among

the Ancients, that Law (i. e. Law natu ral) is not any human device, ordinance, or de-cree of any people or state, but something Eternal which governs the whole world, a perfect Wif dom in commanding what is fit and forbidding the contrary. So, they faid, that principal and fupreme Law was the Mind of God himself, commanding or prohibiting every thing, according to exact reafon and the nature of things. From whence that Law, which God has given to mankind, derives its juft commendation, it being the very reafon and understanding of one truly wife, which has a natural aptitude to direct what is fit to be enjoined or forbidden. And again he fays, The force or power, of this fupreme Law, is not only of older date than

e

any

aliquod effe populorum, fed æternum quiddam, quod univerfum mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique fapientia. Ita principem legem illam & ultimam, mentem effe dicebant omnia ratione, aut cogentis, aut vetantis Dei: Ex qua illa lex quam Dii humano generi dederunt, rectè eft lauda a: eft enim ratio menfque fapientis ad jubendum & ad deterrendum idonea.

e Quæ vis non modo fenior eft quam ætas populorum & civitatum, fed æqualis illius cœlum atque terras tuentis & regentis Dei: Neque enim effe Mens Divina fine ratione poteft, nec ratio divina non hanc vim in rectis pravifque fanci endis habere.

any people or community of men, but is coaval with God himself, who preferves and governs beaven and earth: For neither can the Divine Mind be otherwife than rational, nor can the Divine Reafon exift without having this power or property of giving a fanction to the difference between Good and Evil. And then observing, that fome particular worthy and unworthy actions there mentioned, were in themselves good or evil, before any written Law defcribing them to be fuch, by virtue of that antecedent, inward and eternal Law of Reason, he adds, that it was Reason, proceeding from the nature of things, prompting to do right and restraining from doing wrong, which did not then commence a Law when it was first put into writing, but when it had its first original: Now it had the fame original with the Divine Mind or Understanding. From whence he makes this conclufion, Wherefore that true and fupreme Law, which has a proper fitnefs

f

f Erat enim ratio profecta à rerum natura, & ad recte faciendum impellens & à delicto avocans: Quæ non tum denique incipit lex effe cum fcripta eft, fed tum cum orta eft; orta autem fimul eft cum mente divina.

Quamobrem lex vera atque princeps, apta ad jubendum & ad vetandum, ratio eft recta fummi Jovis.

fitness to command and forbid, is the right (of perfect) Reason of the Supreme Being h

I have been the more particular in taking notice of this opinion of Tully in the matter before us, not only because he himself lays great ftrefs upon it, and likewise affirms it to be the judgment of the wifeft Heathens before him, in deducing the true nature of Laws from their original: But also because it plainly shews, that those men who now pretend to be Deists, i. e. to believe a God and a Providence over the natural world, and yet imagine, either that he is not way concerned about the nature and confequences of human actions, or that we can have no fuch true notion of his moral Attributes as to argue any thing from them, are not yet advanced fo far in the knowledge of the true grounds, either of Natural Religion or Morality, as Thinking Men among the Heathens were.

And

h And to this purpose there is a large passage out of his 3d Book de Republica, preferved to us by Lactantius (lib. 6. de ve ro cultu, cap. 8.) in which be declares the Eternity and Immutability of this Law, and concludes after this manner : Unufque erit communis quafi magifter, & imperator omnium Deus ille, legis hujus inventor, difceptator, lator: Cu qui non parebit, ipfe fe fugiet ac naturam hominis afpernabitur, atque hoc ipfo luet maximas pœnas, etiamfi cætera fup plicia, quæ putantur, effugerit.

And much less can they have any notion of go verning themselves by fuch a precept as that of our bleffed Saviour in the Gospel, of being perfect as our Heavenly Father is perfect, i unlefs it be firft owned, that we are capable of understanding what the moral Perfections of God, which we fhould endeavour to imitate, fignify, by their being of the same nature with the correspondent perfections in men.

But now, if moral perfections, such as Goodnefs, Juftice and Truth, do neceffarily belong to the Supreme Intelligent Being; and if we can have any true notion of fuch perfections, we may then juftly argue, that God Almighty does always act according to those perfections, especially in his dealings with Rational Creatures, capable of understanding what those perfections mean: And confequently that he confiders the actions of Rational and Free Agents, according to their moral nature, as they are good or evil; that is, as they agree or difagree with the eternal rules of Goodness, Juftice and Truth: And that he respects

· Καθ' ἡμᾶς δ ̓ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή ἐτι ? μακαρίων πάντων, ὥτε καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνθρώπες καὶ Θες διόπερ γίνεας τέλειοι ὡς ὁ πατὴς ἡμῶν ὁ ἐξάνι@ τέλειός ἔτι, διδασκόμεθα, &c. Origen. contra Celf. lib. 4. pag. 180.

respects them accordingly, and will in due time make fuch a proper diftinction between them, as will evidently declare and vindicate his own moral perfections. For if he is the Governor of the whole world, that is, of the Rational as well as Natural world, he will govern it according to these perfections which are inseparable from an infinitely perfect reasonable Being. This is allowed to be a reasonable way of arguing, even by k Cotta the Academic in Tully, in that very discourse where he is endeavouring to render the Stoical arguments, for Providence over Human Affairs, uncertain and ineffectual, But then we must not from hence conclude, that he does not thus govern the world, only because at present we do not fee this difference, which we expect from the nature of moral Good and Evil, entirely and finally made by an im mediate application of confequent Rewards and Punishments, in proportion to the respective behaviour of every Rational or Free Agent. For we must remember, that we cannot fee

the

k Ut enim nec domus, nec refpublica ratione quadam & difciplina defignata videatur fi in ea nec rectè factis præmia exftent ulla, nec fupplicia peccatis, fic mundi divina in homines moderatio profectò nulla eft, fi in ea difcrimen nullum' eft bonorum & malorum. Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 3. cap. 35: