INASMUCH as that all governments, of whatsoever nature, must be administered by persons selected from the mass, to perform certain duties, supposed to be for the common benefit of the community in which they live, so must those persons be rewarded for the services they render by support, more or less sufficient, ample or munificent, according to the time and talents necessary for their discharge. These persons form always a corps of common interest, which is constantly striving to increase the term of office, make it more secure, and enhance its emoluments at the expense of the people. They are, in fact, from the highest to the lowest, the servants of the people, and as such, occupy positions necessarily beneath the rank of independent freemen, and of right ought to be considered, in accepting office, as having derogated from the rank of an independent republican. They may, it is true, earn distinction by the faithful discharge of their duties, as a head-waiter is respectable when he fulfils his duties, but cannot, fairly, under any circumstances, arrogate to themselves superiority over their employers. In monarchial countries, where the sovereign is the source of all power, and also regarded as the fountain of honor, he appoints persons to rule the people, and delegates to them various gradations of power. The lowest of them, in institutions where the sovereign is the state and the people nobody, is, of course, of rank superior to the people, and is looked up to by them; but the highest is nevertheless lower than the sovereign whom he serves, and from whose hand he receives both office and its perquisites. In a republic, like ours, the reverse of this state of things is supposed to exist. The people are the sovereign, the source of power and the fountain of honor. When a person steps out of their ranks, where he has been engaged in promoting the general welfare, by accumulating individual wealth through his industry and skill in the pursuit of happiness, relinquishes his position and condescends to serve his fellow-citizens, he has not become greater than those whom he serves, but should rank below them in the social scale. One great reason why the offices of government here have been looked to as both honorable and profitable, has been that the principles of our institutions have been imperfectly carried out. Our officers are

theoretically elected by the people, but for the most part these have contented themselves with electing a chief-magistrate, and delegating to him regal authority, in the right to appoint and pay numberless officers to act under him, all of whom look to him as the source of honor and profit, and seek to strengthen his position and supposed rights, in contravention of the free exercise of the popular will. The consequence is, that he centres in himself a patronage which creates in the bosom of the community a political interest antagonistic to that of the people. In proportion as the number and emoluments of these officers holding from the chief-magistrate are more or less considerable, will the government be more or less "centralized," and the means of thwarting or perverting a true expression of the popular will be more efficient. To allow of a great executive patronage is to establish a kind of feudal system. In the earlier stages of that system a successful warrior divided among his armed followers the lands of the conquered, which were held at his pleasure, the occupant being liable to military service when called on. Of precisely the same tenure is the holding of office at the present day. The successful candidate divides the offices among his political followers, who are liable to political service when called on. That incipient stage of feudality was, by the growing power of the incumbents, ultimately perfected into hereditary tenures; and there is no reason why emoluments acquired by the ballot-box should not strengthen the possessors, and enhance their pretensions equally with those acquired by the sword. The advancement of civilization has not changed the desires of mankind, although it may have modified the means by which they are to be gratified. In the countries of Europe under monarchial sway, the patronage of the government has latterly become the most, if not the only efficient means of sustaining the royal authority against the growing encroachments of the people; and this dependence upon patronage increases as the "legitimate," (as it is called in aristocratic parlance,) sway of the sovereign is weakened. Thus in Russia, where the power of the crown is absolute and undisputed, the "centralization" of the executive offices is loose. The under officers are less actively impressed with the vigilance of the appointing power, which has no occasion to make crown dependants feel the necessity of promoting the royalist cause. Hence corruption prevails to a most remarkable degree. The officers are appointed above the people, and not being held strictly accountable, are to the last degree corrupt; justice is notoriously sold to the highest bidder, and the bribes of revenue officers is supposed to exceed the amount collected. In Prussia, a country as destitute of representation as is Russia, the power of the crown is absolute, but it exists among a thinking, intelligent, and industrious people, who hold absolutism on its good behavior; and the administration of the law, as well as most functions of the government, are honestly and faithfully performed-perhaps more so than in any other country of Europe. It is to be remarked, however, that the power of the crown has gradually been surrounded, through ministerial influence, with such checks, as that promotion from nepotism and back-door influence are nearly impossible. Those checks consist in the regulations by which appointments and promotions in all the offices are invariably made. The examination of candidates for promotion is divided into 15 general heads,*

The general heads of examination are as follows: 1 Description_of the individual. 2. Particulars of birth. 3. Education 4. Former public service. 5. Particulars respecting his present service and condition. 6. Particulars respecting property. 7. Particulars respecting family. 8. Mode of life. 9. Physical constitution. 10. Character. 11. Knowledge of the world. 12. Abilities. 13, Accomplishments. 14. Results of his official management. 15. Recommendations.

