existence of a great First Cause, sufficiently wise and powerful to produce all these effects. In order therefore, to be consistent, the skeptic should either contend with some visionary philosophers, that there is no such thing as matter, or a material universe in existence, because his reason cannot point out the manner in which they exist; or else admit that God may make a revelation of an existence to man hereafter, and of circumstances attending that existence which are above the comprehension of his reason.

In order that the subject may be clearly understood, let us inquire in the first place, what is reason? In answering this question, it will not, I presume, be considered improper to introduce the definition given of it by the learned Mr. Locke. He says it is 'that faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts, and wherein it is evident he surpasses them.' Reason, in its operations is fourfold. "The first and highest degree of it is the discovering and finding out of truths; the second, the regular and methodical disposition of them; the third is, the perceiving their connexion; and the fourth, making a right conclusion from them.' The first and great object of reason is to discover truth. This it attempts to accomplish by a careful examination and comparison of things and principles which are known to exist,-by following causes to the various effects which they are capable of producing; or by searching out those causes from the effects which obviously have been produced. In this manner maný important and useful truths are brought to light;

many of the operations and phenomena of nature are discovered and satisfactorily explained; and in this manner we are enabled to 'look through nature, up to nature's God.' But there is a point beyond which human reason cannot go; and although it teaches us that there must be an infinite First Cause of all things, yet it can tell us nothing of his character, or of his purpose in giving us existence. There are other important and interesting questions which it cannot solve; whether we shall exist beyond the grave; and if so, what will be our constitutions in eternity, are inquiries beyond its reach. Hence, in order to answer these questions satisfactorily, revelation becomes indispensable. But how are we to satisfy ourselves that such a revelation has been given us? Or admitting it has been given, how are we to ascertain the truths it contains, but by the aid of reason? In short, why are the Holy scriptures any more a revalation to man than the beasts of the field, if it be not on the ground that man is capable by his reason of understanding them?

We may now notice the connexion subsisting between reason and revelation; and also the proper office of reason in the concerns of religion. Revelation is addressed to reasonable beings; its principles and requirements are all reasonable; and it is only through the medium of reason, that we are convinced the scriptures contain a revelation from God to man. Hence, as the justly celebrated writer already mentioned observes, Reason is natural revelation, whereby the Eternal Father of light, and fountain of

existence of a great First Cause, sufficiently wise and powerful to produce all these effects. In order therefore, to be consistent, the skeptic should either contend with some visionary philosophers, that there is no such thing as matter, or a material universe in existence, because his reason cannot point out the manner in which they exist; or else admit that God may make a revelation of an existence to man hereafter, and of circumstances attending that existence which are above the comprehension of his reason.

6

In order that the subject may be clearly understood, let us inquire in the first place, what is reason? In answering this question, it will not, I presume, be considered improper to introduce the definition given of it by the learned Mr. Locke. He says it is 'that faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts, and wherein it is evident he surpasses them.' Reason, in its operations is fourfold. The first and highest degree of it is the discovering and finding out of truths; the second, the regular and methodical disposition of them; the third is, the perceiving their connexion; and the fourth, making a right conclusion from them.' The first and great object of reason is to discover truth. This it attempts to accomplish by a careful examination and comparison of things and principles which are known to exist,-by following causes to the various effects which they are capable of producing; or by searching out those causes from the effects which obviously have been produced. In this manner many important and useful truths are brought to light;

many of the operations and phenomena of nature are discovered and satisfactorily explained; and in this manner we are enabled to 'look through nature, up to nature's God.' But there is a point beyond which human reason cannot go; and although it teaches us that there must be an infinite First Cause of all things, yet it can tell us nothing of his character, or of his purpose in giving us existence. There are other important and interesting questions which it cannot solve; whether we shall exist beyond the grave; and if so, what will be our constitutions in eternity, are inquiries beyond its reach. Hence, in order to answer these questions satisfactorily, revelation becomes indispensable. But how are we to satisfy ourselves that such a revelation has been given us? Or admitting it has been given, how are we to ascertain the truths it contains, but by the aid of reason? In short, why are the Holy scriptures any more a revalation to man than the beasts of the field, if it be not on the ground that man is capable by his reason of understanding them?

We may now notice the connexion subsisting between reason and revelation; and also the proper office of reason in the concerns of religion. Revelation is addressed to reasonable beings; its principles and requirements are all reasonable; and it is only through the medium of reason, that we are convinced the scriptures contain a revelation from God to man. Hencé, as the justly celebrated writer already mentioned observes, Reason is natural revelation, whereby the Eternal Father of light, and fountain of

all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties; revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries 'communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives that they came from God. So that he who takes away reason, to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both; and "does much the same, as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the light of an invisible star by a telescope.'

Our senses are the inlets of all our knowledge. By them we discover the existence of objects without ourselves. But it is reason which arranges these objects with regularity in our minds, and perfects that which was only begun by the operation's of sense. Hence every thing which is placed by our bountiful Creator within the scope of human ability is seized upon by the senses, and converted to useful purposes by the instrumentality of reason. There are some truths so plain and obvious, either to our powers 'of perception, or faculties of judgment, that we can no more doubt them than we can our own existence; and consequently we can never admit as true, any principle which contradicts, or denies them. Of this sort are those propositions which assert that no effect can exist without a cause adequate to its production-that no organization can exist without an organizer--that there can be no law, either moral or physical, without a lawgiver; and that no effect can possibly exceed its cause. From these clear and