acquitted. In 1717, he commanded the Oxford of seventy guns, in the Baltic fleet, under Sir George Byng.

In 1728 he was promoted to be rear-admiral of the blue; and, next year, was made rear-admiral of the white. In 1733 he was appointed vice-admiral of the white. After six years of inactivity, he was sent into the Mediterranean; but was soon afterwards withdrawn from that station to take command of the channel fleet. In 1743 he was appointed admiral of the white; and, in the same year, he succeeded Si. John Jennings in the governorship of Greenwich hospital.

Next year he accepted the command of a large fleet which had been drawn together, and equipped with all possible expedition, for the purpose of relieving the squadron under Sir Charles Hardy, then blocked up in the Tagus by a superior force. Sir John hoisted his flag on this occasion, on board the Victory of one hundred and ten guns, a ship allowed at that time to be the finest ever built. His crew consisted of 1100 picked men, and there were upwards of fifty young gentlemen on board serving as naval cadets. Sir John speedily effected the main object of the expedition by relieving Sir Charles; but, while on its return to England, the fleet encountered a violent storm in the bay of Biscay; and the Victory, separating from her companions, is supposed to have struck on the Casket rocks near Alderney.

Sir John Norris.

BORN A. D. 1670.-died a. D. 1749.

THIS excellent naval officer was the descendant of a respectable Irish family. Having received what was called the king's letter at an early age, he passed, with considerable credit, through the stations of midshipman and lieutenant, and was, on account of his very meritorious conduct at the engagement off Beachy Head, promoted on the 6th July, 1690, to be commander of the Pelican fire-ship. He owed every subsequent advancement entirely to his own merit.

In the year 1693 he was captain of the Sheerness, a frigate mounting twenty-eight guns, one of the unfortunate squadron under Sir George Rooke, to whose protection the Smyrna fleet was confided. Captain Norris acquired, nevertheless, on that occasion, the highest credit; for his sagacity and activity in executing the commands of his admiral were considered to have materially lessened the weight of the disaster, by preventing many of the merchant-ships from falling into the hands of the enemy, as, in all probability, they otherwise inevitably would have done. In reward for his conduct, he was, after his return to England, promoted to the command of the Carlisle, a fourth rate; and, having distinguished himself very highly, in the month of January, 1694-5, in the attack of two French men-of-war, the Content and Trident, both of which were captured after a severe action, he was recommended by Mr Russell to the command of the Content. This ship was considered one of the finest of her class then existing. In 1696 he was appointed commodore of a small squadron, consisting of four fourth rates, an equal number of frigates, two bomb-ketches, and as many fire-ships, ordered to Hudson's bay, for the recovery of

the British settlements in that quarter, which had surrendered a short time before to a French armament. On his arrival at Newfoundland, he received intelligence that a squadron, consisting of five large French ships, had been seen in the bay of Conception. Agreeably to his instructions, he immediately called a council of war, in which the unanimous opinion was, that the squadron which had been seen was a part of that commanded by the marquess De Nesmond, which was known to be much superior to the force under Mr Norris. The land-officers, therefore, considered it extremely imprudent that the ships should venture to sea, but insisted that they should wait the approach of their antagonists, under the protection of the batteries raised on shore. A few of the naval officers were unhappily of the same opinion, and the question of putting to sea was accordingly carried against Norris, and those who entertained the same sentiments with him, by a great majority. His opinion was, that the enemy's vessels were not those under the orders of the marquess De Nesmond, but some which had casually put into the bay for supplies; and he accordingly despatched a frigate to reconnoitre, and received, on her return, the truly mortifying intelligence, that his own suggestions were true, and that the ships discovered were returning to Europe under the command of Pointi, laden with the plunder of the Spanish West Indies, and which, from the inferiority of their force, would undoubtedly have fallen an easy prey to the British armament. In about a month after the first alarm, however, the marquess De Nesmond arrived with a squadron of sixteen ships of war, ten of which were of the line, and some of them very large. The French admiral, on his approach, discovering the dispositions made by Norris for his reception, prudently desisted from all attack, and the island of Newfoundland remained for that time unmolested.

