What we know of self or person, we know only as given in consciousness. In our perceptive consciousness there is revealed as an ultimate fact a self and not-self; each given as independent-each known only in antithesis to the other. No belief is more " intuitive, universal, immediate, or irresistible," than that this antithesis is real and known to be real; no belief therefore is more true. If the antithesis be illusive, self and not-self, subject and object, I and Thou, are distinctions without a difference; and consciousness, so far from being "the internal voice of our Creator," is shown to be, like Satan, "a liar from the beginning." The reality of this antithesis, in different parts of his philosophy, Dr. Brown affirms and denies. In establishing his theory of perception, he articulately denies that mind is conscious of aught beyond itself; virtually asserts that what is there given in consciousness as not-self is only a phenomenal illusion-a modification of self, which our consciousness determines us to believe is the quality of something numerically and substantially different.

66 Ille ego sum sensi, sed me mea fallit imago."

After this implication in one part of his system that our belief in the distinction of self and not-self is nothing more than the deception of a lying consciousness; it is startling to find him, in another, appealing to the beliefs of this same consciousness as to "revelations from on high;' nay, in an especial manner alleging "as the voice of our Creator," this very faith in the distinction of self and not-self, through the fallacy of which, and of which alone, he had elsewhere argued consciousness of falsehood.

On the veracity of this mendacious belief, Dr. Brown establishes his proof of our personal identity. (Lect. xii.-xv.) Touching the object of perception, when its evidence is inconvenient, this belief is quietly passed over as incompetent to distinguish not-self from self; in the question regarding our personal identity, where its testimony is convenient, it is clamorously cited as an inspired witness, exclusively competent to distinguish self from not-self. Yet why, if, in the one case, it mistook self for not-self, it may not, in the other, mistake not-self for self, would appear a problem not of the easiest solution.

The same belief, with the same inconsistency, is again called in to prove the individuality of mind. (Lect. xcvi.) (Lect. xcvi.) But if we are fallaciously determined in perception, to believe what is supposed indivisible, identical, and one, to be plural and different and incompatible, (self-self+not-self); how, on the authority of the same treacherous conviction, dare we maintain, that the phenomenal unity of consciousness affords a guarantee of the real simplicity of the thinking principle? The materialist may now contend, without fear of contradiction, that self is only an illusive phenomenon; that our consecutive identity is that of the Delphic ship, and our present unity merely that of a system of co-ordinate activities. To explain the phenomenon, he has only to suppose, as certain theorists have lately done, an organ to tell the lie of our personality; and to quote as authority for the lie itself, the perfidy of consciousness, on which the theory of a representative perception is founded.

On the hypothesis of a representative perception, there is, in fact, no salvation from materialism on the one side, short of idealism on the other. Our knowledge of mind and matter, as substances, is merely relative; they are known to us only in their qualities; and we can justify the postulation of two different substances, exclusively on the supposition of the incompa

Is this sup

tibility of the double series of phenomena to coinhere in one. position disproved?-the presumption against dualism is again decisive. Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity; a plurality of principles is not to be assumed where the phenomena can be explained by one. In Brown's theory of perception, he abolishes the incompatibility of the two series; and his argument, as a dualist, for an immaterial principle of thought, proceeds on the ground that this incompatibility subsists. Lect. xvci. pp. 646, 647.) This philosopher denies us an immediate knowledge of aught beyond the accidents of mind. The accidents which we refer to body, as known to us, are only states or modifications of the percipient subject itself; in other words, the qualities we call material, are known by us to exist only as they are known by us to inhere in the same substance as the qualities we denominate mental. There is an apparent antithesis, but a real identity. On this doctrine, the hypothesis of a double principle, losing its necessity, becomes philosophically absurd; and, on the law of parsimony, a psychological unitarianism is established. To the argument that the qualities of the objects are so repugnant to the qualities of the subjects of perception, that they cannot be supposed the accidents of the same substances, the unitarian-whether materialist, idealist, or absolutist-has only to reply, that so far from the attributes of the object being exclusive of the attributes of the subject, in this act, that the hypothetical dualist himself establishes, as the fundamental axiom of his philosophy of mind, that the object known is universally identical with the subject knowing. The materialist may now derive the subject from the object; the idealist derive the object from the subject; the absolutist sublimate both into indifference, nay, the nihilist subvert the substantial reality of either ;-the hypothetical realist, so far from being able to resist the conclusion of any, in fact, accords their resumptive premises to all.

The same contradiction would, in like manner invalidate every presumption in favour of our liberty of will. But as Dr. Brown, throughout his scheme of ethics, advances no argument in support of this condition of our moral being, which his philosophy otherwise tends to render impossible, we shall say nothing of this consequence of hypothetical realism.

