remains the same however circumstances may differ. For it is implied in what has been proved and shewn to be confessed, that the same event comes to pass in all circumstances. In God's sight no man living can be justified; but all are sinners, and exposed to condemnation. This is true of persons of all constitutions, capacities, conditions, manners, opinions and educations; in all countries, climates, nations and ages; and through all the mighty changes and revolutions which have come to pass in the habitable world.

We have the same evidence that the propensity in this case lies in the nature of the subject--and does not arise from any particular circumstances-as we have in any case whatsoever; which is only by the effects appearing to be the same in all changes of time and place, and under all varieties of circumstances. It is in this way only we judge that any propensities which we observe in mankind, are seated in their nature in all other cases. It is thus we judge of the mutual propensity betwixt the sexes, or of the dispositions which are exercised in any of the natural passions or appetites, that they truly belong to the nature of man; because they are observed in mankind in general through all countries, nations and ages, and in all conditions.

If any should say, Though it be evident that there is a tendency in the state of things to this general event-that all mankind should fail of perfect obedience, and should sin, and incur a demerit of eternal ruin; and also that this tendency does not lie in any distinguishing circumstances of any parti cular people, person or age-yet it may not lie in man's nature, but in the general constitution and frame of this world. Though the nature of man may be good, without any evil propensity inherent in it; yet the nature and universal state of this world may be full of so many and strong temptations and of such powerful influence on such a creature as man, dwelling in so infirm a body, &c. that the result of the whole may be a strong and infallible tendency in such a state of things, to the sin and eternal ruin of every one of mankind.

To this I would reply, that such an evasion will not at all avail to the purpose of those whom I oppose in this controversy. It alters not the case as to this question, Whether man, in his present state, is depraved and ruined by propensities to sin. If any creature be of such a nature that it proves evil in its proper place, or in the situation which God has assigned it in the universe, it is of an evil nature. That part of the system is not good, which is not good in its place in the system; and those inherent qualities of that part of the system which are not good, but corrupt, in that place are justly looked upon as evil inher ent qualities. That propensity is truly esteemed to belong to the nature of any being, or to be inherent in it, that is the ne

cessary consequence of its nature, considered together with its proper situation in the universal system of existence; whether that propensity be good or bad. It is the nature of a stone to be heavy; but yet if it were placed, as it might be, at a distance from this world, it would have no such quality. But being a stone is of such a nature, that it will have this quality or tendency in its proper place in this world, where God has made it, it it is properly looked upon as a propensity belonging to its nature. And if it be a good propensity here in its proper place, then it is a good quality of its nature; but if it be contrariwise, it is an evil natural quality. So, if mankind are of such a nature that they have an universal effectual tendency to sin and ruin in this world, where God has made and placed them, this is to be looked upon as a pernicious tendency belonging to their nature. There is perhaps scarce any such thing, in beings not independent and self-existent, as any power or tendency but what has some dependence on other beings, with which they stand connected in the universal system of existence. Propensities are no propensities any otherwise than as taken with their objects. Thus it is with the tendencies observed in natural bodies, such as gravity, magnetism, electricity, &c. And thus it is with the propensities observed in the various kinds of animals: and thus it is with most of the propensities in created spirits.

It may further be observed, that it is exactly the same thing as to the controversy concerning an agreeableness with God's moral perfections of such a disposal of things—that man should come into the world in a depraved and ruined state by a propensity to sin and ruin-whether God has so ordered it, that this propensity should lie in his nature considered alone, or with relation to its situation in the universe, and its connection with other parts of the system to which the Creator has united it; which is as much of God's ordering as man's nature itself, most simply considered.

Dr. T. (p. 188, 189.) speaking of the attempt of some to solve the difficulty of God being the author of our nature and yet that our nature is polluted, by supposing that God makes the soul pure, but unites it to a polluted body, (or a body so made as tends to pollute the soul;) he cries out of it as weak and insufficient, and too gross to be admitted: For, says he, Who infused the soul into the body? And if it is polluted by being infused into the body, Who is the author and cause of its pollution? And who created the body, &c.—But is not the case just the same, as to those who suppose that God made the soul pure, and places it in a polluted world, or a world tending by its natural state in which it is made to pollute the soul, or to have such an influence upon it that it shall without fail be polluted with sin and eternally ruined? Here may not I also cry out, on as good grounds as Dr. T.-Who placed the soul

here in this world? And if the world be polluted, or so constituted as naturally and infallibly to pollute the soul with sin, Who is the cause of this pollution? And, who created the world?

Though in the place now cited, Dr. T. so insists upon it, that God must be answerable for the pollution of the soul, if he has infused or put the soul into a body that tends to pollute it yet this is the very thing which he himself supposes to be fact, with respect to the soul being created by God, in such a body, and in such a world; where he says, "We are apt, in a world full of temptation, to be drawn into sin by bodily appetites." And if so, according to his way of reasoning, God must be the author and cause of this aptness to be drawn into sin. Again, p. 143. we have these words, "Who drinketh in iniquity like water? Who is attended with so many sensual appetites, and so apt to indulge them?" In these words our author in effect says the individual things that he exclaims against as so gross, viz.-The tendency of the body, as God has made it, to pollute the soul which he has infused into it. These sensual appetites which incline the soul or make it apt to a sinful indulgence, are either from the body which God hath made, or otherwise a proneness to sinful indulgence is immediately and originally seated in the soul itself, which will not mend the matter.