During the peace which presently followed, Captain Norris was employed as captain of the Winchester, first on the Mediterranean, and afterwards on the Newfoundland station. Immediately after the accession of Queen Anne, he was appointed to the Orford, of seventy guns, one of the fleet sent on the expedition against Cadiz. On his passage

thither, he had the good fortune to make no less than six prizes; but, during this service, he unfortunately got involved in a dispute which threatened to terminate his naval career. He was naturally of a very warm temper,-extremely irritable and violent when excited. A difference having arisen between him and Captain Ley, who then commanded the Sovereign, as captain to Sir George Rooke, the commander-in-chief, Norris so far lost command of himself, as not only to strike, but to draw his sword upon his brother officer. The insult was still more flagrant, from the circumstance of its having taken place on the quarter-deck of Ley's own ship, who was also a much older officer in the service than Captain Norris. Sir George Rooke felt himself reduced to the necessity of putting Norris under arrest; but this very disagreeable business was speedily compromised by the interference and intercession of the duke of Ormond; and the whole affair was soon afterwards terminated by the death of Captain Ley.

In the following year, Captain Norris, still continuing in the Orford, had the good fortune, when on his passage to join the fleet under Sir Cloudesley Shovell, to fall in with and capture a large privateer, called

the Philippeaux. In three or four days afterwards he made prize of a second armed ship belonging to the enemy, carrying sixteen guns; and when the fleet was on its return from the Straits in the month of November following, the Orford had the additional good fortune to fall in with and capture the Hazard, a French fourth rate, carrying fiftytwo guns.

In 1704, Norris acted as one of the seconds to Sir Cloudesley Shovell, in the battle off Malaga. His gallantry on that occasion may be said to have raised his character higher than all his preceding services had done. So strongly did it recommend him to the notice of the admiral, by whose side he fought, that, in the ensuing year, Captain Norris was selected to command the Britannia, a first rate, on board which Sir Cloudesley and the earl of Peterborough hoisted their flag, as joint commanders-in-chief. His behaviour was so conspicuous in the attack of Fort Montjoi, that the archduke Charles wrote a letter to Queen Anne with his own hand, soliciting her majesty's favour and protection for him. Being sent home on board the Canterbury, as the bearer of the news that the city of Barcelona had surrendered, he received the honour of knighthood, and was presented with a purse of one thousand guineas.

He is not known ever to have been subsequently employed as a private captain; but, having been, on the 10th of March, 1706-7, advanced to the rank of rear-admiral of the blue, he was appointed to serve under his former friend and patron, Sir Cloudesley Shovell, who was once more invested with the Mediterranean command. The admiral-in-chief, who well knew his gallantry and ability, selected him to lead the detachment employed on the very arduous and important service of forcing the passage of the Var, which was effected with a loss so trivial, as to be nearly incredible; for it amounted to no more than ten persons, who were unfortunately drowned, through their over-eagerness and precipitancy. At the siege of Toulon, his counsel and advice were, on all occasions, sought by the commander-in-chief, as a person in whose judgment the most implicit confidence might be placed. On his return to England, he narrowly escaped the melancholy fate which befell his patron, the admiral-in-chief.

Early in the ensuing winter, he was one of the six flag-officers selected to assist his royal highness, Prince George of Denmark, to whose opinion the decision of the court-martial, on Sir Thomas Hardy, had been referred. In the year 1708 he was employed under Sir John Leake in the Mediterranean; but the only service of moment that it was possible to effect in that quarter, was the capture of a numerous fleet of tartans and barks, bound for Peniscola, near the mouth of the Ebro, with provisions for the duke of Anjou's army. On his return from the Straits, he was, on the 21st of December, promoted to be vice-admiral of the red, and is said by Burchett to have commanded, in the ensuing year, an armament sent into the Baltic. Sir John did not return to England till the month of October, 1711, and, the peace of Utrecht almost immediately following, a stop was put to his further naval exertions till after the accession of George I.

In 1706, the restless temper of Charles XII. of Sweden, and the depredations committed by the privateers of that nation, under his sanction, rendered it expedient for the preservation of the British com

merce and the due maintenance of the kingdom's dignity and honour, that an armament should be sent into the Baltic. Sir John was chosen to command it; and, having in consequence hoisted his flag on board the Cumberland of eighty guns, he sailed from the Nore on the 18th of May, having with him eighteen ships of the line, a frigate, and a sloop of war, together with a very numerous fleet of merchant-vessels, which he was ordered to protect on their voyage to the northward. On the arrival of this force in the Sound, on the 10th of June, Sir Jolin joined the squadrons of Russia, Denmark, and Holland. That of Russia was commanded by the czar in person, Peter the Great. Ir compliment to his high dignity, it was agreed, that he should have the chief command of the whole; that Sir John, with the English squadron, should lead the van; the Danes, under Count Gueldenlaw, the rear; and that the Dutch, joined by five English ships of war, should take the charge of escorting, to their several places of destination, the trade of all the allied powers. On the approach of winter, Sir John, with the main body of the fleet, returned to England, leaving Commodore Cleland behind him, with a squadron of seven ships of war, and instructions to act in conjunction with the other allied powers as circumstances might arise. Matters not being sufficiently accommodated, it was deemed proper to send a fleet into the Baltic the following spring. Sir John was again selected to direct its operations; and to his former character of admiral-in-chief was added that of ambassador and minister-plenipotentiary to the czar Peter. The death of Charles at the siege of Fredericshall, in the month of November following, put a period to these northern expeditions.

In the year 1719, the very extraordinary conduct of the court of Spain, and its avowed intentions of making a descent on Great Britain in favour of the pretender, caused the equipment of two squadrons, which were sent out for the purpose of intercepting the Spanish armament. The absence of Sir John, however, on this service was but of short duration; for, in less than three weeks from the time of his sailing, he received information that the Spanish fleet had not only been totally dispersed in a violent gale of wind, off Cape Finisterre, but that the greater part of the ships had put back on account of the damage they had sustained in the tempestuous weather. He was next employed to check the restless spirit of the emperor of Russia, who, encouraged by the death of Charles XII., had commenced inroads on the coast of Sweden. The czar, however, retired without coming to an engagement, and the English fleet returned to the Nore in November. In the following spring, Sir John Norris resumed his command in the Baltic, and effected a treaty between Denmark and Sweden; but the czar refused to come to terms, until the following year, when, seeing the inutility of further obstinacy, he consented to a peace.

From this period Sir John enjoyed a temporary relaxation from the fatigues of public service; for, except that he was appointed to command the squadron which convoyed George I. from Helvoetsluys to England, he held no naval command till the year 1727, when the apprehension of an attack meditated on Sweden by the czarina, rendered the equipment of a fleet necessary. Its appearance in the Baltic produced the same instantaneous effect which it always had on every preceding occasion; Sweden remained unattacked, because she was

protected by Britain. From this time till the year 1735 Sir John Norris held no command; but a dispute having then arisen between the crowns of Spain and Portugal, the latter applied to Britain for protection. The command of the fleet fitted out on this occasion was given to Sir John, who had, during his retirement from public service, been advanced to the rank of admiral of the white.

Early in 1739 he was appointed vice-admiral of Great Britain, and on the breaking out of the Spanish war he was ordered to cruise in the bay of Biscay; but, owing to tempestuous weather, was compelled to put into port for the winter. In the following year, he sailed, with a force of sixteen ships of the line and a few frigates, towards the Spanish coast, but came back with no better success than had attended him in his last expedition. On the 12th of October he put to sea again, with a squadron of ten ships, and returned without having effected more than on the two former occasions. The nation manifested great dissatisfaction at the result of these enterprises; and, as the admiral's former achievements had raised his character for valour too high for calumny, his want of success was generally attributed to private instructions from the ministry, who had in a manner been forced into the war by the state of public feeling. If, however, the design of ordering out these armaments was, as has been said, merely to alarm the enemy, the object of each expedition was fully accomplished. In 1744, France attached herself to the cause of Spain, and projected the invasion of Scotland in favour of the pretender. A very formidable force was collected at Brest for this purpose; it consisted of no less than twentythree ships of war, the chief command of which was bestowed on M. De Rouquefeuille, an officer of eminence and reputation. But, though these measures had been concerted with the utmost secrecy, the British ministry had the good fortune to procure correct information of them; and, ere it reached the British channel, a fleet, consisting of twenty-nine ships of the line, was collected in the Downs, under the orders of Sir John Norris. The French armament, at the sight of the English squadron, retreated in the greatest confusion; and Norris returned to the Downs, for the purpose of blockading the port of Dunkirk. With this last service the naval life of Sir John Norris ceased. He had been in constant employment for the space of nearly sixty years, so that his age and infirmities rendered his retirement a matter of necessity. This relaxation from fatigue, however, he did not long enjoy. He died on the 19th of July, 1749.

Although many may have had the good fortune to acquire a greater share of popular applause, few have had a nobler and juster claim to public gratitude than this brave and able commander, although a degree of misfortune rarely failed to attend him through life. Seamen-who are, as a body of people, the most superstitious in the world-constantly foretold a storm whenever Sir John put to sea. The frequent accidents which befell the ships and squadrons under his command,-the misfortunes which attended him, and could not be warded off by any prudence or sagacity, procured him the whimsical appellation of foul weather Jack by which name he was better known in the service than by his own proper style and title. The incidents of war for the space of forty years succeeding the battle off Malaga, in 1704, presented no grand operations, no field for those brilliant acbievements by which a deathless