So much for the system which, its author imagines, "allows to the sceptic no resting-place for his foot, -no fulchrum for the instrument he uses;" so much for the doctrine which Brown would substitute for Reid's; -nay, which he even supposes Reid himself to have maintained.

"Scilicet hoc totum falsa ratione receptum est!"*

The very limited space necessarily assigned in this work to reviews of a metaphysical character, has prevented me from including the following, which I had abridged for selection. Examination of Belsham's System of Ethics, Vol. i. page 475. - Review of Drummond's Academical Questions, Vol. ii. page 163.-Strictures on the Metaphysical Opinions of Dr. Priestley, Vol. ix. page 153-Critiques on Beattie's Essay on Truth, Vol. x. page 171.-Gambier's Introduction to the Study of Moral Evidence, Vol. xii. page 202. - Forsyth's Principles of Moral Science, Vol. vii, page 413.-Degerando's work on the Origiu of Ideas, Vol. v. page 318; and Knight's Enquiry into the Principles of Taste, Vol. vii. page 295. Of the Essays on Phrenology, I intended to give the last, published in Vol. xliv. page 253., which occasioned a controversy between the Editor and Mr. Combe. I find, however, that I have not room for it without rejecting other matter of more general interest. The writings of Doctors Gall and Spurzheim attracted the attention of the E. Review when the science of phrenology was in its infancy; and it must be admitted, that whatever talent may have been exhibited in the abusive attacks made upon it by the writers in that work, they have not examined its principles and pretensions with that candour and dignity which should characterise philosophical discussion. Those who are interested in the controversy are referred to Vol. ii. page 147.; Vol. xxiv. page 439; and Vol. xxv. page 227.

PART SIXTH.

EDUCATION.

INQUIRY INTO THE UTILITY OF CLASSICAL LEARNING.*

THERE are several feelings to which attention must be paid, before the question of classical learning can be fairly and temperately discussed.

We are apt, in the first place, to remember the immense benefits which the study of the classics once conferred on mankind; and to feel for those models on which the taste of Europe has been formed something like sentiments of gratitude and obligation. This is all well enough, so long as it continues to be a mere feeling; but, as soon as it interferes with action, it nourishes dangerous prejudices about education. Nothing will do in the pursuit of knowledge, but the blackest ingratitude;-the moment we have got up the ladder, we must kick it down;-as soon as we have passed over the bridge, we must let it rot;-when we have got upon the shoulders of the ancients, we must look over their heads. The man who forgets the friends of his childhood in real life is base; but he who clings to the props of his childhood in literature must be content to remain as ignorant as he was when a child. His business is to forget, disown, and deny—to think himself above every thing which has been of use to him in time past—and to cultivate that exclusively from which he expects future advantage; in short, to do every thing for the advancement of his knowledge, which it would be infamous to do for the advancement of his fortune. If mankind still derive advantage from classical literature proportionate to the labour they bestow upon it, let their labour and their study proceed; but the moment we cease to read Latin and Greek for the solid utility we derive from them, it would be a very romantic application of human talents to do so from any feeling of gratitude, and recollection of past service.

To almost every Englishman up to the age of three or four-and-twenty, classical learning has been the great object of existence; and no man is very apt to suspect, or very much pleased to hear, that what he has done for so long a time was not worth doing. His classical literature, too, reminds every man of the scenes of his childhood, and brings to his fancy several of the most pleasing associations which we are capable of forming. A certain sort of vanity, also, very naturally grows among men occupied in a common pursuit. Classical quotations are the watchwords of scholars, by which they distinguish each other from the ignorant and illiterate; and Greek and Latin are insensibly become almost the only test of a cultivated mind.

Some men through indolence, others through ignorance, and most through necessity, submit to the established education of the times; and seek for their children that species of distinction which happens, at the period in which they live, to be stamped with the approbation of mankind.

Edgeworth's Professional Education.-Vol. xv. page 41. October, 1809.

This

mere question of convenience, every parent must determine for himself. A poor man, who has his fortune to gain, must be a quibbling theologian, or a classical pedant, as fashion dictates; and he must vary his error with the error of the times. But it would be much more fortunate for mankind if the public opinion, which regulates the pursuits of individuals, were more wise and enlightened than it at present is.

All these considerations make it extremely difficult to procure a candid hearing on this question; and to refer this branch of education to the only proper criterion of every branch of education-its utility in future life.

There are two questions which grow out of this subject; 1st, How far is any sort of classical education useful? 2d, How far is that particular classical education adopted in this country useful?