each of which is subdivided into almost numberless questions, all of which must be satisfactorily answered. It is sometimes the case that the king breaks through these checks, and places a favorite in office in disregard of them. He does this at his peril, however, because the whole official body make common cause against the innovation. The body of officers holding from the king are a means of his strength, but they are also strong in resisting him when he encroaches on their interests. In an absolute government, in a progressive age, this organization of official power is wise; and in a country where there is no free press, is a valuable bulwark against official injustice. In England, all offices are in the gift of the nobility; and until the Reform Bill, without the patronage of a noble, no man of unknown parentage could enter Parliament, or force his way to office, but through the pocket-borough of a peer. Executive patronage was but a system of nepotism, which, from time immemorial, has first provided for all the junior branches of a noble family, and the private secretary and family solicitor following in regular succession. These three enumerated governments are well-established, with well-affected people, present no immediate danger of revolutions. In England, the general system has been preserved from attack by conferring offices and pensions, as well upon all members of the opposition as upon supporters of the ministry. France presents a different state of things. There the sole support of the dynasty and the throne is official patronage. In 1830, revolution placed upon the throne a new king, with a liberal constitution, in accordance with which the country was to be governed. That constitution contained two fatal errors. It did not limit executive patronage, and it did limit the right of suffrage. These errors have entirely neutralized all its wise provisions, and enables the unscrupulous king, the offspring of the revolution, to centralize his power, and through the influence of official patronage, operating upon a limited number of electors, to rule with a sway as absolute as does the autocrat of Russia. France is divided into 86 departments, subdivided into 361 arrondissements, which are again divided into communes, of which the number is 38,096. Each commune has a mayor, and one or more assistants, appointed by the crown in towns of over 3,000 souls, and by the Prefect in smaller places. These mayors are accountable to the sub-Prefect, who presides over the arrondissement, and who, in his turn, is accountable to the Prefect of the department, who reports to the Minister of the Interior. Through this machinery the commands of the minister promptly reach the village mayor, and none dispute them. There is a body called the Municipal Council, elected by communal electors, of whom there are ten of the highest taxes payers for every one hundred inhabitants; but this council has no right to discuss any but strictly local subjects, repairing roads, regulating streets, establishing a school, &c. When it is elected and wishes to meet for any other purpose, it must ask permission of the Prefect, who vetoes their proceedings, and dissolves them as a body at pleasure Formerly they were wont to re-elect those dissolved by the government, but eight months after the installation of Louis Phillipe, a law was passed authorizing the king to suspend the municipal election altogether. The power of the crown is thus direct and certain to the heart of the smallest villages. It is, however, by a judicious combination of government patronage, with the right of suffrage, that the power of the crown is supported. After the peace of 1815, the Government of the Restoration were to meet a people on one hand who demanded representative government, and a Holy Alliance on the other, which having replaced the Bourbons on the throne, had denounced all representative government. The object then was to create a show of representation which should be entirely within the control of the

