceffity? (We call in this hypothefis with more confidence, as it is in fact the

fame