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of them to their feveral ufes; so that there is nothing either of fuperfluity or defect, but every thing properly tending to the prefervation, continuance and propagation of the feveral kinds, through all generations; with a fuitable provifion for all their natural wants and defires, fo that they can and do all rejoice in their beings; which fhews a goodness anfwerable to the power and wisdom of the Author of their being. I was in the last place, confidering Man, the principal inhabitant of this lower part of the world, with whom we have the best opportunity of being most intimately acquainted; and in whom, if we were to confider only the vifible relation which he ftands in to this material world about him, we might fee an infinite wisdom and goodness continually taking care of him: So that, notwithstanding the ancient objection of the Epi-cureans and others, that he is neither fed, nor clothed, nor armed, by nature, in the fame ready manner that fome other creatures are ; yet he has abundantly more, and better use of all these conveniences, than thofe very creatures which are born with them; and by virtue of his natural reason and fuperiority over the other creatures, can easily supply himself, by their means, with whatever he

wants,

wants, in great abundance. Is not the labour of building, and sowing, and planting, and all other manual operations, in which we are also greatly ferved, and much of our pains eased, by the other creatures, abundantly recompenfed by a more commodious way of dwelling, and a more plentiful variety of food and clothing, procured for us, in a way fuitable to our fuperiority over those creatures; and by the exercise of those powers, in which by nature we do excel them? So that what complaints foever some rash and unthinking men may make, of the disadvantages mankind lie under, compared with other creatures, yet, I believe, no man in his wits would deliberately change his condition with any of those brutes, whose happiness he would fometimes be thought fo much to envy. A man that seriously and impartially confiders this matter, would wonder to find, that so stupid, as well as ungrateful a complaint, could ever proceed from men, in other refpects, of good difcernment, fuch as Pliny and some others. I mention Pliny particularly, because (both by his works, and by the account which his nephew gives of him, lib. 3. epift. 5.) he appears to have been a man very studious, and of great industry, and not much addicted to any mere sensual pleaQ4

fure;

fure; and by confequence, one who might have known how to diftinguish better, between the value of thofe rational entertainments, which are by nature fo eminently provided for man above other creatures, and thofe conveniences of mere animal life; which though brutes have without their own care, yet every man may have, in more abundance, by the exercise of fuch a care, as is rather pleasant than uneafy to his reason; which makes fuch a complaint the more unaccountable in him, if it were not, that where men quit the sense of Providence, their reafon alfo often forfakes them. But as for those who are fo far funk into brutality, that they have no notion of any human happiness, but what confifts, either in the mere gratification of their outward fenfes, or a perfect inactivity; fuch a complaint from them is, I confess, the lefs to be wondered at. A perfect idleness feems to be the darling principle of the Epicureans, upon which they deny all providence, because, according to them, no being can be happy that has any thing to do. But as Tully, in the perfon of Cotta, justly ob

Nifi quietum nihil beatum

ferves,

And, Nos autem bea

tam vitam in animi fecuritate & in omnium vacatione mu

nerum

ferves, fuch kind of argument, not only destroys the activity of the Divine nature, but is the ready way to make men idle, and good for nothing b. And unless it be upon this Idle prin"ciple, no man can justly complain, that nature has made better provifion for other creatures than she has for man, even in respect of the mere animal life.

But my defign was not fo much to confider man, in respect of his bodily conveniences, and that outward condition, whereby he is related to the material world, as in refpect of his mind and reason; whereby he is made capable of judging about the rest of the Creation, and of reflecting upon himself and his own actions, and confidering what his own nature is in its best capacity, and whether there be any powers above him, to which he may be likewife related. However, by the way, it may not be improper to take notice of two or three observations, which arise from that rank or order which man bears in the world, in respect of other creatures.

I. That

nerum ponimus. Cic. de N. D. lib. 1. cap. 20. And again, cap. 36. Profectò Epicurus, quafi pueri delicati, nihil ceffa tione melius exiftimat.

b Hæc oratio non modò Deos fpoliat motu & actione divinâ, fed etiam homines inertes efficit, fi quidem agens aliquid, ne Deus quidem effe beatus poteft. lb. cap. 37.

1. That there is a manifeft fubordination of one thing to another, or different degrees of perfection in the several ranks of creatures one above another, till we come to mankind: From whence men have been taught, by the mere light of nature, to conclude, that there is fomething in man more excellent and valuable than in them, which gives him a natural dominion over them; and fignifies, that they were made for his use, and defigned to serve him. This is not merely a notion of the Stoics, though they infist much upon it, as may be feen from Tully and other writers; but is, be fore them, laid down by Aristotle, as an allowed principle, that Plants were made for Animals, and the other Animals for the fake of Man, the tame ones both for use and food, the wild ones, if not all yet, at least the greatest part of them, for food and clothing, and other conveniences; and that therefore,

if

• Η μ εν τοιαύτη κτῆτις ὑπ ̓ αὐτῆς φαίνεται ~ φύσεως διδομένη πᾶσιν, ὥστες και πρώτω γένεσιν αὐθὺς, ὅτω καὶ τελει ωθεῖσι Ὥσε ομοίως δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις οἰητέον, τά τε φυτὰ τ ζώων ἕνεκεν εἶναι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα ἢ ἀνθρώπων χάριν τὰ Η ήμερα, καὶ διὰ ἢ χρῆσιν καὶ διὰ τ' τροφί· ἳ δ' αγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τάγε πλῆςα τ' τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοηθείας ἕνεκεν, ἵνα καὶ ἐπῆς καὶ ἄλλα ὅς[ανα γίνη ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ ὧν ἡ φύσις μηδὲν μήτε ατελὲς ποιεῖς μήτε μάτίω, ανα[καῖον ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι * φύσιν. Arifos, Polit. lib. 1. cap. 8.

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