Latin and Greek are, in the first place, useful, as they inure children to intellectual difficulties, and make the life of a young student what it ought to be, a life of considerable labour. We do not, of course, mean to confine this praise exclusively to the study of Latin and Greek; or to suppose that other difficulties might not be found which it would be useful to overcome but though Latin and Greek have this merit in common with many arts and sciences, still they have it; and, if they do nothing else, they at least secure a solid and vigorous application at a period of life which materially influences all other periods.

To go through the grammar of one language thoroughly is of great use for the mastery of every other grammar; because there obtains, through all languages, a certain analogy to each other in their grammatical construction. Latin and Greek have now mixed themselves etymologically with all the languages of modern Europe-and with none more than our own; so that it is necessary to read these two tongues for other objects than themselves.

The two ancient languages are, as mere inventions-as pieces of mcchanism, incomparably more beautiful than any of the modern languages of Europe; their mode of signifying time and case by terminations, instead of auxiliary verbs and particles, would of itself stamp their superiority. Add to this, the copiousness of the Greek language, with the fancy, majesty, and harmony of its compounds; and there are quite sufficient reasons why the classics should be studied for the beauties of language. Compared to them, merely as vehicles of thought and passion, all modern languages are dull, ill contrived, and barbarous.

That-a great part of the Scriptures have come down to us in the Greck language is of itself a reason, if all others were wanting, why education should be planned so as to produce a supply of Greek scholars.

The cultivation of style is very justly made a part of education. Every thing which is written is meant either to please or to instruct. The second object it is difficult to effect, without attending to the first; and the cultivation of style is the acquisition of those rules and literary habits which sagacity antipates, or experience shows, to be the most effectual means of pleasing. Those works are the best which have longest stood the test of time, and pleased the greatest number of exercised minds. Whatever, therefore, our conjectures may be, we cannot be so sure that the best modern writers can afford us as good models as the ancients;-we cannot be certain that they will live through the revolutions of the world, and continue to please in every climate-under every species of governmentthrough every stage of civilization. The moderns have been well taught by

their masters; but the time is hardly yet come when the necessity for such instruction no longer exists. We may still borrow descriptive power from Tacitus; dignified perspicuity from Livy; simplicity from Cæsar; and from Homer some portion of that light and heat which, dispersed into ten thousand channels, has filled the world with bright images and illustrious thoughts. Let the cultivator of modern literature addict himself to the purest models of taste which France, Italy, and England could supply, he might still learn from Virgil to be majestic, and from Tibullus to be tender : he might not yet look upon the face of nature as Theocritus saw it; nor might he reach those springs of pathos with which Euripides softened the hearts of his audience. In short, it appears to us, that there are so many excellent reasons why a certain number of scholars should be kept up in this and every civilized country, that we should consider every system of education from which classical education was excluded as radically erroneous, and completely absurd.

That vast advantages, then, may be derived from classical learning, there can be no doubt. The advantages which are derived from classical learning by the English manner of teaching involve another and a very different question; and we will venture to say, that there never was a more complete instance in any country of such extravagant and overacted attachment to any branch of knowledge, as that which obtains in this country with regard to classical knowledge. A young Englishman goes to school at six or seven years old; and he remains in a course of education till twenty-three or twenty-four years of age. In all that time, his sole and exclusive occupation is learning Latin and Greek;* he has scarcely a notion that there is any other kind of excellence; and the great system of facts with which he is the most perfectly acquainted are the intrigues of the Heathen Gods;with whom Pan slept?-with whom Jupiter?-whom Apollo ravished? These facts the English youth get by heart the moment they quit the nursery; and are most sedulously and industriously instructed in them till the best and most active part of life is passed away. Now, this long career of classical learning, we may, if we please, denominate a foundation so far above ground, that there is absolutely no room to put any thing upon it. If you occupy a man with one thing till he is twenty-four years of age, you have exhausted all his leisure time he is called into the world, and compelled to act; or is surrounded with pleasures, and thinks and reads no more. If you have neglected to put other things in him, they will never get in afterwards;-if you have fed him only with words, he will remain a narrow and limited being to the end of his existence.

The bias given to men's minds is so strong, that it is no uncommon thing to meet with Englishmen, whom, but for their grey hairs and wrinkles, we might easily mistake for schoolboys. Their talk is of Latin verses; and it is quite clear, if men's ages are to be dated from the state of their mental progress, that such men are eighteen years of age, and not a day older. Their minds have been so completely possessed by exaggerated notions of classical learning, that they have not been able in the great school of the world to form any other notion of real greatness. Attend, too, to the public feelings-look to all the terms of applause. A learned man!—a scholar! -a man of erudition! Upon whom are these epithets of approbation bestowed? Are they given to men acquainted with the science of government?

* Unless he goes to the University of Cambridge; and then classics occupy him entirely for about ten years; and divide him with mathematics for four or five more.