Providence from the conftant government of what we call the courfe of Nature; which makes the Epicurean Poet, e when he ridicules Miracles, as fit only to be believed by Jews, affert it, as his fettled opinion, that there is no fuch thing as Divine Providence any way concerned in the effects of Nature, whatever happens, ordinary or extraordinary. But as thofe, who own the world to be governed by the powerful direction of a wife Providence, cannot reasonably deny the poffibility of Miracles, when there is a proper occafion for them; fo neither can they, who believe the moral perfections of the Divine Nature, reasonably suppose Divine Miracles ever to be intended to give countenance to any deceit or falfhood; fince this would as effectually deftroy our natural notions of the Truth and Goodness of God, as denying their poffibility would destroy those of his Power and Wisdom. Upon these confiderations therefore, I think we may justly conclude, that whatever Revelation is attended with fuch miracles, as I have Credat Judæus apella Non ego. Namque Deos didici fecurum agere ævum; Triftes ex alto cœli demittere tecto. Horat. Sat. 5. lib. 1. have before described Divine Miracles to be, muft neceffarily be a Divine Revelation; and that we cannot otherwise be deceived by it, but either by our own negligence, in not fufficiently attending to the terms in which it is delivered, and thereby mistaking its meaning; or by wilfully perverting the fenfe and defign of it through partiality, prejudice, or fome prevailing paffion, contrary to a fincere and unprejudiced love of truth. And I cannot readily think of any objection, to which this way of reafoning, from the Truth of God to the truth of Revelation thus attefted, is liable, but only this, That a perfon, who has once wrought true miracles in the name of God, and thereby gained a just credit to his doctrine, may poffibly afterwards revolt from the truth, and by virtue of that credit and authority, which his former miracles gave him, may teach another doctrine, for which he has no fuch commiffion. And this is a cafe which may be fuppofed poffible, from what St. Paul fays, f Though we (i. e. himself or any other Apostle) or an Angel from heaven, preach any other Gospel unto you, than that ye bave received, let him be accurfed. Now to clear the objection which may be made from hence, concerning the difficulty of difcerning between true and pretended Revelations, there are these two things to be confidered. 1. Though it be supposed, that a person once truly commiffioned by God to declare his will, may poffibly forfake or tranfgrefs the terms of that commiffion, and declare fomething afterwards, which is not the will of God; yet it cannot be conceived agreeable to the Divine goodness and truth, that God fhould fuffer his credentials to continue with him after fuch a defection; that is, it is no way probable, that he should be affifted with the fame power of working miracles, after his revolting from the truth, which was at first given him to confirm it. And to this purpose what our Saviour faid to his disciples, upon occafion of one that caft out devils in his name whom they forbad to do it, because he did not follow them, is very confiderable; 8 Forbid him not, (fays he) for there is no man which shall do a miracle in my name, that can lightly speak evil of me. While this power is continued to him, he cannot readily be my enemy. God can eafily withdraw his creden tials & Mark 9.39, tials from one that begins to make an ill use of them; and he will leave no honeft mind under a neceffity of being deluded by him. But it is alfo to be confidered, 2. That those persons to whom any doctrine is propounded, as a Revelation from God, are supposed both to have a capacity, and to lie under a natural obligation, to make an honeft and diligent use of their own reason and judgment, in diftinguishing between greater and ef s evidence, as well as in difcerning when one doctrine contradicts or differs from another. They are likewise supposed to have the Knowledge of the common principles of natural Religion to go upon, and to act according to thofe principles, that they may not be deceived in admitting any pretended Revelation which contradicts them. therefore suppose they were once convinced, by a plain and unquestionable miracle, that a meffage delivered to them by fuch a perfon, was really a meffage from God, this ought not to make them abfolutely depend upon every other meffage, which the fame perfon might poffibly deliver afterwards, fo far as to receive them all without examining, whether they agreed with that original meffage, for which his credentials were firft given him. E e 4 And For For this would be an unreasonable credulity, which, if not guarded against, might lead to the destruction of all rational faith in Revelation; inasmuch as it would expose a man to the belief of contradictions, as often as a man, that had once a true Revelation, fhould think fit, upon the credit of that, to pretend to another which was not true. And to this purpose there is a remarkable instance, in the old Teftament, of a Prophet punished for too easy a credulity in the pretended Revelation of another prophet, without confidering how far a former certain Revelation made to himself, which it contradicted, was to be attended to in oppofition to it. The cafe was this. h A man of God was fent from Judah, with a prophecy against the altar at Bethel, the truth of which he confirms by an immediate Şign or Miracle, both upon the altar itself, and upon the King, who burnt incense upon it, when he offered violence to him. And the fame Revelation, of which he had this conviction, directed him from God, not to eat or drink in that place, nor to return the fame way that he came, after he had delivered his meffage: This direction he obferved for a time, hi Kings 13. I |