court. It was discovered, that if by making it necessary to become a representative or a deputy, the candidate should be required to pay 1,000 francs taxes per annum, and be above forty years of age, the number of persons in France qualified to be elected would be reduced to 15,000; and further, by making a direct tax of 300 francs per annum, and thirty years of age the qualification for the right of suffrage, the number of votes would be under 80,000, and much under the number of offices at the disposal of the government. This plan worked well for some time, but toleration gained ground, and in 1826, Villèle proposed to add to the 80,000 electors the unpaid functionaries appointed by the king, notaries, attornies, doctors, and licentiates, &c., which swelled the government influence in the elections. When the revolution of July took place, the extension of the right of suffrage was supposed to be accomplished; but as the royalists were declared "the incapables," because with 500,000 offices at their disposal they could manage 80,000 electors, the new dynasty did not mean to earn the same title. The new king fully understood the power of corruption. Lafitte was the minister, and the resources at the disposal of the crown were 931,997 officials; of these 376,487 are paid $60,000,000 per annum, the remainder, pensions, &c., amounting to $15,000,000 per annum. The paid offices are about 500,000; with these it was easy to manage 80,000 electors. But the people, who had just placed the king on the throne, demanded reform, and the minister therefore proposed to reduce electoral qualifications from 300 to 200 francs taxes, and from 30 to 25 years, and those of a deputy from 1000 to 500 francs tax. This would have increased the number of electors to so much in proportion to the offices that the government majority could not be insured at the election, and this reform would still fall miserably short of popular expectation. Consequently, an old expedient was resorted to. The question of suffrage was referred to a committee, of whom Bérenger was head; this commission was not proof against the influence of the crown, and they reported 250 francs and 30 years as the qualifications of the electors. The ministry insisted upon 200 francs and 25 years; and thus, while actually cheating the people out of the extended suffrage, for which they had overthrown one dynasty and put up another, the ministry got credit for striving for the rights of the people. Under this law, out of 35,000,000 people, less than 200,000 enjoy the elective rights. It is to be remarked, however, that although the government has the power of buying all, it never buys more than a safe majority; and the impotent minority is pointed at as a proof that the government is not corrupt. Two hundred and thirty members form the absolute majority of the deputies, and 260 would be enough to buy. The court likes to be safe, and requires 300 out of 459. The total number of electors in 350 poor arrondissements is at most 100,000. Sixty thousand offices out of 500,000, at the disposal of the minister, gives him a majority of 20,000 votes in the electoral colleges, which he attains at an expenditure of but a small part of his resources. It is ascertained that at this moment more than two-thirds of the electors of France are directly dependent upon government for places. The deputies returned by these electors are not a very dangerous class to the government; very many of them possess scarcely more than the required qualifications, say $900 income per annum. On this they cannot live in Paris, and therefore carry on a traffic for government plunder. To these men the railway marria has been a vastly profitable operation, inasmuch as they receive a certain number of shares for their votes. Many also charge from $200 to $300 for appointments obtained through their influence. The late expose of the government corruption and consequent suicide of a minister, is but an instance of the existing state of

things. The civil offices in France, amounting, as before stated, to 931,997 official personages dependent on the government, of whom 376,457 are paid, receiving 314,726,000 francs, ($62,000,000,) 13,660 unemployed officers receiving annuities, &c., to the amount of 9,638,000 francs, ($200,000,) and 104,460 pensioners, &c., receiving 72,967,000 francs, ($15,000,000,) form but one of three branches of the government patronage; a standing army of 400,000 men, the officers being appointed by the government, in addition to 70,000 retired on pensions, amounting to $8,000,000 per annum, is a second branch; a third is composed of the national debt, amounting to $78,000,000 per annum interest, all the recipients of which are adherents of the government, which has also taken possession of the savings banks, under pretence of "security," which means to secure the small depositors in the interests of the government. The government is also the general pawnbroker, and has sole control of all the hospitals and the attending surgeons.

This centralization, through government patronage, has destroyed the liberties of the French citizen. M. Guizot on a late occasion, as minister of the crown, made a brilliant speech upon the question of government corruption. He denied that corruption, properly speaking, exists at all, maintaining, that in the natural order of things, where the interests of certain classes and those of the government were the same, corruption could not be charged upon them for pursuing those interests. He admitted, that in some degree, the power of expenditure which the government possessed, attracted to its support all those who, under the limitations of the laws, possessed the faculty of political activity, a very small class in France. The same class in Great Britain is somewhat larger, there being about 800,000 entitled to vote, while the amount annually expended by the government is much less in proportion; that is to say, in Great Britain the annual expenditure, exclusive of the debt, is $95,000,000, and in France $75,000,000. In Great Britain, however, a powerful, wealthy and influential landed aristocracy holds a large portion of that patronage, which in France depends directly on the crown. The general interests of both crown and aristocracy in England are the same in respect to the people, on whose rights they are continually seeking to encroach.

In the United States universal suffrage has alone protected our institutions from the injurious influence of executive patronage, the interests of which has, nevertheless, at times been felt to be utterly incompatible with the free exercise of the elective franchise. The great fault of the French constitution of 1830, and which has destroyed its efficacy, was the fact that the patronage of the government bore too great a proportion to the right of suffrage. The glorious constitution of the United States committed the error of throwing into the hands of the Federal Government by far too great an amount of patronage; and had the various attempts which have been made to limit the right of suffrage been successful, there is but little doubt but at this time our institutions, would have been so centralized, that the line of states' sovereignty would have become so indistinct as scarcely to have been distinguishable. The amount of patronage in the hands of the Federal Government is by far too great not to jeopardize the purity of the elective franchise, and the patronage seems now to be in process of rapid extension; while a recent administration has afforded an example to what an extent its corrupting influence may be carried at the polls. The number and emoluments of the Federal employees, it is true, bears no proportion to those of the European countries we have cited, but is nevertheless too large for the public good; including the postoffice department, the number is about 35,000. The following will show