I would lastly observe, that our author insists upon it, p. 42, S. that this lower world, in its present state, "Is as it was, when, upon a review, God pronounced it and all its furniture, very good. And that the present form and furniture of the earth is full of God's riches, mercy, and goodness, and of the most evident tokens of his love and bounty to the inhabitants." If so, there can be no room for evading the evidences from facts of the universal infallible tendency of man's nature to sin and eternal perdition; since, on the supposition, the tendency to this issue does not lie in the general constitution and frame of this world, which God hath made to be the habitation of mankind.

SECT. III.

That propensity which has been proved to be in the Nature of all Mankind, must be a very evil, depraved, and pernicious Propensity; making it manifest, that the Soul of Man as it is by Nature, is in a corrupt, fallen, and ruined State; which is the other Part of the Consequence drawn from the Proposition laid down in the first Section.

The question to be considered in order to determine whether man's nature be depraved and ruined, is not, Whether he is inclined to perform as many good deeds as bad ones? But to which of these two he preponderates in the frame of his heart and the state of his nature, a state of innocence and righteousness, and favour with God; or a state of sin, guiltiness, and abhorrence in the sight of God?-Persevering sinless righteousness, or else the guilt of sin, is the alternative on the decision of which depends-according to the nature and truth of things, as they are in themselves, and according to the rule of right and of perfect justice-man being approved and accepted of his Maker and eternally blessed as good; or his being rejected and cursed as bad. And therefore the determination of the tendency of man's heart and nature, with respect to these terms, is that which is to be looked at, in order to determine whether his nature is good or evil, pure or corrupt, sound or ruined. If such be man's nature and the state of his heart, that he has an infallibly effectual propensity to the latter of those terms; then it is wholly impertinent to talk of the innocent and kind actions, even of criminals themselves, surpassing their crimes in numbers, and of the prevailing innocence, good nature, industry, felicity, and cheerfulness of the greater part of mankind. Let never so many thousands or millions of acts of honesty, good nature, &c. be supposed; yet, by the supposition, there is an unfailing propensity to such moral evil as in its dreadful consequences infinitely outweighs all effects or consequences of any supposed good. Surely that tendency which in effect is an infallible tendency to eternal destruction, is an infinitely dreadful and pernicious tendency: And that nature and frame of mind which implies such a tendency, must be an infinitely dreadful and pernicious frame of mind. It would be much more absurd to suppose, that such a state of nature is not bad, under a notion of men doing more honest and kind things than evil ones; than to say the state of that ship is good for crossing the Atlantic Ocean, though such as cannot hold together through the voyage, but will infallibly founder

and sink, under a notion that it may probably go great part of the way before it sinks, or that it will proceed and sail above water more hours than it will be in sinking: Or, to pronounce that road a good road to go to such a place, the greater part of which is plain and safe, though some parts of it are dangerous and certainly fatal to them that travel in it; or to call that a good propensity, which is an inflexible inclination to travel in such a way.

A propensity to that sin which brings God's eternal wrath and curse (which has been proved to belong to the nature of man) is evil, not only as it is calamitous and sorrowful, ending in great natural evil; but as it is odious and detestable; for by the supposition, it tends to that moral evil by which the subject becomes odious in the sight of God, and liable as such, to be condemned, and utterly rejected, and cursed by him. This also makes it evident, that the state which it has been proved mankind are in is a corrupt state in a moral sense, that it is inconsistent with the fulfilment of the law of God, which is the rule of moral rectitude and goodness. That tendency which is opposite to what the moral law requires, and prone to that which the moral law utterly forbids and eternally condemns, is doubtless a corrupt tendency, in a moral sense.

So that this depravity is both odious, and also pernicious, fatal and destructive, in the highest sense; as inevitably tending to that which implies man's eternal ruin. It shews that man, as he is by nature, is in a deplorable state, in the highest sense. And this proves that men do not come into the world perfectly innocent in the sight of God, and without any just exposedness to his displeasure. For the being by nature in a lost and ruined state, in the highest sense, is not consistent with being by nature in a state of favour with God.

But if any should still insist on a notion of men's good deeds exceeding their bad ones, and that, seeing the good more than countervails the evil, they cannot be properly denominated evil; all persons and things being most properly denominated from that which prevails and has the ascendant in them; I would say further, That if there is in man's nature a tendency to guilt and ill desert in a vast overbalance to virtue and merit; or a propensity to sin, the demerit of which is so great, that the value and merit of all the virtuous acts that ever he performs are as nothing to it; then truly the nature of man may be said to be corrupt and evil.

That this is the true case, may be demonstrated by what is evident of the infinite heinousness of sin against God, from the nature of things. The heinousness of this must rise in some proportion to the obligation we are under to regard the Divine Being; and that must be in some proportion to his worthiness of regard; which doubtless is infinitely beyond